TURKISH READOUT OF ARPAKAN-FRENCH CONSULTATIONS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005610

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH READOUT OF ARPAKAN-FRENCH CONSULTATIONS ON
EU ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS

REF: PARIS 5528 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) Summary: Turkish Deputy Under Secretary Apakan's
August 17 and 18 discussions with officials in FM
Douste-Blazy's and PM de Villepin's cabinets provided no new
clarity on French motives and intentions. The French
rehearsed familiar arguments about the need to take French
public opinion into account following the failed May 29
referendum, while insisting that they did not intend to be an
obstacle to the beginning of accession negotiations with
Turkey on October 3. Most telling was a "personal" request,
rebuffed by Apakan, that Turkey issue a clarification that
the French could use as a fig leaf presumably to allow it to
draw back from the brink. So far the French have indicated
no clear intention to do so. But even if they are looking
for a way out, a question remains as to what France would
need -- on Cyprus or other issues -- in order to back away
from their current position. The French continued to
indicate that French policy has not yet been fixed, pending
exchanges with other EU partners at the August 31 Coreper and
September 1-2 informal ministerial. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Pol deputy met August 19 with Turkish Counselor
Bashkan Oz (or Oez) to obtain a readout of Turkish MFA Deputy
Under Secretary for Cyprus Ertugrul Apakan's August 17 and 18
consultations with FM Douste-Blazy's chef de cabinet Pierre
Vimont and PM de Villepin's diplomatic advisor Christophe
Farnaud. (Farnaud declined to respond to an inquiry from POL
M/C.)


3. (C) Oz said that Apakan's formal mission was to provide
an explanation of Turkish thinking behind its July 29
statement on the enlargement protocol, but he dismissed
French claims that the statement had created a "new" element
that needed to be taken into consideration. The Turkish MFA
had consulted closely with international lawyers in
elaborating the statement to ensure it would not invalidate
the protocol. Moreover, negotiations in the run-up to the
December 2004 summit had made clear that "both sides would
clarify their positions" on the Cyprus question; this, in
fact, had formed the legal basis for the Turkish declaration.
French objections to Turkish references to "partnership" on
Cyprus were unfounded, as similar language was to be found in
the Annan plan. Similarly, the French lamely cited
unspecified translation problems with the Turkish statement
from English into French, which was not credible given PM de
Villepin's diplomatic experience.


4. (C) Oz claimed that Vimont and Farnaud had made it clear
that the French position was motivated largely by the need to
take into account the results of the failed May 29 referendum
on the EU constitutional treaty. It was necessary to proceed
slowly on all EU-related issues, including enlargement.
While France had no desire to create obstacles for the
beginning of accession negotiations, it needed to satisfy
public opinion. Oz was explicit that neither Vimont nor
Farnaud suggested that French statements to date should be
equated with new preconditions. The Turks were told that
France had not yet defined its position, and that this would
be done only after consultation with other EU partners. The
French had inquired about Turkish soundings in other European
capitals.


5. (C) Asked whether the French had had any ideas for
overcoming the current impasse, Oz said they had asked "on a
personal basis only" whether Turkey would be prepared to make
a new statement clarifying its June 29 declaration. Oz said
this would not be possible, given domestic political
sensitivities in Turkey. Oz said Arpakan had referred the
French to Turkey's June 1 letter to the UN SYG Annan on
Cyprus. Pol deputy asked whether Turkey would be prepared to
state simply that its June 29 unilateral statement on the
customs union protocol should be interpreted in light of the
earlier letter to the UN explaining its willingness to allow
free movement of goods and services and open sea and air
ports. This would not be possible, he said, given that
ratification of the customs union extension, scheduled for
October 4, was already facing considerable opposition in
parliament.


6. (C) Pol deputy noted that the U.S. hoped the
negotiations would begin as planned on October 3 and was
considering ways to approach EU members. Oz stressed the
importance of beginning accession negotiations, stressing
their importance in promoting reform. Whether they
eventually ended in EU membership was not a question that
either side needed to resolve at the moment. Turkey
understood that it would need to recognize Cyprus before any
eventual accession. But if pushed if to choose between the
EU and Cyprus too soon, it would have to choose the latter.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) As we have noted before, it appears that the French
will not define their position until after the August 31
Coreper and September 1-2 Gymnich meetings. Even assuming
that the French hope to climb down from their demands,
however, it remains unclear how this can be accomplished in a
face-saving way, given the apparent weakness of their
position. The way out could lie in the last para of the
French non-paper, which demands that Turkey clearly express
its intention to recognize each one of the EU member states.
Perhaps the Turks could be persuaded to work with this idea,
although the French informal suggestion that the Turks make
an additional statement was reportedly dismissed as a
non-starter for the Turks. Another option could be to seek a
strengthening of the EU anti-statement or additional
conditionality in the negotiating framework. Our British
colleague speculated August 18 that France may want to wait
until CDU leader Angela Merkel takes over as Chancellor in
Germany (assuming that occurs) before softening in order to
ensure continuity of follow-up. Christian Heldt, the German
advisor on Franco-German relations in the FM's cabinet, told
Pol M/C today, however, that the French may have
misinterpreted Merkel's calls for a privileged partnership
with Turkey as willingness to delay the opening of
negotiations. Our British colleague speculated that France
might be looking for a quid pro quo in other areas, for
example UK agreement to abandon its proposed mid-term review
of EU financing.
Hofmann