PM SHARON VISIT HERALDS SYMBOLIC UPTURN IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 005263

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2015
TAGS: PREL IS KPAL SY IR PTER PARM FR
SUBJECT: PM SHARON VISIT HERALDS SYMBOLIC UPTURN IN
FRENCH-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary and comment: Israeli PM Sharon's successful
July 26-29 visit to France was marked by warm atmospherics
and ostentatious emphasis on improving bilateral relations
from both sides, with many French media outlets heralding a
new "honeymoon" in French-Israeli relations. The GoF, in
welcoming Sharon to Paris, stressed its support for Gaza
disengagement, commitment to fighting anti-Semitism, and
longtime friendship and "shared values" with Israel, while
reiterating support for the roadmap and an independent
Palestinian state. Sharon, for his part, paid effusive
public tributes to Chirac, invited him to Israel, and
stressed GoF-GoI agreement on issues like Syria and Iran.
French MFA contacts described the visit as a success in
largely symbolic terms, with both sides seeking to highlight
the positive and not dwell on areas of disagreement, while
not shifting from established positions. That said, the GoF
appears to have recalibrated its public message on Gaza
disengagement more in line with the U.S. focus on making
disengagement a success, while highlighting the roadmap as
offering a political perspective to Palestinians. The main
topics of Sharon's discussions with Chirac and other senior
French officials were Gaza disengagement, Syria/Lebanon, and
Iran/EU-3 negotiations, with the MFA reporting a particular
convergence of views on the latter two topics. Quai contacts
told us they were struck particularly by Chirac's toughness
on Syria, and noted that the GoF opted to raise what happens
post-Gaza disengagement during the PM Villepin-Sharon
discussion only. The sole deliverable from the visit was the
GoF-proposed creation of a new France-Israel foundation,
which will seek to improve Israel's public image in France,
and vice-versa. End summary and comment.


2. (SBU) At the invitation of President Chirac, Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited France July 26 through
July 29, his first visit to France since 2001. On July 27,
Sharon had a working lunch with Chirac and had a separate
meeting and working dinner with PM de Villepin; on July 28,
he met with French FM Douste-Blazy and attended cultural
events with French Jewish community groups. The
two-hour-plus Chirac-Sharon meeting, which focused on
bilateral ties and regional issues, was marked by
exceptionally positive atmospherics. In public remarks,
Sharon called Chirac "one of the world's great leaders,"
hailed French firmness on the Syria/Lebanon and Iran/EU-3
dossiers, and invited the French president to visit his ranch
in the Negev. (MFA contacts confirmed that Chirac accepted
the offer, and spontaneously offered to donate a French cow
to Sharon's ranch, with cattle being an additional
ice-breaking topic between the two leaders.) Chirac publicly
offered Sharon "the warmest of welcomes" and applauded the
Gaza disengagement plan as a "historic decision," reiterating
that France would be side-by-side with the Israeli and
Palestinian people in helping to relaunch the roadmap. PM de
Villepin went further in projecting the image of a balanced
French Middle East policy, declaring that, "France, with its
unrelenting support for a balanced solution, will always be
side-by-side with Israel, and all partisans for peace...
France and Israel have the same passion for democracy and for
liberty...on the basis of these shared values, it is up to us
to continue and enrich our dialogue..." French media coverage
of the visit was generally positive, with multiple references
to a new "honeymoon" in French-Israeli relations after
decades of strains, notwithstanding continuing bilateral
differences on key issues like West Bank settlements and the
security barrier.

GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, HAMAS
--------------


3. (C) We received a brief readout of the Sharon-Chirac
meeting from Diplomatic Advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne,
and a more detailed briefing on the discussion topics from
MFA Israel desk officer Etienne Chapon. Gourdault-Montagne
characterized Chirac's talks with Sharon as highly positive,
especially given that the visit was a delicate one for the
GOF. Gourdault-Montagne added that Chirac had asked Sharon
whether the Palestinians had an interest in sabotaging Gaza
disengagement, to which the Israeli PM replied that he didn't
know, but would implement the plan regardless. Chapon noted
that although the Israeli PM, during his bilateral
discussions, entered into less detail than the GoF had hoped
on his plans for Gaza disengagement, Sharon left no doubt on
the French side of his determination to implement the plan.
Chapon said the GoF "got the message" from the U.S. on the
need to focus on making Gaza disengagement a success, and
took this line with Sharon; the planned Douste-Blazy visit to
Israel and the Occupied Territories September 4-6 would be
made in a similar spirit. Chapon added that the GoF chose to
raise the issue of what happens "after Gaza withdrawal"
during the Villepin-Sharon meeting only, as Chirac had wanted
to avoid contention in his meeting with the Israeli PM.
Chapon conceded that some in the GoF had worried whether
Villepin, known for his passion on the Israeli-Palestinian
issue, would press the point too harshly, but in the end, the
PM handled the issue diplomatically. Sharon's response to
Villepin was to note that we were still in a prelude to the
roadmap, for which implementation was contingent on a
complete halt to terrorism, confiscation of weapons,
dismantlement of terrorist groups, and an end to incitement
of hatred towards Israel. Chapon commented that the last
condition listed by Sharon was new, and suggested a
maximalist, hard-line approach on roadmap implementation.


4. (C) On Hamas, Chapon reported that Chirac defused the
issue by reiterating its status as a "terrorist organization"
during his discussion with Sharon and making clear that the
GoF had no intention of talking to Hamas. Sharon, for his
part, observed that PA President Abbas had committed a grave
error in seeking accommodation with Hamas, which had been
borne out by recent clashes between the two sides. Chapon
added that FM Douste-Blazy took a more nuanced line with
Sharon on Hamas; rather than stressing its status as a
terrorist group, he pointed to the need to undermine Hamas'
popular appeal by giving full support to the PA.

SYRIA/LEBANON, HIZBALLAH
--------------


5. (C) Chapon described Syria/Lebanon and Iran/EU-3
negotiations as "honeymoon" topics between Chirac and Sharon,
but noted that both sides stuck to generalities. Chapon
stressed that Chirac and Sharon discussed Syria from the
Lebanon angle, and agreed on the need to keep pressure on
Damascus, while not addressing any new initiatives. Sharon
commended Chirac for his cooperation with the U.S. on UNSCR
1559, and stressed the importance of full implementation.
According to Chapon, Sharon described Hizballah as an
"existential menace" to Israel, but did not appeal for
Hizballah disarmament, nor did he ask the EU to list
Hizballah as a terrorist organization -- two omissions which
took the GoF by surprise. Chapon speculated that Hizballah
was a case in which Israeli/French differences were
well-established and perhaps not worth pressing during
meetings intended to mend fences. He added that Chirac
helped defuse the issue by stressing that the GoF was sending
very firm messages to Iran to push Hizballah to moderate its
behavior. Chirac also advised Sharon that it was Syria, not
Iran, that was offering the bulk of external support to
Hizballah; therefore external pressure should remain focused
on Damascus. Chapon concluded that he and other MFA contacts
were struck by the toughness of Chirac's message on Syria,
which he dismissed as a "bad regime" which understands no one
and does nothing to change its behavior. Chapon confirmed
that Sharon raised concerns on Syria's support for
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to which Chirac assented.

IRAN/EU-3
--------------


6. (C) Chapon reported that the Israeli PM thanked Chirac for
the GoF's efforts to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons
and for keeping Israel informed of the progress of EU-3
negotiations. Sharon also reportedly described the EU-3
effort as the best possible option to contain Iran's nuclear
ambitions. Describing divisions between the Iranian regime
and its young people, civil society, and female population,
however, he argued that threats of UNSC sanctions were an
effective form of pressure on the regime. According to
Chapon, Chirac stressed that the GoF would be firm and make
no concessions to Iran on the nuclear issue, and was working
to maintain the best possible coordination on the issue with
Washington and Moscow. Chirac explained that the EU-3 would
seek to make a serious and credible offer to Iran in order to
put the onus on the Iranian side to respond. If the Iranians
failed to meet their obligations, Chirac stressed that the
GoF was ready to take the issue to the UNSC. Chapon added
that Sharon maintained a relatively moderate line on Iran and
did not into enter details, for instance, on Israeli analysis
of the progress of the Iranian nuclear program.

FRANCE-ISRAEL FOUNDATION
--------------


7. (SBU) Chapon and Israeli embassy contacts described the
proposed founding of a new France-Israel foundation as the
sole concrete result from the Sharon visit. Chapon
explained that the GoF-proposed foundation will be an unusual
public-private partnership, with a 1:7 ratio between
government and private sector financing, the latter coming
mainly from the French Jewish community. The purpose of the
foundation will be to improve the public image of Israel in
France, and vice-versa, through high-profile public diplomacy
initiatives, in contrast to the very low-key France-Israel
technical commission in operation since 2003. Initial
efforts will focus on student exchanges, expanded civil
society contact, and organizing a France-Israel cultural week
in 2006, which will mark the formal launch of the foundation
and the opening of a new French cultural center in Tel Aviv.
Chapon added that the bilateral public diplomacy efforts had
already started before the Sharon visit, with coordinated
interviews by Chirac and Sharon appearing in the French and
Israeli press last week.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) The Sharon visit culminates a GoF effort launched
nearly three years ago (under then-FM Villepin) to improve
its long-troubled bilateral relations with Israel, and was a
resounding success in overcoming the GoF's particular
psychological baggage with respect to Sharon. Though Chirac
and Sharon are not new best friends, their convergence on
such varied issues as anti-Semitism, Syria, Iran, and cows is
striking, especially for two dinosaurs of international
politics. The visit offered the GoF the chance to offer
Sharon a symbolic boost before Gaza disengagement begins, but
was also timed, Quai contacts tell us, to avoid generating
domestic controversy, with most of the French public already
in vacation mode by late July. We do not see the GoF using
the Sharon visit as way to seek a more high-profile role in
peace efforts at the expense of the U.S., as some local media
analysts have speculated. For now, the GoF appears to have
recalibrated its public message on Gaza disengagement in line
with that of the U.S.: focus on making disengagement a
success, and highlight the roadmap as offering a political
perspective to the Palestinians. End comment.




STAPLETON