NEA/PI DIRECTOR ROMANOWSKI PROMOTES GREATER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 005143

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2015
TAGS: PREL KDEM PHUM EAID XF FR KMEPI
SUBJECT: NEA/PI DIRECTOR ROMANOWSKI PROMOTES GREATER
COOPERATION ON MIDDLE EAST REFORM DURING PARIS VISIT

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: NEA/PI Director Alina Romanowski stressed the
need for greater complementarity and information sharing
between U.S. and French efforts to promote reform in the
Broader Middle East, during a July 18-20 visit to Paris.
French officials were receptive to Romanowski's emphasis on
complementarity, and reaffirmed GoF intent to concentrate on
revitalizing the Barcelona Process vice BMENA initiatives.
French officials also described positive shifts in the GoF
approach to regional reform, with increased emphasis on good
governance, though the GoF continues to favor cooperation
with governments over civil society. French development
officials were particularly candid in assessing shortcomings
in the Barcelona Process, difficulties in implementing French
assistance programs, and lack of GoF political will at the
highest levels to push Arab governments toward reform. In a
sign of increased French willingness to engage positively on
reform issues, Romanowski was invited to address an
MFA-sponsored annual conference on international development,
serving alongside senior UNDP, EU, and GoF representatives in
a panel discussion on reform efforts in the Middle East/North
Africa. End summary.

DISCUSSION WITH MFA NEA A/S-EQUIVALENT THIBAULT
-------------- --


2. (C) During a July 18 meeting, MFA Director
(A/S-equivalent) for North Africa/Middle East Jean-Francois
Thibault agreed with Romanowski that the U.S. and EU shared
common objectives in promoting reform in the region and that
we should seek to make our mutual efforts more complementary.
At the same time, Thibault stressed the need to preserve the
independence of EU initiatives, as Europe had a special
strategic relationship with the region. Romanowski reassured
Thibault that the U.S. had no desire to take over EU
initiatives and that we wanted to keep our reform efforts
separate and complementary. Thibault agreed that better
transparency and information could help identify gaps or
redundancies between U.S. and European efforts. At the same
time, he observed that the GoF hoped to convince the U.S.
that its approach was right in focusing more on governments
than civil society.


3. (C) Romanowski, Thibault, and MFA action officer for BMENA
issues Brigitte Curmi compared notes on U.S. and French
approaches on education, particularly in the Maghreb.
Thibault noted that some 40 percent of French development aid
in the North Africa/Middle East region was devoted to
education, with spending concentrated on Morocco, Algeria,
and Tunisia. Algeria had made disastrous mistakes in
dismantling its French-Arabic bilingual education system in
the 1970's, to the extent that students spoke neither
language well. Morocco had similar challenges, with a high
illiteracy rate and a government education policy in relative
disarray. During a recent visit by French FM Douste-Blazy to
Rabat, the GOM had appealed to the GoF to expand French
government schools in Morocco, from a current enrollment of
some 15,000 to up to 30,000. Thibault complained that the
GoF did not want to substitute for the GOM in educating
Moroccans. Curmi added that the GoF's education assistance
to Morocco was concentrated on basic education, and training
teachers and public administrators. Unlike the U.S., GoF
education assistance was not focused on curriculum reform or
assistance to civil society or NGOs; the GoF was trying to
win the confidence of those who set education policy to help
foster improvements in basic education as a whole. Curmi
concluded that the GoF and USG efforts in Morocco
complemented each other well.


4. (C) In a brief exchange on democratization, Thibault
cautioned against opening the Pandora's box of political
Islam, particularly in Egypt. Thibault described regional
governments as vehement in their insistence that moderate
Islamists do not exist. He observed personally that
Islamists were not a monolith, and that it may not be
impossible to engage with those who share basic democratic
values. Romanowski also updated Thibault on U.S. plans to
move forward on initiatives to establish a regional
Foundation and Fund for the Future; Thibault said the GoF
would not oppose the Foundation or Fund initiatives, but
noted that France's initial reservations about the foundation
proposal when it was first floated in 2004 remained
unchanged. The GoF preferred to concentrate on new EU
initiatives such as the Alexandria-based Anna Lindh
Foundation and a new platform to promote Euro-Mediterranean
NGO cooperation, based in Paris. Thibault and Curmi agreed
with Romanowski that it would be useful to share analyses on
NGOs in the region to determine which ones were worthy of
support.

DISCUSSION WITH COOPERATION/GOVERNANCE OFFICIAL
-------------- --


5. (C) Herve Magrot, head of the MFA Directorate-General on
International Cooperation (DGCID) Office on Governance,
offered Romanowski a candid assessment of the GoF approach on
reform issues during a wide-ranging discussion July 19.
Magrot described the recent renaming of his office, from
"institutional cooperation" to "governance," as a major
positive shift. (Magrot quipped that in an earlier posting
at the French UN mission in Geneva, he was regularly
instructed to oppose references to "good governance" in CHR
texts.) According to Magrot, the new GoF emphasis on
governance resulted largely from DGCID discussions with NGOs,
who complained that France was doing too much state-to-state
cooperation. DGCID governance efforts focused on three main
areas: financial governance, rule of law, and modernization
of the state, to include improving administration and
decentralization. While sub-Saharan Africa remained the
largest recipient of DGCID governance funds, the Middle
East/North Africa region had significant needs as well, and
received some 5.6 million euros for governance in 2004.
According to Magrot, the problem with NEA countries,
especially those in the Maghreb, was that they were too close
to France, which made it more difficult to establish
strategic priorities. In the case of the Maghreb, the
proliferation of cooperation initiatives by multiple GoF
ministries created additional difficulties in prioritizing
aid.


6. (C) Magrot reported that the top five recipients of French
assistance in the NEA region remained (in descending order)
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon. (Note: These
five countries received 91 percent of French development aid
for the NEA region in 2003. End note.) Magrot observed that
the GoF was trying to increase its governance activities in
the Gulf region as well, and cited a DGCID-sponsored
conference on justice in Qatar in October 2004. With the
vast majority of DGCID funding determined by embassies in the
field, Magrot stressed the importance of increased dialogue
between U.S. and French missions on the ground, in order to
better target our mutual assistance programs and reduce
redundancies. Magrot cited the cooperation between French
and U.S. ambassadors in Lebanon as a model to follow, though
it remained the exception to the rule. Protectiveness over
French language programs and commercial competition often led
French diplomats in the field to eschew closer cooperation
with U.S. counterparts. Magrot suggested that the U.S.
consider sending more French diplomats on exchange programs
in the U.S. in order to overcome ignorance or mistrust of the
U.S. (Note: Magrot spent a tour in Washington as the NEA
watcher at the French embassy in the 1990's. End note.)
Romanowski suggested that the Marshall fellowship and NDU
NESA program could be of possible interest to French
diplomats.


7. (C) According to Magrot, the most significant difference
between the U.S. and French approaches on reform was the
French emphasis on working with governments over civil
society. Though the GoF did some work with civil society,
its overwhelming focus remained on how to help Arab
governments function better, which did not mean bigger
government. Like his MFA colleagues, Magrot concluded that
the U.S. and French efforts were highly complementary.
Unlike his MFA colleagues, however, Magrot conceded that
another difference between the U.S. and French approaches was
the disconnect between assistance and political leverage in
France. While the GoF had the technical capacity to offer
governance assistance, it lacked the political will to push
Arab governments to make implementation of such programs
successful. For instance, the GoF had spent a lot training
Egyptian journalists, but the lack of press freedoms in Egypt
made it difficult for the journalists to use their new skills
in a meaningful way. Since the U.S. had the political will
to pressure Arab governments, Magrot suggested that the U.S.
should devote more effort to working with governments, and
not bypass governments in favor of civil society. Another
disappointment cited by Magrot was Syria, where the GoF had
launched one of its largest governance programs in the
region, based on an earlier personal request from President
Asad to Chirac to help Syria modernize its administration,
judiciary, finance, and political system. The GoF sent two
evaluation missions and delivered a number of reports to
President Asad in 2003, but with the deterioration in
GoF-SARG relations in 2004 over UNSCR 1559, Syria abruptly
terminated the program. Romanowski observed that it could be
useful to have deeper discussions on Syria, as waivers in
restrictions on U.S. assistance might allow for limited MEPI
funding of NGOs in Syria.


8. (C) Asked to explain the European Commission's (EC)
reluctance to deepen dialogue with the U.S. on assistance to
the region, Magrot said the problem had to do with the EC's
relations with U.S., as well as the relationship between the
Commission and member states. In terms of relations with the
U.S., there was considerable dismay in Europe last year when
the U.S. launch of the BMENA initiative was seen as
downplaying and overshadowing the long-standing Barcelona
Process, which led member states to push the EC to focus on
protecting the independence of EU programs. Now, with the
fear of the U.S. taking over EU programs no longer valid,
member states could help encourage the EC to broaden
exchanges with the U.S. on reform-related assistance. Magrot
added that he viewed positively BMENA's moving beyond the G-8
context, as France had its own "issues" with the G-8 which
further complicated its response to BMENA.


9. (C) In closing, Magrot described difficulties in the
French education efforts in Morocco, noting that the GoF was
overwhelmed by demands from the GOM and trying to help close
the gap between well-educated elites and the masses. The
issue was not merely educating more people but providing job
opportunities for graduates; improving education without
addressing lack of opportunity, in Magrot's view, would
simply create better educated terrorists. He concluded that
the GoF could "not do it alone" in Morocco and was trying to
launch multilateral initiatives. He agreed with Romanowski
that it would be useful to exchange papers on education
programs in Morocco, and also concurred that further U.S.-GoF
in-depth exchanges on reform-related assistance to Morocco
and Egypt could be useful.

DGCID CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT
--------------


10. (U) In a sign of more positive French engagement on BMENA
issues, Romanowski was the only U.S. official invited to
speak at a two-day annual DGCID global conference on
international development (to be reported septel),at which
she joined a July 19 panel on regional reform efforts with
A/S-equivalent Thibault, EC Director for New Neighbors/MEDA
issues Richard Weber, and Jordan-based UNDP representative
Rima Khalaf. Before an audience of some 200 French
development experts, cultural attaches, and NGO
representatives, Romanowski explained the President's freedom
agenda in detail, offering concrete examples of MEPI projects
throughout the region and stressing the complementarity
between the U.S. and European approaches. A/S Thibault,
while cautioning that reform could not be imposed on the
region by a Western front, put greater emphasis on
democratization than usual and stressed the need to support
modernizers wherever they may be, in government or civil
society. Weber described EU reform-related efforts in the
region as a comprehensive process, involving promotion of
literacy/education, rule of law, and good governance. He
also suggested that France broaden its focus on the region
beyond the Maghreb. Khalaf, meanwhile, observed widespread
agreement that reform must be home-grown, but questioned how
inclusive the process should be, and whether it should
include Islamists or Ba'thists, for example. She also called
on the U.S. and Europe to expand the scope of assistance to
the region to focus on freedom and knowledge deficits and
status of women. Khalaf called on the EU to make better use
of the Barcelona Process and for France to move beyond
country-specific cooperation to a more regional approach,
more like UNDP.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (SBU) The Romanowski visit was important in helping to
move our dialogue with the French on BMENA issues towards a
more constructive and pragmatic approach. Her discussions
with GoF officials and briefing at the DGCID development
conference helped dispel outdated misperceptions that the
U.S. is seeking to impose reform on the region or to merge
U.S. and EU initiatives. Post will continue to follow up
with GoF officials, particularly in the DGCID, to seek
greater information sharing on reform related programs in
Morocco and Egypt, as well as encourage the GoF to take a
more supportive approach to U.S. proposals for the Foundation
and Fund for the Future. On the latter topic, more
high-level Washington visitors on BMENA issues could help
push the French toward a more constructive position in the
run-up to the Forum for the Future in November. End comment.



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