Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS4751
2005-07-07 15:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

PDAS CHENEY MEETS WITH MFA'S A/S-EQUIVALENT

Tags:  PREL LE SY EAID PTER MOPS FR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004751 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2014
TAGS: PREL LE SY EAID PTER MOPS FR
SUBJECT: PDAS CHENEY MEETS WITH MFA'S A/S-EQUIVALENT
JEAN-FRANCOIS THIBAULT, FOCUSES ON LEBANON

REF: BUCK-FITZPATRICK 6/28 E-MAIL

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS
ONS 1.4 B/D

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004751

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2014
TAGS: PREL LE SY EAID PTER MOPS FR
SUBJECT: PDAS CHENEY MEETS WITH MFA'S A/S-EQUIVALENT
JEAN-FRANCOIS THIBAULT, FOCUSES ON LEBANON

REF: BUCK-FITZPATRICK 6/28 E-MAIL

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS
ONS 1.4 B/D


1. (C) Summary: NEA PDAS Liz Cheney met July 1 with
Jean-Francois Thibault, the MFA's A/S-equivalent for the
Middle East, and focused on Lebanon while also briefly
touching on Iran. The two agreed that July 25 and 26 should
be the next dates for a Core Group meeting in Beirut. They
also agreed that, following the formation of a new
government, the US, UK and French Ambassadors should deliver
a joint demarche to demonstrate Core Group and international
community unity. In addition, the French explained the
apparent conflict between the view in Paris and the view in
the French Mission to the UN on the issue of mentioning
Hezballah and UNSCR 1559 in a Security Council discussion of
cross-border violence in the Shebaa farms area. They also
informed the PDAS that, despite their earlier agreement to
send a joint military assessment team to Beirut, the French
would be moving ahead alone on this in August. End summary.


2. (U) French participants in the meeting, which took place
at the French Foreign Ministry, included Thibault,
PDAS-equivalent Christian Jouret, DAS-equivalent for UN
issues Jean Pierre Lacroix and Remy Bonallegue, Lebanon/Syria
desk officer. PDAS Cheney was accompanied by Polmincouns
Josiah Rosenblatt and Poloff Peter Kujawinski (note taker).

IRAN


3. (C) Thibault initially raised Iran, and said the the GOF
was "quite surprised" about incoming Iranian President
Ahmadinejad's reported role in the U.S. Embassy
hostage-taking. He added that the EU-3 still planned on
transmitting to the Iranians a set of proposals by the end of
July, as they had committed to do. Because they were unsure
of Ahmadinejad's position regarding negotiations with the
EU-3, they saw transmitting the proposals by the end of July
as a good way to lay down an EU marker before Ahmadinejad's
August 3 inauguration. (Comment: Readouts from other
capitals on the latest EU-3/Iran round indicate that the EU-3

may prefer to present its proposals only after the August 3
inauguration of Ahmadinejad (reftel). Thibault's information
may be accurate, but it should be borne in mind that he is
not in the inner circle of Iran negotiations. End comment.)

LEBANON/CORE GROUP


4. (C) Cheney and Thibault decided upon July 25 and 26 as
dates for the next Core Group meeting in Beirut. They
discussed who should be invited, and whether or not it was a
good idea to invite Russia. Thibault said Russia would not
be happy if it wasn't invited, but that not inviting them
would make it easier not to invite Italy. He noted, and
Cheney agreed, that the Russians had not been helpful at the
June 13 meetings in Paris. He added that France was not
opposed in a general sense to Italy's inclusion, especially
given its commercial ties with Lebanon, but that the GOF saw
the Core Group as pragmatic, reactive and small. If Italy
came in, said Thibault, Germany would want to join as well.
Cheney said the USG would like to keep the Core Group small
and would come back to Thibault with U.S. views on Russia and
Italy.


5. (C) Cheney suggested that when the new Lebanese government
is formed, the US, UK and French Ambassadors should make a
joint demarche outlining the Core Group and international
community's goals for Lebanon's transition. Although
initially Thibault preferred that any decision on joint
demarches be made by the Ambassadors in-country, he
eventually agreed upon issuing instructions from capitals
requesting a joint demarche. Beyond instructing the
Ambassadors to make a joint demarche, Cheney and Thibault
agreed that other details, including proposing a structure
for the Beirut meeting, should be discussed by the
Ambassadors in Beirut with recommendations coming to the
capitals.

HEZBOLLAH/SHEBAA FARMS/ARMS EMBARGO/SYRIA


6. (C) Cheney noted that the GOF's June 30 press statement on
Hezbollah's involvement in a recent Blue Line incident
specifically cited Hezbollah and UNSCR 1559, despite the fact
that the same day, France's UN mission resisted citing UNSCR
1559 in discussions on a Security Council reaction (see GOF
press statement at para 8). Thibault and Lacroix argued that
since France was UNSC President at the time, it was obligated
to seek consensus as quickly as possible, and it "knew" that
Algeria and perhaps other members would refuse to include a
reference to UNSCR 1559. They pointed to their June 30 press
statement as the definitive GOF position. Thibault said the
statement was not controversial, given that it was based on
facts. Thibault added that the recent violence in the Shebaa
farms area had caused concern in the GOF. The French
believe, said Thibault, that Hezbollah was very nervous and
that in this situation, it might be tempted to undertake
further actions. In the current context, the GOF believed
that a potential UNSC resolution regarding an arms embargo on
Hezbollah would be "something dangerous" that would "put fuel
on the fire." He said Terje Roed-Larsen must deliver the
right message to the Syrians, and also, Larsen was the right
channel to deliver the message. Cheney said that Syria must
recognize that talking to Larsen is not enough, and it must
act. Regarding a possible UNSC arms embargo against
Hezbollah, Cheney said the U.S. would consult with the new
Lebanese government. If it believed that such an embargo
resolution (either "negative" or "positive") would help it
extend control over the entirety of its territory, this would
influence the U.S. position. Thibault reiterated that an
embargo aimed at Hezbollah would have very sensitive
implications, and that great caution was required. France's
first priority, said Thibault, was stability in Lebanon.

LEBANON/JOINT MILITARY ASSESSMENT


7. (C) Following discussion of a potential arms embargo on
Hezbollah and the needs of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),
Thibault mentioned that the French MOD planned a military
needs assessment/audit to Lebanon in August, although no
plans or dates had been definitively fixed. When Cheney
asked if the GOF had given up on their commitment to a joint
U.S., French, UK assessment - as agreed on June 13 - Thibault
was evasive. He emphasized that their military attaches in
Beirut should coordinate closely.


8. (U) Informal translation of the French Foreign Ministry
press statement, issued on June 30:

"We condemn the action which provoked serious confrontation
in the Sheba farms sector. We mourn for the victims.

In this period of a crucial translation regarding Lebanon's
future, we call on all parties, in particular Hezbollah, not
to cede to the temptation of violence and to demonstrate
self-restraint and responsibility.

Furthermore, we underscore our desire that all pertinent
resolutions on Lebanon be implemented, including UNSC
Resolution 1559 which anticipates that Lebanese authorities
will exercise control over the entirety of their territory."


9. (U) This cable was cleared by PDAS Liz Cheney.
STAPLETON