FRANCE: GOF READY TO ADVANCE SELECTEE EMERGENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004466

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE-SBALL, JLEVIN, EB/TRA: ARADETSKY,
DS-JHAWLEY
DHS FOR TSA-INTL AFFAIRS-DTIEDGE AND AVIATION OPS
FBI HQ FOR COUNTERRORISM DIVISION
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR TSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2015
TAGS: EAIR PTER FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE: GOF READY TO ADVANCE SELECTEE EMERGENCY
AMENDMENT IMPLEMENTATION

REF: A) 04 PARIS 9137 B) 04 PARIS 7092 C) 04 PARIS
4556 D) 04 PARIS 1016

Classified By: CHARGE ALEX WOLFF FOR REASONS 1.4 (A) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 22 meeting with GOF officials,
Emboffs received assurances that the GOF would work to
resolve the remaining issues in Selectee Emergency Amendment
(EA) implementation. After a review of prior progress and
outstanding issues on the range of aviation EAs, the Embassy
agreed to present a formal proposal in writing for action by
the GOF. The GOF also indicated that it was aware of upcoming
EAs on overflight and Secure Flight, and was attempting to
prepare in advance for them. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs,
Transportation Security Administration Representative, and
Econoff met with officials from the General Secretariat for
National Defense (SGDN) June 22 to discuss EA implementation.
Prefect Bernard Boub, SGDN Director of Protection and State
Security, Colonel Henri Schlienger, SGDN Aviation Security,
and Captain Jean-Louis Vichot, Assistant Director of European
and Strategic Affairs participated for the French.


3. (C) Emboffs began by reviewing the progress made on
implementation of No-Fly and Master Crew List EAs (reftels),
noting that since the GOF agreed to begin implementing them
in December 2004 occasional no-fly notification problems have
occurred and needed to be avoided. The USG understood the
French insistence on dealing with aviation security matters
on a government to government basis, and believed that the
modifications in procedures for implementing the EAs that we
had agreed to previously met the needs of both governments.


4. (C) Emboffs noted that Air France appears to be attempting
to follow No-Fly procedures closely, and that errors are
possibly due to airline inexperience with the system. The
more serious issue was systematic lack of notification on
possible Selectee List matches, which we understood was being
held back due to lack of instruction from the GOF. Air France
was successfully implementing the EA in the US, and was
technically capable of doing so in France. We believed we
had a written committment dating from last year from the GOF
to do this.


5. (C) Prefect Boub underlined that the GOF was committed to
implementation of the No-Fly and Selectee EAs, and wanted to
do all it could to avoid airplane diversions, which were
costly and potentially embarrassing. He promised to consult
with Air France about potential issues with Selectee EA
implementation. On No-Fly, he understood that the problem in
the most recent diversion was the way Air France's software
evaluated names for possible matches; Air France had modified
it to bring it closer to the U.S. system.


6. (C) TSA Rep pointed out technical issues with the Master
Crew list which the GOF furnishes to the USG on CD-ROM every
six months. Formatting incompatibilities and incomplete data
fields prevented its effective use in the U.S. data base. A
more effective approach would be direct transmission of
APIS-formatted data electronically to DHS. TSA Rep offered to
arrange for technical assistance to help Air France personnel
resolve these issues if needed. Prefect Boub promised to
consult with Air France about this, and appeared inclined to
accept the offer.


7. (C) Boub noted that to implement the Selectee List EA it
would be necessary to present the issue to the new government
for a decision, and agreed that the best way to begin would
be for the Embassy to draft a letter from the Charge to MFA
Cabinet Director Pierre Vimont outlining what we
proposed--the same procedure we used to successfully
implement the No-Fly EA. He also remarked on French concerns
about the quality of information on both the No-Fly and
Selectee lists, and said that the French privacy authority,
the National Commission for Computerization and Liberty
(CNIL) had been "very negative" about the lists. Judicial
problems in France remained a possibility.


8. (C) On a more positive note, Boub said the GOF was aware
of potential EAs on overflights and advance transmission of
PNR data (Secure Flight). On the latter the French were
working to be able to respond quickly if and when it is
issued, but would like prior consultation. They also
suggested further cooperation in adopting agreed-upon
measures for designated flights of interest (Ref D),and on
maintaining a vigorous program of airport inspections.
COMMENT: GOF officials have previously raised with Embassy
and TSA officials their interest in drawing up joint "flight
of interest" criteria and procedures, similar to what they
understand has been done in the US-UK context. Post would
appreciate Washington guidance on how to respond. END COMMENT


9. (C) COMMENT: The meeting indicated French willingness to
work with us to implement fully our agreement on the No-Fly,
Selectee and Master Crew List EAs. Embassy Paris intends to
propose the same procedure we have adopted for the No-Fly EA:
Air France will notify the Air and Border Police (PAF) of
potential matches, and the PAF will inform the Legatt. This
approach stands the best chance of quick adoption. Given the
GOF's choice to deal with aviation security on a government
to government basis, we will need to continue to consult with
them both formally and informally on the implementation of
these and future EAs. Post urges Washington Agencies to use
prior consultation with European partners before implementing
new EAs on overflights and Secure Flight. END COMMENT
WOLFF