Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS426
2005-01-24 17:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

GOF OFFICIALS ON BAGHDAD SECURITY CONCERNS, GOF

Tags:  PREL PINR IZ FR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000426 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015
TAGS: PREL PINR IZ FR
SUBJECT: GOF OFFICIALS ON BAGHDAD SECURITY CONCERNS, GOF
OFFER TO TRAIN IRAQI POLICE, IRAQI OCV IN FRANCE

REF: A. A) PARIS 299


B. B) 04 PARIS 9098

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000426

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015
TAGS: PREL PINR IZ FR
SUBJECT: GOF OFFICIALS ON BAGHDAD SECURITY CONCERNS, GOF
OFFER TO TRAIN IRAQI POLICE, IRAQI OCV IN FRANCE

REF: A. A) PARIS 299


B. B) 04 PARIS 9098

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: MFA A/S-equivalent for Middle East/North
Africa Jean-Francois Thibault stressed GoF security concerns
regarding its personnel in Baghdad, during an introductory
meeting with Pol/MC January 21. Noting that he had been
instructed to raise the issue, Thibault asserted that
increasingly stringent and arbitrary MNF-1 security measures
at checkpoints at the Green Zone potentially endangered GoF
personnel by keeping them waiting in cars for long periods at
vulnerable intersections, and impeded French efforts to seek
meetings with Iraqi officials, as well as at U.S. and EU
missions located in the Green Zone. Thibault also cited an
incident in which the French ambassador to Iraq was prevented
from taking his car and security detail into the Green Zone
to attend a meeting with a visiting senior U.S. official.
Thibault urged better coordination between MNF-1 and
diplomatic missions in Baghdad, to avoid compromising the
security of diplomatic vehicles or impeding necessary access
to the Green Zone. On other Iraq issues, Thibault waxed
positive on the recent visit of IIG President Yawer to Paris
and confirmed that a weeklong electoral training program for
Iraqi political party representatives in Paris had given the
GoF more optimism on potential cooperation among Iraqi
politicians of varying backgrounds. Thibault confirmed press
reports that the GoF was prepared in principle to train up to
1500 Iraqi gendarmes outside Iraq, but stressed that the
scope and venue of the program would depend on the Iraqi
response, which was still not forthcoming. Thibault also
confirmed that registration for out-of-country voting (OCV)
for Iraqis resident in France was underway, with one polling
center in central Paris for the estimated 3,000 to 8,000
Iraqis residing in France. End summary.


DEMARCHE ON SECURITY CONCERNS
--------------


2. (C) During an January 21 introductory call by Pol M/C,
newly appointed MFA A/S-equivalent for Middle East/North
Africa Jean-Francois Thibault opened discussion by noting
that he had been asked to raise with us GoF concerns on

security of its personnel in Baghdad, a demarche which French
officials had also delivered in Washington and Baghdad. The
GoF was increasingly concerned over increased difficulties
for its diplomats in gaining access to the Green Zone, due to
more complicated and seemingly arbitrary security measures
employed by MNF-1 at Green Zone checkpoints. These security
procedures, according to Thibault, had the effect of keeping
French diplomats waiting for long periods in cars, at
intersections known to be prime targets for car bombs; the
French complaint was not with the wait, but with the
vulnerability that this waiting created by keeping French
diplomats waiting in vulnerable areas. A second concern for
the GOF was that the potential such restrictions on Green
Zone access had on impeding GoF access to officials from the
Iraqi Interim Government (IIG),the Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq (IECI),as well as U.S. and EU member
state diplomatic missions. On the latter point, Thibault
reported that meetings convened by the EU presidency in
Baghdad took place in the Green Zone, giving the French
ambassador in Baghdad another need for regular Green Zone
access.


3. (C) Citing specific incidents in particular, MFA Iraq desk
officer Renaud Salins reported that French Ambassador to Iraq
Bertrand Bajolet, en route to a meeting with visiting EUR A/S
Jones in early January, had been required to wait for a long
period at a Green Zone checkpoint and was told that his
security detail and car could not accompany him in the Green
Zone. As a result, Bajolet had to walk about 2 kilometers
from the checkpoint to the meeting place at the Rashid Hotel;
the French complaint was not that the ambassador had to walk,
but that he was placed in a potentially vulnerable position
and separated from his armed security detail for an extended
period. In closing, Thibault expressed regret that he had to
bring up a negative issue, and expressed hope that the USG
could facilitate better coordination between MNF-1 and
diplomatic missions in Baghdad, perhaps through clarification
of new procedures or issuance of updated identification cards
which would be recognized by MNF-1 checkpoints throughout the
city. In passing, he noted that the GoF had similar concerns
over restrictions on access to the Baghdad airport road. He
also made clear that the GOF did not believe that French
officials were being singled out for any kind of special
treatment.

YAWER VISIT, TRAINING OFFER
--------------


4. (C) Turning to more positive issues, Thibault described
the January 12-15 visit of IIG President Ghazi al-Yawer (ref
a) as a "rich and friendly" exchange of views, with "no
taboos." Echoing comments to us from the Elysee (ref a),
Thibault described Yawer as an impressive interlocutor with
an excellent command of internal and regional issues.
Asked for details on the French offer to train Iraqi police
outside of Iraq, Thibault offered few specifics. He
acknowledged press reports (sourced to Iraqi officials) that
the GoF was prepared to train up to 1500 Iraqi police at a
still undetermined venue, but stressed that there was
"nothing new" about the French idea. The GoF had informed
the IIG of the training offer some time ago, and Chirac used
the occasion of the Yawer visit to remind the IIG of the
idea, with more precision on what France could do. Thibault
emphasized that it was still up to the Iraqi government to
tell the GoF what it wanted; the training could take place in
France, or in a country neighboring Iraq, or both. For
instance, if the Iraqi government was more interested in
training high-level police officers, training could take
place largely in France at the St Astier gendarme academy.
Thibault summed up that the Iraqi government appeared
interested in the French police training offer, but to date
had not responded or opted to send a delegation to Paris to
discuss the issue further, as suggested by Chirac (ref a).
The GoF presumed that an Iraqi government response would be
forthcoming after the January 30 elections and formation of
the new Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG).


5. (C) Thibault also described in upbeat terms the January
10-14 visit of 14 Iraqi political party representatives for a
weeklong GoF-sponsored training session on the electoral and
constitutional process (ref b). The Iraqi delegation was
received by FM Barnier and Thibault, and met separately with
representatives of the Socialist, Communist, and center-right
UMP and UDF parties. The group also received a briefing on
the French constitutional process from the officials at the
"Council of State" (French Supreme Court-equivalent) and took
part in an elections simulation organized by the Ministry of
Interior. Thibault commented that the delegation -- which
included representatives of all of Iraq's major parties
(including Allawi's Iraqi National Accord) as well as two
parties boycotting elections, the Iraqi Islamic Party and the
Muslim Arab Socialist Party -- got along "remarkably well,"
which gave the GoF some renewed hope on the potential of
Iraqi politicians to work together after elections.


6. (C) Thibault summed up that the GoF viewed Iraq's January
30 elections as a defining moment, in which credibility of
the ballot was of paramount importance. The GoF remained
worried over the prospects for voter participation and
whether Iraq's Arab Sunni population would vote in large
numbers. The GoF would continue to contribute as much as it
could to support the elections, with GoF limits (in putting
personnel on the ground in Iraq).

OUT OF COUNTRY VOTING ON TRACK
--------------


7. (C) Asked for an update on Iraqi OCV in France, Thibault
confirmed that one OCV voting center, in the 13th
arrondisement in Paris, would serve all of France's Iraqi
voters. The voter registration process had started slowly,
but was on track. Iraq desk officer Salins commented that it
was difficult to estimate with precision the number of Iraqis
in France, which is generally thought to range from 3,000 to
8,000; he commented that the GoF did not "know well" its
Iraqi population and communities were generally divided on
ethnic and sectarian lines, with Iraqi Kurds more affiliated
with Kurds from neighboring countries. (Note: The Iraqi
embassy DCM informed us separately that the central Paris
voting center will also serve Iraqi voters coming from Spain
and Switzerland, and that he had received complaints from
Iraqis based in southern France over the requirement that all
voters come in person to register, first, and later, to vote
on January 30. End note.) Thibault affirmed that the GoF
would provide ample security protection for the voting
center, for which the location had been moved once to take
security factors into account. He added that logistical
planning for OCV with the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) had been slow and somewhat of a headache,
largely because IOM had no office in France.

BIO NOTE:
--------------


8. (C) Comment/Biographic Note: Thibault took up his new
functions as French NEA A/S equivalent January 10, after
serving since May 2003 as the Minister of Defense's Senior
Advisor on International Cooperation and Arms Exports. His
resume is not typical for attaining such a key position in
the French diplomatic hierarchy; unlike most senior MFA
officials, Thibault did not attend the elite "Ecole Nationale
d'Administration" (ENA) and instead graduated from law school
and the prestigious "Langues Orientale" institute (majoring
in Arabic literature) before entering the diplomatic corps in

1973. After postings which included Rabat, Manama, and New
York, he left the MFA for a five-year detail in the late 80's
with ELF-Aquitaine. He later served as French Ambassador to
the UAE from 1997 to 2001 and Ambassador to Mauritania from
2001 to 2003. Thibault opened his discussion with us by
stressing his strong desire for regular and close cooperation
with the USG, and he strikes us as a more open interlocutor
than his predecessor, current French Ambassador to Lebanon
Bernard Emie. Given Thibault's important position and stated
readiness to build ties with U.S. officials, we believe it
would be worthwhile for senior NEA officials, who may be en
route to the region in coming months, to consider stopping in
Paris to establish contact with Thibault.


9. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
Leach