POLICY PLANNING CHIEF LEVY ON WHY AND WHAT NEXT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004141

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR EUN
SUBJECT: POLICY PLANNING CHIEF LEVY ON WHY AND WHAT NEXT OF
EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY DEFEAT IN FRANCE

REF: PARIS 4119

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt for re
asons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 10 discussion with visiting acting
NIC Chairman David Gordon and NIO for Europe Ambassador
Richard Kauzlarich, Pierre Levy, the head of the MFA's policy
planning staff, offered his assessment of the reasons for and
implications of France's "no" vote on the EU constitutional
treaty on May 29. Emphasizing that he was still in the
process of analysing the situation, Levy nevertheless
presented a thoughtful, balanced picture of where he sees
France now. Levy noted that in the realm of public opinion,
there had always been the radicals or fringe who would have
said no. The new category, he said, was the category of
people who voted "no" for/for Europe. Levy said the biggest
issue for French leaders in the European arena now was to
assess whether this was a crisis of maturity -- a growing
pain in the Union's development -- or a deeper crisis of the
European model itself. Levy characterized the June 16-17
European Council, as "crucial." He also echoed Chirac's
calls to continue the treaty ratification process, saying,
"We need a global picture of the problem." He acknowledged,
however, that doing so risked another round of "no"s that
could spiral Europe deeper into crisis. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Nearly two weeks having passed since the French said
no to the EU constitutional treaty, Levy told his guests that
he wanted to talk about the referendum -- first, he said, how
to understand what happened, and second, what the French
should do now. He said it was not easy to understand the
"no" votes in France and the Netherlands -- because there
were a mixture of issues behind people's votes. Levy noted
that in the realm of public opinion, there had always been
the radicals or fringe who would have said no -- he cited
Charles Pasqua, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, and Philippe de
Villiers as examples. The new category, he said, were the
people who voted "no" for/for Europe. While some of them are
not sincere, Levy said, some are.


3. (C) Citing Zbigniew Brzezinski's adage that France seeks
its reincarnation in Europe, and Germany its redemption, Levy
said that for many years, "Europe" was a "bigger France" but
that now French people are saying, "We don't recognize Europe
-- it doesn't look French any more." Describing this as a
French "pathology," he noted many French voters were so upset
Europe did not appear to be French any more that they felt
the need to express themselves at the ballot box.


4. (C) Levy noted that the EU has reached a certain level of
maturity -- with the single market, the euro, and the charter
of fundamental rights -- and that people appeared to be upset
they had not been consulted along the way, and had
determined, as he put it, "that it's time to say something."



5. (C) Levy said the biggest issue for French leaders in the
European arena now was to assess whether this was a crisis of
maturity -- a growing pain in the Union's development -- or a
deeper crisis of the European model itself, of how Europe
should be constructed. Levy characterized the coming days,
with the GAERC and, especially, the June 16-17 European
Council, as "crucial," and he restated President Chirac's
point that it is important to keep the ratification process
going -- European leaders have to take into account the 10
states that have already ratified the treaty, he pointed out.
"We need a global picture of the problem," he said. He
acknowledged, however, that continuing risked another round
of "no"s that could spiral Europe deeper into crisis.


6. (C) On the question of enlargement, Levy said that
European leaders "can't act as if nothing has happened."
They have to be careful, he said, to show the public that the
process is "under control." The decision in March not to let
Croatia begin its talks as scheduled was important in this
vein, he said. Levy said that he did not know whether Turkey
would be ready to start negotiations in October as planned.
He also noted that ratification of the Bulgarian and Romanian
accession treaties will now come before the French parliament
-- which he found ironic. Here is a question, he said, that,
like the constitutional treaty itself, would normally be
passed handily by the Parliament. Given the referendum
results, however, and the message that French voters had
sent, he was not sure that the French ratification would be
trouble-free. In answer to a question from Ambassador
Kauzlarich about the damaging effect that the possible loss
of the impetus for reform that derives from a realistic
aspiration from EU membership, Levy assured: "We're deeply
committed on the Balkans."


7. (C) Regarding the upcoming 2007-2013 budget negotiations,
Levy said that they presented an opportunity for the
Europeans to assess what they want as their priorities.
"There is a stupid way and a clever way to look at the budget
negotiations," he said. "The stupid way is to look only at
the numbers, at the euros. The smart way is to discuss
content of common policy." In response to the question of
whether the crisis and apparent desire of EU public to focus
on domestic problems would mean a drawdown in funds for EU
external action, Levy responded that people wanted a Europe
that was active on the international scene. The EU's role on
the world stage would not be diminished. Levy also asserted
that the EU has a "real problem of governance" on economic
issues, which contributes in part, he believes, to the weak
economic performance in many of the EU's big economies.
"We've done monetary union but not economic union," he said.


8. (C) COMMENT: Levy, who served as chief of the MFA's
Common Foreign and Security Policy unit from 2002 until
earlier this year and as deputy director of the cabinet of
then-Minister for Europe Pierre Moscovici from 1997 until
2002, acknowledged at one point that France's European policy
planners are at something of a loss to know how to proceed in
the wake of the referendum defeat. As architects of a policy
they believed would benefit France and Europe, they are still
attached to many of the institutional innovations contained
in the constitution. The rejection of this very constitution
by French voters, however, has left them wondering what it is
the French want from Europe. Increasingly, they are
concluding that their countrymen want to protect French jobs
and social welfare benefits, and to move much more
deliberately on future enlargements. END COMMENT.
WOLFF