A/S FRIED MEETING WITH FRENCH OPINION LEADERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004119

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED MEETING WITH FRENCH OPINION LEADERS

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS
ONS 1.4 B/D


1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs Daniel Fried met a small group of French opinion
leaders June 7 to discuss next steps following France's
rejection of the European constitution. A/S Fried emphasized
that, although the U.S. did not have a position on the
Constitution, it clearly was in favor of a strong Europe and
therefore, the USG was not happy with the recent results in
France and the Netherlands. Among the opinion leaders, some
believed that certain foreign policy aspects of the
Constitution - such as a Foreign Minister - could be
implemented without having to approve the Constitution, while
others believed this type of piece-meal approach was
impossible in current circumstances, and that the EU would
have to focus on saving what had already been implemented,
such as the euro and the common market. In general, the
opinion leaders were pessimistic regarding the opening of
negotiations with Turkey in the fall, believed that future
enlargements, to include the Balkan states, would likely be
delayed, at the very least, and expressed general gloom about
French (and European) politics in general. End summary.


2. (C) On June 7, Assistant Secretary Fried met with French
opinion leaders in Paris, France. Participants included:

U.S.
--------------

A/S Fried
Charge Alex Wolff, Embassy Paris
Kathy Allegrone, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
Renee Earle, Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs, Embassy
Paris
Peter Kujawinski, Embassy Paris (notetaker)

France
--------------

Thierry de Montbrial, Director, French Institute of
Interntional Relations
Nicole Gnesotto, Director, Institute for Security Studies
Sylvie Goulard, CERI researcher
Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
and Flom
Amaya Bloch-Laine - Director, German Marshall Fund of the
U.S., Paris office


3. (C) In a lunch with French opinion leaders June 7,
Assistant Secretary Fried explained that he had decided to
travel to Europe following the rejection of the EU
Constitution by French and Dutch voters in order to get a
sense of what people were thinking and to reassure the
Europeans that the U.S. wanted a strong Europe as a partner.
Although the USG did not have a position on the Constitution,
it clearly was in favor of partnership with a strong Europe.
President Bush, said A/S Fried, did not like weak
institutions or governments, and therefore, the USG was not
happy with the results of the two recent referendums. Our
fear, said A/S Fried, was that a weakened EU would turn
inward and be more reluctant to engage with the U.S. on
pressing international matters. In addition, the USG hoped
that a weakened EU would not search for a scapegoat, with two
possible candidates being Turkey and the U.S.


4. (C) Nicole Gnesotto, director of the Paris-based Institute
for Security Studies, said she believed the EU would turn
inward in reaction to the probable defeat of the
Constitution. EU policymakers will want to spend money
within the EU instead of turning to problems outside the EU
borders, said Gnesotto. This is bad news for the U.S., which
has now (belatedly, in her view) come to see Europe as a
partner. Gnesotto believed that the priority for the EU will
be saving the accomplishments of previous years: the euro,
the common market, and other social and economic programs.
Once those are saved, said Gnesotto, EU policymakers can
again turn to strengthening Europe. Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, a
partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom, said he
believed the French rejection of the referendum was also a
rejection of past enlargements, the euro and the common
market. Therefore, it was of great importance to fight
against the renationalization of Europe. He feared that EU
countries would fight amongst themselves, with each
individual member country needing to show its respective
population that it defends national interests.


5. (C) Gnesotto agreed that Europeans will be tougher against
each other in the aftermath of the Constitution,s failure
and that European solidarity was in doubt. Thierry de
Montbrial, director of the Paris-based French Institute of
International Relations (known by its acronym, IFRI),said
that the next several months were important to muddle through
and that he hoped governments would avoid swerving towards
narrow national interests. He believed that a key problem
was the weakness of European leaders and noted that President
Chirac was currently at the lowest approval rating (26 per
cent) of any French president in the Fifth Republic (since
1958).


6. (C) Montbrial speculated that, despite the rejection of
the Constitution, some of the proposals, such as increasing
diplomatic cooperation within the EU and the institution of a
EU Foreign Minister, might still be possible via a piecemeal
approach. Gnesotto and prominent researcher Sylvie Goulard
disagreed, saying that any attempt to implement the
Constitution through what would be perceived as a back-door
method was impossible, given the current political climate
within the EU.


7. (C) In general, the opinion leaders believed that
Turkey,s EU candidacy was in danger following the
Constitution,s rejection. Montbrial said he thought Chirac
had committed an enormous error in pledging that all future
enlargements would be the subject of referendums, in that he
outsourced a core foreign policy decision to voters.
Europeans still held to the idea that Turkey was not
European. It was a paradox, said Montbrial, that those who
so vociferously argued against inclusion in the Constitution
of language referring to Europe,s Christian heritage at the
same time believed Turkey should not be a member because it
wasn,t European, i.e., Christian. Gnesotto said she thought
the EU would decide not to begin negotiations with Turkey in
October, despite pledges to do so. Goulard said EU
populations continue to believe that Turkey is too big, too
poor and too foreign to become a member of the club. A/S
Fried replied that it would be a mistake to straight-line
current political dilemmas or to draw strategic conclusions
from them. In the 1980s, Poland,s potential membership in
the EU was regarded as the subject of fantasy. In the
Balkans, in Ukraine and in Turkey, the prospect of EU
membership, said A/S Fried, was one of the West,s most
durable and powerful tools to encourage democratic
transitions and economic openness. Without the prospect of
EU membership for Turkey and the Balkan states, the EU would
be faced with the potential of great insecurity on its
borders. Goulard agreed, but said that the EU would always
prioritize its own internal stability even if that meant that
the stability of neighboring countries might be damaged. In
the current context, she believed that opening negotiations
with Turkey would damage internal EU stability. The European
interlocutors approached these issues in a gloomy spirit,
concerned about the electorate's rejection of the core values
that had animated the European Project for a generation. All
agreed that France was in no condition to pick new fights
with the United States ("We would look even more absurd than
we do now," whispered Gnesotto to Fried.)


8. (U) A/S Fried cleared this cable.
WOLFF