Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS4106
2005-06-10 17:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

STAFFDEL TALWAR DISCUSSES LEBANON/SYRIA,

Tags:  PREL XF IZ IR LE FR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 004106 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015
TAGS: PREL XF IZ IR LE FR
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL TALWAR DISCUSSES LEBANON/SYRIA,
IRAN/EU-3, AND IRAQ WITH SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIALS

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 004106

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015
TAGS: PREL XF IZ IR LE FR
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL TALWAR DISCUSSES LEBANON/SYRIA,
IRAN/EU-3, AND IRAQ WITH SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIALS

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Visiting SFRC Professional Staff Member
Puneet Talwar met separately with MFA NEA A/S-equivalent
Jean Francois-Thibault and Presidential Middle East/Americas
advisor Dominique Boche June 3 and discussed Lebanon/Syria,
EU-3 negotiations with Iran, and Iraq. Thibault expressed
concern over the assassination of journalist Samir Kassir, as
well as the tendency for Lebanese politicians to return to
old habits. Thibault stressed the French commitment to UNSCR
1559 and asserted that Hizballah's disarmament could result
only from its political integration. Both Thibault and Boche
credited Iran for its moderating stance on Hizballah, with
Thibault describing Iranian officials as surprisingly
negative towards Syria's leadership. French officials
offered little detail on the package which the EU-3 will
present Iran in two months, but instead stressed the
importance of continued U.S. support and speculated that a
Rafsanjani victory could herald a more constructive Iranian
position. On Iraq, Thibault expressed worry over increasing
sectarianism and questioned the decision to exclude Iraq's
neighbors from the June 1-2 preparatory meetings for the
U.S.-EU conference, for which the GoF wants greater
consultation on the draft communique. Without calling for a
U.S. withdrawal date from Iraq, Thibault and Boche stressed
that giving Iraqis a better "perspective" towards an eventual
MNF-1 withdrawal could be the key to attracting greater Sunni
politicalp articipation. French officials also expressed
reticence over an expanded NATO role in Iraq, and voiced
concern over the dwindling Iraqi Christian community, citing
a recent visit by the Chaldean Patriarch. End summary.

LEBANON
--------------


2. (C) Thibault commended close U.S.-French cooperation on
Lebanon while expressing worry over the current situation
there, especially after the June 2 assassination of "Al
Nahar" journalist Samir Kassir. Thibault described Kassir,
a dual French-Lebanese national, as a fighter for Lebanese
democracy and independence, and suggested that the slain

journalist had crossed a line in his work, while not directly
implicating Syrian or Lebanese security services in the
assassination. In response to a query from Talwar, Thibault
conceded that the question remained open whether the March 14
"counter-demonstration" marked a new era in Lebanese
politics. Thibault described the debate over the 2000
electoral law and the decision to retain that law as
"unfortunate," and having opened the door to traditional
Lebanese political habits of back-room deals and trading
advantages. The composition of the next parliament and the
degree to which the opposition won a clear majority would be
important, he observed, in determining whether or not the
next government was merely transitory. Thibault added that
the younger political generation in Lebanon was looking for a
new political direction. There appeared to be a certain
level of disappointment in the first round of legislative
elections in Beirut, given the low level of voter
participation, though the GoF would not dwell on the
participation levels publicly and had issued a positive
message in support of the elections.


3. (C) On Hizballah, Thibault stressed the GoF's commitment
to UNSCR 1559 and its clear objective of disarming Hizballah
and Palestinian militias. At the same time, he stressed that
Hizballah disarmament could come about only
through a positive political evolution, not via military
means. For this reason, the GoF would continue to push for
democracy and inclusiveness in Lebanon, similar to its
approach in Iraq. Talwar agreed with Thibault's assessment
that Hizballah disarmament remained a sensitive issue in
Lebanon and needed a Lebanese approach. Thibault suggested
that Hizballah forces needed to be presented with
alternatives, such as joining the Lebanese army or taking up
new occupations. At the same, the international community
needed to be sensitive to the appearance of foreign
interference and advise the Israelis, in particular, against
unhelpful moves.


4. (C) On the issue of foreign interference, Talwar raised
Hizballah's support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad, noting that
PA President Abbas and Israeli officials had raised concerns
over the issue during an earlier Codel Biden visit
to the region. Thibault did not respond to Talwar's comment
directly and instead cited Iran's moderating influence on
Hizballah and in Lebanon in general. Thibault said that in
discussing Lebanon with Iranian officials, including Iranian
Ambassador to France Sadegh al Kharazi, the GoF found the
Iranian judgment on Syria and its political leadership to be
surprisingly negative. Iranian officials, he added, were
extremely cautious in discussing Hizballah and stressed the
need for it to behave cautiously. Iran had also deplored the
Hariri assassination, and, like France and others, viewed it
as a crime from another era. Elysee advisor Boche, in a
separate conversation with Talwar, also commended Iran's more
constructive stance in Lebanon, describing it as one of the
benefits generated by the ongoing EU-3 negotiations. Boche
asserted that Iran had passed many moderating messages at
French request to Hizballah, which in turn helped gain
Hizballah support for the electoral process in Lebanon.

IRAN
--------------


5. (C) On EU-3 negotiations with Iran, Boche stressed that
the GoF shared U.S. nonproliferation concerns with respect to
Iran, and that renunciation of all Iranian military
application of nuclear technology and suspension of Iranian
enrichment activities remained essential, immutable elements
of the EU demarche. Boche described the U.S. and EU as
having similar goals but different tactics, with the
U.S.-preferred approach of UNSC referral and possible
sanctions offering uncertain prospects for success. Boche
described the EU approach as more pragmatic and seeking to
make Iran understand that if it renounced military use of
nuclear technology, the EU would help Iran achieve greater
integration into the world economy and recognition as a
responsible, regional power. The U.S. had made two important
concessions in support of the EU-3 effort, by lifting its
opposition to Iran's entry into the WTO and to the sale of
spare aircraft parts to Iran. Boche noted that the initial
Iranian reaction to the U.S. policy shifts had been negative,
as Iran misinterpreted the U.S. moves as "fake concessions"
designed to rally the EU-3 behind UNSC referral. He noted
that the Iranian attitude had shifted somewhat, however,
since the WTO decision to start membership negotiations with
Iran, a development of significant interest to Tehran.


6. (C) Boche acknowledged that in the run-up to the May 25
meeting between the Iranians and EU-3 foreign ministers in
Geneva, the Iranians had put forth a number of "ingenious"
proposals which crossed the line on enrichment, which many
Iranian officials seemed to view as a fundamental human
right. The EU-3 had been firm in telling the Iranians that
their proposals were "off track," so it was decided at
Geneva that the EU-3 would present the next proposal, by the
end of July. Boche said the EU-3 was beginning work to make
its proposal attractive, but offered no further details.
Asked what further gestures the U.S. could make to support
the process, Boche stressed the need to wait until after
Iran's presidential elections, to see if a new Iranian policy
configuration emerged. He noted that Rafsanjani appeared to
be the electoral front-runner, and described him as a
hard-liner on domestic policy, but a realist, with
respect to Iran's external relations. Boche added that
Rafsanjani understood U.S. determination on Iran and had
expressed himself on the topic. One potentially helpful U.S.
gesture after Iranian elections, Boche noted, would be
to clarify publicly that the U.S. was not seeking regime
change in Iran.


7. (C) Overall, Boche stressed the need to offer Iranians
incentives for cooperation, and was less enthusiastic on
using the threat of UNSC referral as a means to induce better
Iranian behavior. Repeated public references to UNSC
referral or the prospect of sanctions, in Boche's view, would
undermine the ongoing EU-3 negotiations and run counter to
Iranians' national pride and their resistance to bending to
external pressure. He added that we needed to address the
psychological aspects of the nuclear issue in Iran; while we
could not bend on the nuclear issue, it would be important to
satisfy Iran on other issues related to its national pride,
such as by recognizing Iran as a useful partner in the Middle
East. Boche was positive when asked to assess prospects for
continued U.S. and EU-3 cooperation on Iran. He cited close
cooperation between the U.S. and Europe on Iran during the
past few months, and said he had the impression, since
Secretary Rice's and the President's visits to Europe earlier

SIPDIS
this year, that the U.S. was taking into consideration what
the Europeans had to say. The GoF had the impression that
the U.S. was reassessing its Iran policy cautiously and
realistically, and that the current U.S. approach differed
from that of six months ago.


8. (C) Thibault offered comments similar to Boche's on the
need for continued U.S. support for EU-3 negotiations and the
prospect of a Rafsanjani election victory having a positive
impact on the negotiations. Thibault stressed that the
longer the EU-3 kept Iran in dialogue the better, as the more
time passed with suspension in place, the more difficult it
would be for the Iranians to resume enrichment. Thibault
also stressed that the Iranians, in addition to playing a
relatively responsible role in Lebanon, were playing their
cards cautiously in Iraq, and could have played far more of a
nuisance role, given long-standing ties to Iran among most of
Iraq's Shi'a political leadership. MFA Iraq desk officer
Renaud Salins added that Iraqi FM Zebari, during a discussion
with GoF officials at the recent World Economic Forum meeting
at Dead Sea, had described the Iranians as behaving properly
in Iraq, while harshly criticizing Syrian interference in
Iraq.

IRAQ
--------------


9. (C) Further on Iraq, Thibault described the GoF as very
concerned by increased sectarianism, and suggested that
Iraqis were identifying more with their respective
communities than the prevailing national identity. Thibault
questioned the Iraqi government decision to exclude its
neighbors from the June 1-2 Cairo preparatory meeting for the
June 22 U.S.-EU-hosted ministerial on Iraq, noting that the
move had generated a negative reaction from Iraq's Arab
neighbors and gave the impression that Iraq was trying
separate itself from its Arab surroundings. Thibault noted
that the GoF had not heard much from the European Commission
or Luxembourg EU Presidency about conference preparations,
and hoped to have time to review and comment on the draft
conference declaration before the planned June 21 senior
officials meetings in Brussels.


10. (C) Talwar asked Thibault for an update on the French
offer to train some 1500 Iraqi gendarmes in France, noting
that Codel Biden had recently raised the issue with Iraqi PM
Ja'fari, who was not responsive on the issue. Thibault
reported that the GoF was still waiting for Iraq to send a
mission to France to further discuss gendarme training
programs, and reiterated the French red-line against sending
any troops to Iraq. Thibault added that EU members
were ready to help Iraq via the European Commission and
member states' bilateral assistance, and that the EU wanted
the Iraqi government to be at the center of donor activities.
The GoF, for its part, hoped to have official Iraqi
interlocutors ready to discuss their needs, which had not
been the case up to now. The GoF also hoped that the Iraqi
Transitional Government (ITG) would see the value of having
the UN serve in a "clearinghouse" role on international
assistance, and recognize the important support which Europe
could offer, especially in capacity-building. Boche, in his
separate discussion with Talwar, stressed that French
assistance to Iraq had doubled since the previous year (to
2.5 million euros in 2005),that the GoF had played an
important role on Iraqi debt reduction, and that the GoF was
ready to train Iraqi gendarmes outside the country. When
Talwar asked whether France would oppose expanding the NATO
training mission in Iraq, even though French troops were not
involved, MFA Iraq desk officer Salins responded that the GoF
opposed a greater NATO role in Iraq, as the current
configuration was the maximum President Chirac could accept.
Presidential Advisor Boche offered a more nuanced, but
negative answer when asked about expansion of NATO efforts in
Iraq, and noted that the GoF was always reticent about
planting the NATO flag in the region.


11. (C) Both Thibault and Boche made a linkage between the
continued MNF-1 presence and inclusion of Sunnis in the
political process, and suggested that giving a greater
"perspective" on an eventual troop withdrawal could bring
more Sunnis to the table. Thibault cited French Ambassador
to Iraq Bertrand Bajolet as concluding that as long as there
was no perspective for a troop withdrawal, it would be
difficult to have all Sunni groups included in the
political process. Thibault clarified that the GoF was not
seeking a specific withdrawal date, or to accelerate a U.S.
departure, but simply wanted to provide a better perspective
on an eventual departure of foreign troops, such as a
condition-based timetable. Elysee advisor Boche noted that
the GoF understood that MNF-1 could not withdraw until Iraqi
security forces fulfilled certain conditions. He added,
however, that if the U.S. could make clear that its troops
would not be in Iraq for eternity, this would help associate
more Sunnis with the political process. Talwar responded to
Thibault and Boche's points by observing that, in contrast,
since Iraq's January elections, he had heard fewer calls for
troop withdrawal from Sunni Iraqis, who appeared to view
their non-participation in elections as a mistake and were
more fearful of a potential U.S. pull-out.


12. (C) Thibault also raised GoF concerns on Iraq's dwindling
Christian community, and cited a mid-May visit to France by
Iraqi Chaldean Patriarch Emmanuel Delly, during which the
Patriarch met with President Chirac and senior
MFA officials. Thibault reported that the Patriarch's
essential mission was to seek visas from friendly European
powers to help Iraqi Chaldeans flee the country. Thibault
described the GoF as a bit surprised by the directness of
the Patriarch's message, and said French officials, in
response, sought to stress the importance of the continued
Christian presence in Iraq. He concluded that one of
Christianity's oldest communities was in danger of
disappearing due to migration, and that unfair treatment of
Iraqi Christian voters by Kurdish authorities during the
January 30 election had added to Iraqi Christians' overall
sense of despair.


13. (U) Staffdel Talwar did not clear this message.
WOLFF