TOGO: MEETING WITH FORMER MINISTER BOKO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004103

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: MEETING WITH FORMER MINISTER BOKO

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
n 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Togo's former Interior Minister Francois
Boko visited the Embassy on June 8 to discuss his visa
request and prospective travel to the U.S. He also discussed
events in Togo, stating that he had little faith that Faure
was truly committed to democratic reform. He discussed the
role of the Eyadema clan in drug trafficking. He also had
little faith in UFC leader Gilchrist Olympio in his
self-appointed role of "leader" of the opposition. Boko was
disappointed but not surprised by France's response to events
in Togo, which he ascribed to France's long practice of
supporting the "strong man" of the moment in the hope that
that would lead to stability and continued benefit to France.
Boko expressed a willingness to consult with USG officials
during his upcoming travel to the U.S. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In good spirits, former Togolese Interior Minister
Boko called on emboffs on June 8 in connection with his
request for a visa to travel to the U.S. in the coming weeks,
in response to an invitation from an Amcit in Florida who was
a former Peace Corps Volunteer in Togo who lived with Boko's
family during his PC service (1978-1980). Boko has kept in
close contact with him and with other ex-PCVs and visited him
most recently in Florida in November 2004 when the PCV
invited Boko to observe the elections process in the U.S. We
explained the visa process to Boko and are working with CONS
to facilitate an early interview and appropriate courtesies.
Boko said he was more than willing to travel to Washington to
discuss Togo with USG officials should there be interest in
his doing so.

No Faith in Faure
--------------

3. (C) Boko discussed the situation in Togo at some length.
He said that contrary to the image of moderation that Faure
was trying to project, Faure, in Boko's view, was cynically
trying to retain absolute power in the manner that Eyadema
had. After Eyadema's death, Boko said he had had several
discussions with Faure, appealing to him that as members of
the younger generation, it would be wise for them to engage
in the kinds of reform that the Togolese public desired.
However, Boko said that Faure has demonstrated little
interest in reform and has tried to consolidate power in
every way possible.


4. (C) Boko said that Faure had no qualms about resorting
to violence if necessary. Boko said that the Togolese
military was not as bad as perceived from the outside. He
said that in the pre-election period, he had met with
military leaders and urged them to avoid hardline tactics
before and during the elections. Their attitude, he
reported, was reasonable. Boko blamed the violence and
killings not so much on the military as on the immediate
entourage surrounding Faure, most notably Col. Katanga (NFI),
who Boko said was responsible for implementing the violent
tactics of repression and intimidation that occurred during
the election period. Boko said he was very dismayed to learn
that Col. Katanga was scheduled to come to France within a
few weeks to begin a program at the Ecole Militaire. He
thought, however, that there was a chance the French would
rescind his participation.

Faure's "National Unity" a Sham
--------------

5. (C) Regarding Faure's call for a government of "national
unity/reconciliation," Boko said that this was a sham. Faure
wanted opposition members to sign on to such a government
"blind," without anyone knowing in advance what form this
reconciliation government would take and how powers and
responsibilities would be shared. Boko said that the
government and opposition representatives should instead hold
a round table and hammer out an agreement about how such a
government would function. Only then, when all parties
agreed on a government structure and how power and
responsibility would be shared, should the opposition agree
to join with Faure.


6. (C) Boko said that Faure was pursuing one of his
father's strategies -- call for a government of national
unity and then when the opposition balks due to uncertainty
about its role in such a government, declare "well, I invited
them, but they refused, so I guess I as president will have
to run Togo without them." Boko said that Eyadema operated
in this manner and he suspected that Faure was following suit.

No Faith in Gilchrist Olympio Either
--------------

7. (C) When asked whether he had had contact with other
Togolese dissidents, such as Gilchrist Olympio, Boko said
that he had not, in part because the French, in allowing him
to come to France, told him to lay low and not be active
politically. However, he said that he also had problems with
Olympio, and did not appreciate that Olympio had declared
himself "head of the opposition." The "opposition," Boko
said, had not "elected" Olympio to be its chief. Boko said
that Olympio was carrying on the struggle with the Eyadema
clan that started decades before with Olympio's father. Boko
criticized both the Eyadema and Olympio clans for continuing
to fight these old battles, whereas Togo needed to get beyond
the "fathers' war" and deal with today's reality. Both
Gilchrist and Faure seemed intent on continuing the paternal
wars, which was unfortunate and which, in Boko's view, made
Olympio unsuited to be considered the head of the opposition.

Drugs
--------------

8. (C) Boko described in some detail evidence showing the
Eyadema family's involvement in drug trafficking. He said
that as Interior Minister, he had developed a
counternarcotics program that worked well with the French
security and intelligence services. He said that with French
cooperation, the two sides intercepted in 2004, near the Cape
Verde islands, a ship bound for Togo from Colombia. This
ship contained a large quantity of cocaine. When he first
informed Eyadema of this operation, Eyadema's initial
reaction was to state "make sure that ship isn't seized in
Togo." Boko said that later investigation established in his
mind a direct connection between the Eyadema family
(including Faure) and a longstanding cocaine trafficking
operation. Boko said that when shipments came to Togo, an
army unit was told to off-load the cargo and store it at an
army base, after which the shipments were delivered for
further smuggling elsewhere to a "Mr. Ishay" (phon),whom
Boko described as a person of Middle Eastern origin who was
close to the Eyadema family and resided in Togo. Boko said
that the officer at the military base responsible for
off-loading and storing the cocaine did not appear to know
the nature of the cargo -- he was told that the cargo
consisted of industrial chemicals and he had no reason to
believe otherwise. This officer later said that there had
been "a dozen or more" such shipments in recent years.

France and Togo
--------------

9. (C) When asked about France and Togo, Boko said that
many were disappointed with France's quick endorsement of the
elections, despite countervailing views among EU observers
and those from other countries such as the U.S. (Boko at
several points lauded the support the U.S. had provided to
him personally and to the democratic process more generally
during the election period.) He attributed the French
attitude to what he described as France's "traditional" way
of dealing with its former African colonies -- support the
"strong man" of the moment, seek stability as the first
priority, and continue to benefit from what Boko called the
very old tradition of Africa's "strong men" helping French
leaders in a number of ways, including financial support.
Some of these French political figures then go on to support
publicly a return to "normal" relations with Togo, especially
in the economic area.


10. (C) Boko was highly critical of individuals such as
French citizen Charles Debbasch, whom he described as one of
the Eyadema clan's more unsavory advisors, and who had been
rewarded by the Faure regime with a quasi-diplomatic status.
Boko claimed that it was Debbasch who tipped off the Togolese
security forces when Boko was trying to leave Togo quietly
for Benin after his public declaration that the April
elections should be postponed. He noted that the Amcit he
planned to visit in Florida was with Boko in Togo when he
called for postponement of the elections, was with him in the
car as they tried to leave Togo, and joined him at the German
Embassy before Boko was finally able to come to France. Boko
also said that this Amcit had a copy of the dossier detailing
the Eyadema family's involvement in drug trafficking.

Donors Need to Tell Togo What Needs to Happen
--------------

11. (C) Boko said that the U.S. and Europeans needed to
consult and then present Togo with a roadmap leading to
democracy and reform, with the carrot being renewed foreign
assistance. Togo, he said, had to be told clearly what it
needed to do to return to the good graces of the donor
countries. The evidence of the Eyadema clan's involvement
with drugs could be used as powerful leverage over Faure,
Boko believed.

Why Were You a Part of It?
--------------

12. (C) When asked about his own role in the Eyadema
government, Boko said that he had received very strong and
critical messages questioning his decision to join the GOT as
Minister, many from the group of concerned former Peace Corps
Volunteers with whom he has kept in touch. He said that he
explained to them that if people such as himself, who were
interested in reform and progress in Togo, stayed out, then
nothing would ever change. He felt obliged, as a member of
the younger generation, to give it a try. Obviously, he
said, he reached a point where he could no longer tolerate
what he saw around him and said what he had to say,
irrespective of the consequences.


13. (C) Boko indicated that he planned to establish himself
in France, where he had studied previously. He said that his
marriage to a French citizen would allow him to stay in
France, regardless of whatever status the GOF might accord
him as a "political asylee." He mentioned also that a child
of the couple was born in France, suggesting that this would
strengthen his claim to French residency should there be any
doubt.


14. (U) We promised to keep in touch regarding Boko's visa
request and said that we remained open to meeting again to
continue the discussion.
WOLFF