Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS407
2005-01-21 19:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON MARKING AND TRACING

Tags:  PARM FR UN 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000407 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2015
TAGS: PARM FR UN
SUBJECT: FRENCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON MARKING AND TRACING
OF SA/LW

REF: A. SECSTATE 9788


B. SECSTATE 10065

Classified By: Political Minister/Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for Reaso
n 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000407

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2015
TAGS: PARM FR UN
SUBJECT: FRENCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON MARKING AND TRACING
OF SA/LW

REF: A. SECSTATE 9788


B. SECSTATE 10065

Classified By: Political Minister/Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for Reaso
n 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. SUMMARY. On January 20, poloff met with Jean-Francois
Guillaume, the MFA Action Officer responsible for small arms
and light weapons nonproliferation, who explained that the
French will support European initiatives at the second
negotiation session of the UN Program of Action on Small Arms
and Light Weapons in the interest of maintaining EU cohesion
on the matter. He said France is not a strong proponent of
making the document legally binding or of introducing new
initiatives that could hinder the success of the session.
However, if consensus emerges during the course of the
session behind one or more of the measures France would fall
in line. He added that NGOs and countries such as Germany
that are calling for more radical measures both have an
interest -- for different reasons -- in seeing the working
group session fail. END SUMMARY.

--------------
A Legal Vs. Political Instrument: The U.S. Must Make Its
Position Clear From the Outset
--------------


2. (C) Guillaume explained that the GOF's priority is to
have a successful working group session that is consistent
with U.S. objectives of creating an instrument with "timely,
realistic and practical measures to mitigate the illicit
trade of SA/LW in conflict or post-conflict situations"
(reftel). He said that France would remind its European
partners of the importance of this priority, but added that
several European members are giving in to pressures from NGOs
to go further. Guillaume said that the U.S. must make clear
from the outset its position that the instrument will not be
legally binding; if not, he said, several countries will try
to force it through as a legal instrument when it is close to
completion.

--------------
How Some Countries and NGOs Could Benefit from a Working
Group Failure
--------------


3. (C) Guillaume described Ambassador Thalmann's draft text
as "exhaustive," and said that a simpler, cleaner text would
have been more effective. However, he said, he suspects that
Ambassador Thalmann too has given in to pressures from NGOs
to adopt stricter measures. Ironically, he explained, the
goal of countries like Germany and NGOs like Amnesty
International may be the same - to set the instrument up for
failure. Germany, he said, which introduced many of the more
radical measures, is falling under political pressure at home
due to the fact that it is a major supplier in the worldwide
small arms market. By championing a strict instrument it can
be seen as a "white knight" by the NGOs and then claim "we
tried" when the measures do not win consensus. Guillaume
said that Germany has been "very pushy" in introducing new
SA/LW measures that run the risk of sinking the instrument.
On the other side of the spectrum, Guillaume explained, NGOs
would like to see the efforts of the working group fail so
that they can push for a regional convention that deals with
SA/LW in much the same way that the Ottawa Convention deals
with land mines.


4. (C) In addition to the question of whether the instrument
should be legally binding or include ammunition, Guillaume
said that efforts to make the instrument retroactive could
further endanger the instrument (a retroactive instrument
would require countries to mark weapons that currently
exist). He added that any efforts to reopen debate on the
definition of SA/LW would demand an additional 3 to 6
sessions to address. Guillaume noted that Ambassador
Thalmann did not include explosive mines in his draft. While
Guillaume agreed that there is no need to include mines in
the definition, the fact that they weren't included could
open debate on the subject that would be counterproductive.
Nevertheless, he said, keeping the 1997 definition may be the
most practical solution (Guillaume said that he did not know
how the U.S. views this issue, stating concerns about
ambiguities regarding MANPADS).

--------------
France and the Inclusion of Ammunition in the Instrument
--------------


5. (C) France, Guillaume said, agrees in principle with the
concept of including ammunition in the instrument, but he
said that they proposed using NATO labeling standards that
are already in place. (He added that France would like the
instrument to deal only with weapons of war and not with
weapons associated with criminal activity, which he said will
need to be dealt with separately). Guillaume recalled that
Germany originally introduced the measure in March of 2004
and that demand for it stemmed from the belief that many
war-torn countries are saturated with illicit weapons already
and the only means of controlling violence now is to
effectively monitor and curtail movement of ammunition.
Still, he said, France is only in favor of promoting measures
that are already being implemented such as NATO standard
labeling of ammunition.
Wolff