DELIVERABLES FOR U.S.-EU IRAQ CONFERENCE: NO NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004043

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID EIND ECON FR IZ EUN
SUBJECT: DELIVERABLES FOR U.S.-EU IRAQ CONFERENCE: NO NEW
GOF AID, GOF AWAITING IRAQI RESPONSE ON POLICE TRAINING

REF: A. STATE 103222


B. PARIS 3401

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment: The GoF will not be announcing
new assistance for Iraq at the June 22 U.S.-EU conference,
which FM Douste-Blazy is likely to attend. MFA officials
responded somewhat defensively to our points encouraging
additional French support for Iraq, and stressed that the
Brussels meeting was not intended to be a pledging
conference. MFA officials confirmed the GoF is waiting for a
response from the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) on its
offer to train some 1500 Iraqi gendarmes in France, and
sought U.S. help in encouraging the ITG to be more
responsive. MFA officials blamed continued legal obstacles
for delaying transfer of frozen Iraqi assets to the ITG, and
emphasized that the French Ministry of Finance was working on
draft legislation to remedy the problem. MFA officials
stressed a desire to consult on the draft conference
statement prior to the June 21 senior officials' meeting in
Brussels, and criticized the Luxembourg EU Presidency for
lack of information sharing. End summary and comment.


2. (C) We discussed deliverables for the U.S.-EU
international conference on Iraq with MFA DAS-equivalent for
Iraq/Iran/Arabian Gulf Affairs Antoine Sivan and MFA Iraq
desk officer Renaud Salins June 7, after conveying ref (a)
points to the MFA June 3. Sivan confirmed that
newly-appointed French FM Philippe Douste-Blazy was likely to
lead the French delegation to Brussels, and that he was
awaiting confirmation of this from the minister's staff.
Douste-Blazy will be accompanied to Brussels by French NEA
A/S-equivalent Jean-Francois Thibault, Sivan, and possibly
MFA Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye, in addition to
working level MFA officials.


3. (C) While Sivan stressed GoF eagerness to attend the
Brussels conference and help make it a success, he responded
negatively to the France-specific points of our message (ref
a),and questioned whether our emphasis on seeking more
French assistance for Iraq was consistent with earlier U.S.
assurances that the Brussels meeting would not be a pledging
conference. Poloff reiterated that the Brussels meeting was
not a donors' pledging conference, and the U.S. looked
forward to working with France and other EU members to ensure
a successful outcome. Nevertheless, with Iraqi authorities
expected to present their national priorities on Iraq's
political transition, economic reconstruction, and public
order/rule of law efforts at the Brussels gathering,
announcements of such support by conference participants
could help build new momentum and demonstrate a new
international partnership in place. Poloff added that the
U.S. was not singling out the GoF in our approach, and that
the USG was approaching nearly all the participants at the
Brussels conference to encourage tangible support for Iraq.
Sivan appeared reassured by the latter point, and sought
confirmation that countries which had not disbursed pledges
at Madrid were being encouraged to do so as well.


4. (C) Both Sivan and Salins downplayed prospects for French
bilateral financial assistance for Iraq via the IRFFI.
Salins asserted that new financial contributions to Iraq were
not essential, since significant portions of existing U.S.,
EU and other international pledges for Iraq still needed to
be disbursed. When poloff asked specifically how much the
GoF was giving Iraq bilaterally, Salins at first was
reluctant to reveal the figure, then conceded that it
amounted to some 2.5 million euros in 2005 -- a figure which
he described as minuscule in comparison to U.S. assistance,
but which represented a three-fold increase over French
assistance to Iraq in 2004.


5. (C) On the French offer to train Iraqi police in France,
Salins reported that the GoF was still waiting for the ITG to
send a planning delegation to France. Salins stressed that
the ITG had a standing offer to train up to 1500 Iraqi police
at various gendarme and police training schools in France, on
issues as varied as criminal investigations, customs
collection, border control or counterterrorism -- it was up
to the ITG to present its top priority needs to the GoF.
French gendarme training schools, he added, were
well-accustomed to welcoming foreign trainees, and already
had Arabic interpretation services in place. The GoF
envisioned that training modules could be for small groups of
students and two to three weeks in length; in order to place
students in courses starting in fall 2005, the ITG needed to
send a delegation to France by late June or early July to
work out logistical details. Since we had last discussed the
training offer in May (ref b),Salins said minimal progress
had been made. The ITG had asked the GoF how many people it
should send to discuss the training offer; the GoF had
clarified that a week-long visit by a small delegation of
three to five Ministry of Interior (MOI) officials with
decisionmaking authority would be appropriate, and offered to
cover travel costs. Sivan and Salins asked for U.S. help in
encouraging the ITG to be responsive to the GoF offer and
send the MOI delegation to France in coming weeks.


6. (C) On frozen Iraqi assets, Sivan stressed the complexity
of the issue and that the GoF continued to lack the necessary
legal authority to transfer the remaining 10 million USD in
Iraqi assets to the ITG. He added that Ministry of Finance
officials were working on a draft law which would resolve the
issue, which remained a legal problem, not a matter of
political will. The new law would need to stand up to review
from the French Council of State (France's highest
administrative court) as well as sustain possible legal
challenges. He described French law on confiscation of
assets and property as more rigid than that of other EU
members, and noted such laws were enacted during the post-war
period to prevent a repeat of the wrongful confiscation of
assets belonging to French Jews during Nazi occupation. Iraq
deskoff Salins added that the GoF had transferred all the
accounts and property belonging to the former Iraqi embassy
to the ITG, however transfer of assets in the name of Saddam
Hussein and other former regime figures required adoption of
new legislation. Poloff stressed the urgency of the issue,
which we had been discussing with the GoF since 2003.


7. (C) Summing up, Sivan stressed the GoF desire to be
constructive at the June 22 conference and appealed for
greater consultation in advance on the conference communique.
He expressed hope that the issue was not left until the June
21 senior officials meeting for resolution, and criticized
the Luxembourg EU Presidency for not keeping other EU members
adequately informed of conference planning. He quipped that
the Luxembourg EU Presidency already appeared worn out by the
conference arrangements before the event had even taken
place. Sivan conceded that the GoF had received from the EU
presidency draft texts of the U.S. and EU proposed statements
for the gathering; the GOF had only a few minor quibbles with
the U.S. draft, such as seeking more prominent mention of
UNSCR 1546 and toning down references to insurgents.


8. (C) Comment: The GoF remains opinion-rich and resource-shy
when it comes to Iraq, and does not like being reminded of
this uncomfortable reality. We will continue to press the
GoF to be more forthcoming in offering tangible support for
the ITG, but for the time being, the most we might hope for
is for the French to implement existing training offers and
transfer long-frozen assets to the ITG. End comment.


WOLFF