Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS3521
2005-05-23 15:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

POLICY PLANNING DIRECTOR KRASNER DISCUSSES RUSSIA,

Tags:  PREL RS XF XI FR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 003521 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2015
TAGS: PREL RS XF XI FR
SUBJECT: POLICY PLANNING DIRECTOR KRASNER DISCUSSES RUSSIA,
ARAB WORLD REFORM, TRANSATLANTIC/MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION
WITH FRENCH COUNTERPART


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 003521

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2015
TAGS: PREL RS XF XI FR
SUBJECT: POLICY PLANNING DIRECTOR KRASNER DISCUSSES RUSSIA,
ARAB WORLD REFORM, TRANSATLANTIC/MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION
WITH FRENCH COUNTERPART


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Visiting Policy Planning Director Stephen
Krasner and S/P Deputy Barry Lowenkron met in Paris April 19
with French MFA Center for Analysis and Prediction (CAP)
Director Pierre Levy and his deputy, Philippe Errera for
discussions of Russia's drift towards authoritarian rule;
democratic reform in the Arab world; promoting democracy,
human rights and the rule of law; and improving transatlantic
and multinational cooperation. The French offered their view
of Putin's motivations, suggesting that he is following the
will of Russia's domestic constituency but is still concerned
with his image abroad. They expressed pessimism concerning
Russia's upcoming G-8 presidency, predicting that progress on
ongoing projects would be slow and acknowledged 'huge'
differences in the way EU member states deal with Russia.
The French also pointed out differences between Europe and
the U.S. on the Middle East saying that Europeans favor
respecting the sovereignty of Arab states while the U.S.
favors democratic reform even if it means forcefully changing
regimes. On the subject of post-conflict cooperation, the
French said that many problems stem from a lack of clarity;
post-conflict situations are inherently complicated but are
rendered more so by miscommunication and differing
understandings of commonly used terminology. They suggested
developing a common understanding of terminology and criteria
so that all parties involved in post-conflict reconstruction
have a clear idea of the circumstances that should trigger
action, the processes that should govern how action is taken,
the objectives of the action and the means to realistically
measure success. End summary.


2. (C) In addition to Levy and Errera on the French side at
the lunch were MFA Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye,
CAP Advisor on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Space
Claire Lignieres, and Center for International Studies and
Research (CERI) researchers Pierre Hassner and Marie Mendras.
Poloff (notetaker) accompanied Krasner and Lowenkron.
Krasner opened the session by asking whether the U.S., France

and other Western nations had sufficient influence to
leverage positive change in Russia. Mendras responded with a
question of her own: should the West really care whether
Putin turns away from the democratic path internally so long
as we secure his cooperation on external issues of importance
to us, like Iran's nuclear program?


3. (C) Hassner suggested that Putin's domestic
considerations are to some degree driving his policy choices
in the near abroad. He has not come to terms with the
Ukrainian revolution and we risk continued trouble-making
from Russia on Georgia. The issue for us is to gauge how
much we can push for adherence to democratic norms in Russia
before Putin retaliates by cutting back on whatever
cooperation he might otherwise be prepared to offer on
external issues. Mendras stated that the West -- including
the U.S. during the first Bush administration and France
under Chirac -- had been too indulgent of Putin and had not
spoken out forcefully enough about Russian internal
developments, including Chechnya. She suggested that there
are civil society leaders in Russia, especially in the
provinces, who are unhappy with Putin's authoritarian turn.
These can be important interlocutors for the West. There
are, in fact, many elites in Russia, not just the ones
centered in Moscow and St. Petersburg around Putin.


4. (C) Levy noted that the GOF had begun considering how
best to take advantage of Russia's G-8 presidency next year.
Laboulaye said that given Russian officials' tendency towards
Soviet-style behavior, their penchant for long, intractable
bargaining, and their inexperience in launching initiatives
in multilateral settings, he was not optimistic that the
Russians' G-8 presidency would allow us to advance any of our
ongoing projects. Krasner confirmed that Washington agencies
had begun thinking about this problem, but had yet to come to
a concerted position on it. Agreeing with Levy, Errera said,
using a chess analogy, that the Russians are skilled at
"playing black," but do not have the array of opening gambits
and imagination needed to "play white." Laboulaye suggested
that the Russians could usefully be encouraged to work on G-8
nonproliferation initiatives during the presidency. This
would represent a natural next step in the G-8 handling of
Russia on this subject. We had, he recalled, talked about
Russian proliferation at the Kananaskis Summit, but since the
Evian Summit we have been talking with Russia about North
Korean, Iranian and other proliferation threats. Krasner
agreed that this might be a fruitful area for work during the
Russian presidency.


5. (C) In response to Krasner's question, Laboulaye
acknowledged that there were "huge" differences among
European Union members in their approaches to Russia.
France, Germany, Italy and other established EU members were
"open and accommodating" in dealing with Russia. Former
Warsaw Pact and Soviet members on the other hand were deeply
suspicious of Russia. Poland, having taken the EU lead over
Ukraine as the ORANGE Revolution played out, has developed a
more balanced voice on Russia in EU councils. The
Commission, too, can be very negative in its dealings with
Russia, Laboulaye said.


6. (C) A slightly different array of French players lined up
for the afternoon session on Arab reform. Laboulaye and
Lignieres departed, to be replaced by CAP Advisor Sophie
Pommier and writer and commentator Olivier Roy. Roy led off
by contrasting European and U.S. approaches to promoting
reform in the Arab world. Europeans favor the respect of
sovereignty of states, even if they may be ruled by repugnant
regimes, and attempt to apply political and economic
incentives to promote internal reform. The U.S., as
demonstrated by its intervention in Iraq, is prepared to
pursue a policy of regime change if this is deemed necessary
to bring about reform. This approach was anathema in the
Arab world and Europe before Iraq. But Iraq has changed
attitudes fundamentally, Roy stated. There is now in the
Middle East "a call for democracy." The idea of democracy
has become popular among the people of the Middle East.


7. (C) Nevertheless, differences in the U.S. and European
approaches remain, with Europeans still tending to see
secular, authoritarian regimes in the region as bulwarks
against fundamentalist Islam. The problem with the approach,
however, is that "secular, authoritarian regimes have
generally been failures," Roy went on. They do not reform
politically or economically, they perform poorly in creating
economic growth, and they fuel the growth of Islamic
fundamentalism's appeal to the large numbers of dispossessed
in society. On the other hand, American-style intervention
does not necessarily produce rapid democratization either.
So both approaches have their weaknesses, Roy concluded. His
only constant was that democratic reform in the Arab world is
a long-term process.


8. (C) Roy suggested that the West begin with a simple
question: "Who are the democrats, and what power for change
to they wield?" Entrepreneurs certainly have a stake in
democratic and economic reform, but they are an "elusive"
group in the Arab world. (There are none, for example, in
Iran; in Tunisia there are some, but they are not free
agents, having always to "make deals" with the regime.) This
class does exist in Turkey and is one of Turkish democracy's
strengths, but "it is weak in the Arab world." Intellectuals
are another constituency for democracy in the Arab world, but
they are dependent in many instances on support from abroad,
and this very support makes them suspect in the eyes of many
of their fellow Arabs. Liberal Muslims may also be a group
favorable to democratic ideas, and there are many in the Arab
world. It might also be possible, as in Afghanistan, to work
with traditional civil society groups displaying clan and
tribal allegiances. Whoever we decide are the democrats,
there can be no democracy in the Arab world without political
legitimacy and political legitimacy in the Arab world depends
on nationalism and Islam. Democracy cannot be rooted without
reference to one, the other, or both. In many instances,
groups that hold this legitimacy are not now inclined to work
with the West. The FIS in Algeria, Hizballah in Lebanon,
Hamas in the Palestinian territories and the Islamic
Brotherhood in Egypt all enjoy political legitimacy with
their constituencies and have to be dealt with in some way,
Roy contended.


9. (C) Krasner agreed that we would have to confront this
difficulty. He noted that the U.S. emphasis has been on
promoting elections. First elections in many of the
countries in the region may not be perfect. Some may give
power to Islamist parties and groups. Our objective should
be to ensure that first elections in some of these countries
are not last elections. Under the right conditions, elected
governments will be held accountable by the electorate,
leading to democratic change and good governance. Roy
pointed to the difficulty of ensuring that first elections do
not become last elections, ushering in a democratically
elected dictatorship that will never relinquish power.
Similarly, there is a question as to whether change would
result, even if relatively fair elections could be arranged a
second time in some of these countries. This is because
people tend to retreat into tribal and ethnic identities in
periods of uncertainty, because of fears of reprisal should
traditional rivals ascend to power.


10. (C) Agreeing, Pommier said that it is the lack of
political maturity in much of the Arab world that makes
democratic change rare. Of all Arab groups, Roy suggested,
the Palestinians are perhaps the most politically mature.
They have the experience of relatively free elections in 1996
-- and the experience of rule by an aging, charismatic, but
despotic and ineffectual leader that they do not want to
repeat. Agreeing, Levy noted that the Palestinians are among
the most educated peoples in the Arab world. Taking the
argument one step further, Roy said that if the Palestinians
are able to build a successful, democratic state, they will
demonstrate to others in the Arab world that nationalism and
democracy can go together. That could be a useful example
in promoting democracy elsewhere.


11. (C) With the final group of discussions, dedicated to
"Promoting Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights" and
"Transatlantic and Multinational Cooperation," Levy
introduced Jean-Maurice Ripert, the French MFA Director for
the U.N. and International Organizations and, later, Eric
Chevallier, the former Special Adviser to Bernard Kouchner,
former Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG) to Kosovo. After Krasner outlined the Secretary of
State's emphasis on post-conflict reconstruction and the need
to have well configured mechanisms to identify and react
quickly to potential crises around the world, Ripert
elaborated on the challenges of reconstruction. He said that
the French have termed reconstruction a "complex situation,"
that is, it is not simply coming to the aid of a nation after
a natural disaster where assistance can be given with little
threat or ambiguity. Rather, it is an environment where
there are often multiple actors, movement across borders and
imperfect information that combine to create a situation
where outside action can be costly and confusing. Ripert
said that the U.S. and France agree that current mechanisms
are insufficient to deal with these new challenges. All
sides understand there needs to be international coordination
yet no one nation will submit to the authority of another
nation when it comes time for this coordination to take
place. Furthermore, he added, while internal coordination is
imperative, external coordination is just as important. One
central problem of coordination, Ripert said, is that often
times the coordinating bodies do not share the same vision --
they talk in shared terms while not understanding the other's
definition of these terms -- this, coupled with the fact that
different countries and organizations have different
processes, contributes to the confusion. Ripert said that an
example of this confusion is manifest in the term
"Development of the Rule of Law." He said that people use
this term as if the goal was universally understood, yet
there is little consensus as to what developing a rule of law
entails. Ripert said that 'Human Rights' and 'Democracy' are
two other terms that are often mistakenly viewed as
interchangeable. He asserted that the U.S. generally
promotes democracy while France promotes human rights.


12. (C) Ripert said that the U.S. focus on democracy over
human rights is worrisome to the French. He said that the
meeting of the Community of Democracies would take place in
Santiago as the U.S. and Kofi Annan would "advocate an end to
the UN Commission on Human Rights." Ripert said that it is
good to question the effectiveness of the Commission, but
that the reform measures proposed are not the right
solutions. For example, he said, creating a two-thirds rule
for electing members would allow a country like Libya to get
on the Commission before the U.S. He said the Commission on
Human Rights, as the international human rights advocate,
needs to have everyone on board, "the good guys and the bad
guys." Otherwise, he said, there is a danger that no
organization focused on human rights will exist within the
UN. Furthermore, he warned that allowing human rights
violators to exist on the periphery of an organization serves
to discourage democratic activists in those countries.
Ripert said that activists such as Iran's Shirin Ebadi
consistently demand that France not give up on their plight,
and giving up on the Human Rights Commission would send these
leaders the wrong message. Krasner answered that the Human
Rights Commission has not been effective and that even if the
Human Rights Commission were to go away, the norms upon which
human rights are based will not. So, he asked, is it better
under the circumstances to have a hypocritical organization?
Krasner then suggested that the French CAP consider thinking
of solutions that challenge traditional norms. He asked them
to question the Westphalian assumption that gives rights to
states based on the fact that they are sovereign nations and
consider what might happen if states were held to human
rights or democratic standards in order to determine their
admission into bodies such as the UN Security Council. The
challenge, he said, is to identify what will motivate the
state to undergo change. For example, Krasner said,
pressure from Mercosur was enough to compel Paraguay to
institute reform. He said that finding, creating, and/or
strengthening other institutions so that they might hold this
same persuasive edge may be key to changing the behavior of
states.


13. (C) Pierre Levy then introduced Eric Chevallier who
described several key lessons from the past decade on
post-conflict situations that should inform the international
community going forward. The first, he said, was that in
conflict resolution there has always been a huge gap between
expectations and what can actually be achieved. High
expectations at the outset cause people to measure the
success of action based not upon what it has achieved, but on
what it was expected to achieve, therefore a disproportionate
number of actions are deemed failures while very few are
deemed successes. This, in turn, makes intervention a harder
sell to the domestic constituency. The second lesson,
Chevallier said, is that external legality is never enough.
For the West, an election is the culmination of the
democratic process; it follows that the West, in introducing
elections to an undemocratic society, often concludes that,
because elections have occurred, the society is democratic.
Chevallier said that he believes elections are absolutely
necessary, but that simply stenciling them onto a society is
not enough. Therefore, we must examine and replicate the
process that brings a society to elections- it is through
this process that a society begins to feel empowered and
therefore capable of choosing its own leaders and making its
own decisions. The third lesson is that in conflict and
post-conflict situations short-term goals often contradict
long-term goals.


14. (C) Chevalier said that often times in post-conflict
situations the international community holds the population
to an impossible human standard. It is unreasonable, he
said, to expect a man who has recently learned that his wife
was killed by the other side to "forgive and forget."
Furthermore, people on the ground need to have a realistic
concept of what their future will be like, the promise of an
ideal future in the long-term is useless when a person sees
only a bleak short-term existence with no means of ever
arriving at that distant goal. Objectives must be concrete,
Chevallier said, they must be translated into realities that
people can reasonably expect on the ground. All parties
agreed that the proximity of the EU and hope of potential EU
membership provided countries of the former Yugoslavia a
realistic horizon that allowed them to change more rapidly
than they would've had the potential for EU membership not
existed. Krasner said that identifying and/or creating
bodies that serve, as a motivational tool for states is
imperative adding that it would be great if Africa had an
effective mechanism for promoting change.


15. (C) On elections, Chevallier said that there are
generally two schools of thought: the first is focused on the
importance of the process and the second on the importance of
the outcome. In the first school of thought, elections,
even imperfect, are seen as one step in a process of
refinement of the democratic process. Afghanistan and Iraq
are both examples of this. However, proponents of the second
school of thought, he said, argue that it is better to wait
and have elections when the timing is right. He cited Bosnia
as an example of this. Ripert added that this question of
process vs. outcome is one that the French are currently
debating as regards elections in Lebanon. When asked which
model he favored, Krasner responded that in the past he would
have said that if elections are held too early that the
results would fall on sectarian lines, but that his answer
now would be different. He said that elections that are
focused on process rather than outcome can be successful but
that more robust election monitoring is needed to ensure that
the democratic process is adhered to and improves over time.
Chevallier added that monitoring needs to be in place before,
during and after elections but asked what organization would
be responsible for conducting it, noting that the OSCE
already does election monitoring. Krasner answered that the
OSCE could possibly do it, that coalitions of the willing
would not be the right type to conduct monitoring, and that
the UN may not be capable either. Strengthening the AU to
serve this function, he added, could be an attractive option.



16. (C) Ripert agreed that a more robust election monitoring
apparatus would be useful and suggested that the U.S. and
France work to define criteria. He explained that he was
recently involved in UN discussions where they worked to
define criteria for the use of force and that it occurred to
him that it would be valuable to define criteria for other
actions as well such as successful political transition. All
sides agreed that this would be a good idea and that it would
be beneficial to include the British in these discussions as
well.


17. (U) S/P Deputy Barry Lowenkron has cleared on this
cable.
WOLFF