PRELIMINARY FRENCH REACTION TO U.S. VIEWS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003486

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015
TAGS: PREL SY LE FR
SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY FRENCH REACTION TO U.S. VIEWS ON
POST-ELECTION INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 1520

Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In preliminary comments on the U.S. nonpaper
on an international framework of support for Lebanon
(reftel),Presidential Middle East Advisor Dominique Boche
confirmed GoF support for an international meeting on Lebanon
but cautioned that we should remain discreet in preparations
to ensure it does not become an issue in Lebanon's electoral
campaign. Boche urged that such a meeting should avoid
addressing military/security cooperation and not give the
impression of an international effort to disarm militias,
which would put the new government in a difficult position.
While stressing that the GoF was still formulating its views,
Boche suggested that the GoF might advocate focusing efforts
on two (rather than three) priority areas: rule of law and
economic assistance. The GoF was also reflecting whether it
might be more effective to have one, vice two, international
gatherings, to avoid misinterpretations from the Lebanese
side and focus on the international response. Boche also
raised the familiar French argument that we must avoid any
impression of creating a system of international "tutelage"
in Lebanon, which retained a long democratic tradition and
was not comparable with Afghanistan or Iraq. MFA contacts
stressed the "no tutelage" point in much more detail during a
separate discussion, and were generally more cautious and
negative on the U.S. paper than the Elysee. Both Elysee and
MFA contacts welcomed the idea of holding an informal
planning meeting in Paris the week of June 13 and did not
comment on proposed participants. End summary.


2. (C) During a May 19 meeting with poloff, Presidential
Middle East advisor Dominique Boche commented on the U.S.
nonpaper on a proposed international framework of support for
Lebanon presented to French Ambassador Emie May 16 reftel).
From the outset, Boche stressed that the GoF was still
formulating a response and his views were only preliminary.
That said, he noted that the GoF shared the U.S. desire to
maintain international attention on Lebanon after elections,
and favored the idea of an international meeting focused on
supporting Lebanon's new government. The meeting would need
to be well-calibrated to avoid creating unrealistic Lebanese
expectations of a massive increase in economic aid. He
stressed that we needed to work rapidly to prepare for the
post-election phase, but also should be careful not to
publicize our efforts and keep our consultations at the
experts level, to avoid having them become an issue in
Lebanon's election campaign or a topic of speculation or
distortion in the scoop-hungry Lebanese press.


3. (C) Boche stressed the need to have a "correct" local
Lebanese perception of our efforts, and suggested focusing
the international meeting on less-controversial issues, such
as rule of law, institutional aid, and economic assistance.
Repeating arguments made by French Ambassador Emie in Beirut
(reftel),Boche strongly cautioned against adding a
security/military element to the conference, which he said
would be interpreted very negatively in Lebanon. In the GOF
view, security and military assistance to Lebanon should
proceed discreetly via bilateral channels, although of course
donors could exchange information to better coordinate their
efforts. Boche similarly cautioned that the international
conference should not be interpreted as a tactic to implement
"part two" of UNSCR 1559, i.e. disarm militias, which
remained a delicate issue in Lebanon and would put the new
government in a difficult spot. Boche noted that while the
worst had been avoided, after the compromises reached between
Christian and Muslim opposition factions following divisions
over the 2000 electoral law, the episode exposed the
fragility and inherent fissures in Lebanon's opposition.


4. (C) Boche also noted that the GoF was hearing concerns
from some Lebanese interlocutors over perceived U.S. plans to
inscribe Lebanon in part of a larger USG plan to transform
the region. Repeating a familiar GoF point, he stressed that
Lebanon was an "old democracy" and did not want to be treated
like Afghanistan or Iraq; we should avoid any impression of
seeking to create a system of international tutelage over
Lebanon. Poloff countered the misimpression that the U.S.
was seeking any form of tutelage over Lebanon, which was
without factual basis; the very nature of our joint effort
with France was to help Lebanon realize its full independence
and sovereignty, not to replace Syrian domination of Lebanon
with another outside power broker. Similarly, the USG fully
recognized the distinct character of Lebanon and was not
seeking to "cut and paste" an Afghanistan or Iraq model; at
the same time, we should not dismiss the important democratic
achievements in Afghanistan and Iraq as having no relevance
to the people of Lebanon or the rest of the region.


5. (C) In closing, Boche commented that the GoF was
reflecting on whether it might make more sense to focus our
efforts on two tracks, such as rule of law and economic
assistance, vice the U.S.-proposed political, economic and
security/military tracks. The GoF was similarly considering
whether it might be more effective to hold one conference,
vice the proposed two, in order to avoid misinterpretations
of our intentions among the Lebanese and focus on the
international response to Lebanon's needs. Boche welcomed
the idea of holding an informal planning meeting in Paris the
week of June 13, and did not question the U.S.-proposed
participants in the core donor planning group.


6. (C) In a separate discussion with poloff May 18, MFA
DAS-equivalent for Levant/Egypt Christian Jouret offered a
more cautious and negative preliminary reaction to the U.S.
paper. Like Boche, Jouret stressed that the GoF was still
digesting the U.S. proposals and described his reaction as
personal, not reflecting GoF policy. Jouret suggested that
the Lebanese might view the proposed "Beirut I" conference as
seeking to create a system of international "tutelage" over
Lebanon, which the new government would be likely to reject,
though it would welcome a new donors conference. Poloff
countered the "tutelage" assertion as without basis,
stressing that we were seeking to work with, not impose ideas
upon, the new Lebanese government, who would identify and set
forth its needs to the international community. Jouret said
he did not question the worthiness of U.S. intentions, but
asserted further that a donor-driven reform process, as seen
in the Palestinian example, would constitute a form of
international tutelage. We needed to make sure that
ownership of the reform process remained with the Lebanese.
Jouret added that the issue was not whether Lebanon needed
reforms, as the government clearly needed restructuring "from
A to Z." The question remained how best could the
international community help Lebanon, and whether the
Lebanese would live up to international expectations. Jouret
added that the U.S. and France should continue our careful
and close coordination on Lebanon, best exemplified by the
twin efforts of our ambassadors in Beirut. Despite his
initial pessimism, Jouret was open to the proposal to hold
informal planning meetings in Paris the week of June 13, as
long as we kept these discussions discreet and did not give
the impression that the future of Lebanon was being decided
outside the country.


7. (C) Comment: To keep the French engaged and constructive
on the post-election planning for Lebanon, we will need to
keep our planning discreet before Lebanon's election cycle is
complete and continue to hammer away at the "tutelage"
argument, which gives the French a convenient (and false)
point on which to distinguish their Lebanon policy from that
of the U.S. To this end, it would be helpful if we can avoid
drawing parallels between our post-election Lebanon approach
and past experience with Afghanistan, Iraq, and the
Palestinians, to remind the French that we understand that
Lebanon is a unique case. While the GoF is still formulating
its position, the repeated French cautions on including a
security/military track in an international conference
suggest a hardening GoF position on this point. End comment.

WOLFF