CHARGE CAUTIONS LEBANESE GENERAL AOUN AGAINST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003053

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2015
TAGS: PREL LE FR
SUBJECT: CHARGE CAUTIONS LEBANESE GENERAL AOUN AGAINST
SPLITTING OPPOSITION

REF: A. BASKEY-MAILHOT 5/3/05 EMAIL


B. BEIRUT 1373

C. PARIS 2162

Classified By: Charge d'affaires Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with former Lebanese armed
forces commanding General Michel Aoun in Paris May 4, three
days before Aoun's scheduled return to Lebanon May 7, Charge
cautioned Aoun on the need to maintain Lebanese opposition
unity and to do nothing to delay the conduct of May 29
elections. Aoun took Charge's points on board and asserted
that his only ambition in returning to Lebanon after his 15
years in exile in France was to help restore the Lebanese
democracy. He nevertheless stated that his efforts to broker
a common position with Walid Jumblatt, the Hariri family and
the traditional Christian leadership had been ignored.
Ascribing to these figures mercenary and self-serving motives
in seeking power, Aoun said he could not work with such
corrupt members of the opposition because they were not
credible in the eyes of the Lebanese people. By contrast,
Hizballah enjoys "a certain popularity" and has not been
corrupt or exploitative. For these reasons, Aoun said he
felt he could work with Hizballah, encouraging them to "hand
over their weapons to the army" and become a purely political
group. Aoun also stated clearly that he would encourge a
delay in the conduct of elections of "perhaps 15 days," in
order to give Parliament time to vote a new election law, to
replace the 2000 law which Aoun said would polarize Lebanese
groups and favor the Syrian loyalists. Charge underscored
the importance of conducting elections on schedule, clearly
stated U.S. policy on Hizballah, and warned Aoun not to allow
himself to be used by those who want Syria to retain a
measure of influence in Lebanese affairs. End summary.


2. (C) Charge met with Aoun, at Aoun's request, to lay down
a clear message on the need to maintain opposition unity and
not to allow his return to Lebanon to be exploited by those
who wanted to see Syria retain a measure of influence in
Lebanese affairs. Charge emphasized the need to keep
elections on schedule for May 29 and not to become embroiled
in a devisive debate over the nature of the law that will
govern the elections. Aoun asserted that his only reason for
returning to Lebanon was to help restore the Lebanese
democracy. He added, however, that initial indications for
the success of this project were not favorable. Aoun claimed
to have proposed to Walid Jumblatt and others in the
opposition a common program as early as November 2004, but
said his proposals had been ignored. He claimed that he
alone among Lebanese oppositionists had been forthright in
his support of UNSCR 1559 and that it was only after the
assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri that others in
the opposition spoke out forcefully in favor of a Syrian
withdrawal. These same figures are now trying to block
Aoun's return to Lebanon, even lobbying against him with
Western governments. Jumblatt, Aoun said with some
bitterness, had publicly attacked him.


3. (C) Ascribing to them mercenary and self-serving motives
in seeking power, Aoun said that he saw no possibility now of
finding common ground with Jumblatt, members of the Hariri
family, or the traditional Christian leadership (as
represented in the Qornet Shehwan). The Lebanese people are
aware of the corruption and opportunism of these members of
the opposition, who have no credibility in their eyes, Aoun
went on. The Lebanese people want real change, not a
continuation of governance by an elite political class
seeking only to enrich themselves and enjoy the perquisites
of power. Moreover, Lebanon's new leadership will have to
deal with the critical state of the economy, and cannot do
this by continuing to loot the national treasure. He
recalled that his proposal for an audit of state finances had
raised a "tempest" of protest among officials who had no
desire to see their long years of exploiting the pubic laid
bare.


4. (C) Aoun noted that while considering his return to
Lebanon he had met in Paris with the envoys of Lebanese
President Lahoud, including Lahoud's son and long-time
political operative Pakradouni. He claimed that he had come
to an agreement with Lahoud's envoys to drop the legal
charges pending against Aoun that were leveled by the
pro-Syrian government at the time of Aoun's "war of
liberation" against the Syrians. Aoun said charges of
misappropriation of state funds had been dropped in a legal
proceeding May 4 and that charges related to his
Congressional testimony leading to enactment of the Syrian
Accountability Act were scheduled to be dealt with in court
on May 5. No matter what the outcome of this proceeding,
Aoun said, he would return to Lebanon on May 7 and enjoyed
sufficient popular support and credibility to "remain on the
political scene despite all these efforts to eliminate me
from the game." He stated that he had no fear for his
personal safety in returning.

5. (C) Given the corruption and lack of credibility of most
of the opposition forces, Aoun said he had to "have allies
who perhaps should not be my allies," making clear
subsequently that he was referring to Hizballah. Charge
stated clearly U.S. policy on Hizballah and warned Aoun not
to allow himself to be used by political forces in Lebanon
that wanted to see Syria retain a measure of influence in
Lebanon's affairs. Aoun said he had no personal political
ambitions in returning to Lebanon, either for a seat in
Parliament or for the Presidency. He repeated that his
objective is to restore the Lebanese democracy and have that
achievement stand as his legacy to the Lebanese people. To
do so, however, he needs allies and the traditional political
elite are not a viable alternative in the eyes of the
Lebanese public, which wants real change.


6. (C) Hizballah, by contrast, enjoys "a certain popularity"
and is known to be honest and not to have exploited the
Lebanese people. For these reasons, Aoun said he could work
with Hizballah while encouraging them to give up their
weapons to the Lebanese army. The time of imposition of
change by force in Lebanon is passed, Aoun asserted. "We
must convince people, and put the rifle aside." Hizballah
should also know that its "protection against the foreign
threat" (a reference to Israel) is not through violence, but
through a re-made Lebanon able to speak as a nation and
eventually be part of a wide-ranging Middle East peace
accord. Moreover, said Aoun, "we don't have a way to compel
(Hizballah) militarily" to give up their arms. Bringing
Hizballah around will take finesse and patience, qualities
Aoun said mark him as an "atypical" Lebanese politician.


7. (C) Reminded that he should not allow disagreement over
the election law to become a pretext for delaying the
elections, Aoun demurred. He said that a short delay "of
perhaps 15 days," would allow Parliament time to adopt a new,
more equitable election law that would ultimately strengthen
the opposition's chances in the elections. Conduct of the
elections under the 2000 election law would further polarize
the Lebanese polity and favor pro-Syrian loyalists. "The
results will not be good," Aoun asserted. Charge reiterated
forcefully the need to maintain momentum by holding elections
as scheduled on May 29.


8. (C) Finally, asked about his immediate plans on his
return to Beirut May 7, Aoun said he planned first to visit
the tomb of the unknown solider (perhaps playing to his
supporters within the Lebanese military),then Hariri's tomb.
Aoun is then scheduled to attend a rally in Martyrs Square,
where he will give an address. Thereafter, he intends to
hold "open house" receiving members of the oppostion and
loyalists alike, should they wish to come.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Aoun clearly understood our message and took on board
Charge's warnings on the need to maintain opposition unity
and not allow his arrival to be exploited by pro-Syrian
loyalists. He, nevertheless, is convinced that he knows the
Lebanese political scene into which he is about to reinsert
himself and has a strategy for consolidating support around
himself. His dismissal of the possibility of working with
Jumblatt and other Christian and Sunni opposition figures
does not auger well for opposition unity, and his willingness
to embrace Hizballah is disturbing evidence of the same kind
of political opportunism of which he accuses Lebanon's
political elite. We leave to Embassy Beirut an assessment of
how far Aoun may succeed. Our impression of the man,
however, was that while not lacking in courage, he may be
overestimating the extent of his appeal to the Lebanese
public after 15 years in exile, and (at least in our
two-on-two setting) did not appear to possess the kind of
energy and charisma that would be needed to command the
loyalty of a mass following. End comment.
ROSENBLATT