Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS299
2005-01-14 18:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

YAWER-CHIRAC MEETING HIGH ON ATMOSPHERICS, BUT LOW

Tags:  PREL IZ FR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000299 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2014
TAGS: PREL IZ FR
SUBJECT: YAWER-CHIRAC MEETING HIGH ON ATMOSPHERICS, BUT LOW
ON RESULTS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alex Wolff, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000299

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2014
TAGS: PREL IZ FR
SUBJECT: YAWER-CHIRAC MEETING HIGH ON ATMOSPHERICS, BUT LOW
ON RESULTS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alex Wolff, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Presidential Advisor for Middle East Andre Parant gave
us a brief, but upbeat readout January 14 of President
Chirac's meeting and working lunch with Iraqi Interim
Government (IIG) President Ghazi al-Yawer January 13. (Note:
Yawer met with FM Barnier and the President of the National
Assembly Debre today and departs France January 15; we will
seek MFA and Iraqi embassy readouts next week. End note.)
Parant summed up the Yawer-Chirac discussions as having gone
"very well," with very positive atmospherics but no
significant operational results. According to Parant, Chirac
was largely in listening mode, seeking Yawer's views on the
current and longterm situation in Iraq. Yawer, meanwhile,
presented himself as a true man of the people, as opposed to
other political leaders who had spent most of their time in
exile prior to the fall of Saddam's regime. Parant commented
that the GoF found Yawer to be an articulate and impressive
interlocutor and viewed him as representative of most Iraqis
who want more independence and sovereignty, which the IIG
President stressed would take time and require the continued
presence of U.S. troops.


2. (C) Parant confirmed that Chirac reminded Yawer that the
French offer to train Iraqi security forces (police) remained
on the table; to this end, Chirac gave Yawer a letter on the
French proposal and suggested that the Iraqi government send
a mission to Paris to further discuss the issue. Yawer
responded by taking note of the offer, and affirming that his
government would study the idea. Explaining Yawer's limited
response, Parant speculated that the Iraqi president may not
have been previously aware of the French offer or was not in
a position to act on it. He expressed hope that others in
Yawer's delegation could pick up action on the training
offer, which the GoF hoped would be met with an Iraqi
response. Other points stressed by Chirac, according to
Parant, included French readiness to help Iraq (no further
specifics),GoF support for the political calendar and
maintaining the January 30 election date, the GoF's support
for the compromise reached on Iraq's Paris Club debt, and
French readiness to participate in Iraq's reconstruction,
within the limits posed by the difficult security situation.


3. (C) Parant described Yawer as realistic and sober on the
current situation in Iraq, but optimistic on the medium to
longterm. Yawer described the current situation as very
difficult, with terrorists seeking to derail the political
process, the borders porous to foreign infiltrators, and
Iraq's neighbors, namely Syria and Iran, playing a negative
role. Yawer criticized the CPA decision to dissolve the
Iraqi army as responsible for many of the current security
problems. At the same time, Yawer voiced optimism on
prospects for elections and greater than expected Sunni
participation. The Iraqi President told Chirac that rumors of
a Sunni boycott were greatly exaggerated, with voter
participation problems limited to one to two provinces in
which terrorists -- not a boycott -- would keep voters at
home. Yawer also stressed to Chirac his belief that Iraq was
not headed towards civil war, and asserted that there was a
prevailing Iraqi identity which prevailed over sectarian and
ethnic divisions. Yawer also commented that there appeared
to be two camps within Iraq's Shi'a community: those under
the influence of Iran, and a much-larger group who favored a
uniquely Iraqi, "lighter" version of Shi'ism.


4. (C) Parant noted that Chirac briefly raised the
disappearance of French journalist Florence Aubenas, last
seen in Baghdad January 5, and asked if the Iraqi government
might have any information on her case. Parant said Yawer
appeared to have concluded that Aubenas was being held
hostage by criminals seeking a ransom, but this appeared to
be more speculation than a conclusion based on proven
information. (Note: The GoF is still not calling Aubenas
case a kidnapping. End note.)


5. (C) Comment: Given the low-key manner in which the Yawer
visit has taken place, more than one French daily has
described the visit as a indicative of a "timid" French-Iraqi
rapprochement. Though the Yawer visit was short on results,
his presence here appears to have served a useful purpose in
smoothing French dealings with the IIG just a few weeks
before its dissolution. It also exposed the GoF to a more
constructive assessment of the longterm situation in Iraq
than that typically heard from French press or most French
officials. End comment.


6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
Leach