GOF AGREES ON NEED SUSTAIN PRESSURE ON SYRIA, WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002946

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2015
TAGS: PREL SY LE PTER FR
SUBJECT: GOF AGREES ON NEED SUSTAIN PRESSURE ON SYRIA, WITH
CAVEATS ON HIZBALLAH

REF: STATE 78006

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Charles Neary, reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Senior MFA and Elysee officials described the
GoF as fully agreeing with our message on sustaining pressure
on Syria (reftel),except for two points: the timing of
Hizballah disarmament, with France favoring a gradual
approach, and EU designation of Hizballah, which France
continues to oppose. Elysee officials asserted that
Hizballah's disarmament should not be a precondition of
Hizballah's entry into politics, but instead would be the
eventual result of such politicization. Elysee officials
also stressed the need to keep the U.S.-French demarche on
Lebanon "prudent" and focused on Lebanon's independence and
sovereignty vice hostility to Syria, which had allowed us to
maximize support in Lebanon and among Arab moderates. Elysee
officials also counseled against raising issues such as a
separate Lebanese peace with Israel, which would make life
difficult for the Lebanese opposition. MFA officials
confirmed French intent to participate in the EU election
observer mission and French support for keeping the EU
association agreement with Syria on long-term hold. End
summary.

ELYSEE VIEW: WHY WE CAN'T ALIENATE HIZBALLAH
--------------


2. (C) Visiting NEA DAS Elizabeth Dibble discussed reftel
points on sustaining pressure on Syria and maintaining
momentum towards free and fair Lebanese elections in separate
meetings with Presidential Technical Advisor on the Middle
East/Americas Dominique Boche and MFA A/S-equivalent Jean
Francois Thibault April 29. Poloff also discussed reftel
points with MFA DAS-equivalent for the Levant Christian
Jouret April 28. Boche initially stressed that U.S.-French
cooperation on Lebanon had achieved results unthinkable even
a few months ago -- withdrawal of Syrian troops, a new
Lebanese government chosen by consensus, and elections likely
to take place within constitutional deadlines. He emphasized
that the reasons for this success were that we had been
"careful" in presentation of our demarche, made clear that we
were not seeking to destabilize the region or Syria, and
focused our message on attaining a free, democratic Lebanon.
Keeping our ambitions limited, according to Boche, permitted
us to get the support of the Lebanese people and Arab
moderates, chiefly Egypt and Saudi Arabia.


3. (C) Boche added that the U.S. and France had not achieved
all our objectives in Lebanon, and we needed to remain
vigilant to the covert Syrian security forces which stayed
behind, as well potential disturbances launched by loyalists
or the Palestinian camps, which remained under Syrian
control. There also remained forces hostile to the
U.S.-French effort within the Lebanese government, namely
President Lahoud, who wielded considerable nuisance power.
For this reason, Boche reasoned, we needed to keep as many
Lebanese as possible on our side, and take great care not to
antagonize Hizballah. The GoF had sought to make Hizballah
understand that France accepts Hizballah as a political
reality and representative of the Shi'a community, the most
populous grouping in Lebanon. The GoF had also advised
Hizballah that it needed to choose the political track, and
"abandon ambiguities," such as its plan of national
resistance or actions in Palestinian territories. The GoF
had made clear to Hizballah that the door was open for them
to become a normal political force in Lebanon, and wanted to
proceed on a step-by-step basis. In the GoF view,
disarmament should not be the precondition of Hizballah's
entry into politics, but instead would be the logical
consequence of its politicization. Boche asserted that we
had little alternative to the French approach, as there was
no force or entity present which could disarm Hizballah, and
alienating Hizballah ran the risk of pushing the Shi'a
community into the pro-Syrian camp and undermining the
current political dynamic in Lebanon. He added that there
had been some positive evolution in Hizballah behavior, with
it pronouncing in favor of elections, and members of its
parliamentary delegation voting for Mikati; he concluded that
Hizballah appeared to be reflecting on its future.


4. (C) Boche also advised that the U.S. and France should not
undermine dialogue between communities in Lebanon, or put
"our Lebanese friends" in a difficult situation by opening
old differences. He cited specifically language in a draft
U.S.-France joint statement on the Middle East which referred
to a Lebanon "at peace with its neighbors," cautioning that
such a wording was an immediate "red flag" to Lebanese,
recalling the May 17, 1983 separate peace with Israel which
propelled Lebanon into civil war. Boche added that,
similarly, we should not make things difficult for our
moderate Arab allies, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who could
not continue to play a constructive role unless we made clear
that we were not seeking to antagonize Syria, and that we
accepted that post-withdrawal Lebanon and Syria would have a
strategic, albeit more equal relationship. Boche added that
Iran had shown it could play a positive role on Lebanon and
had passed messages of moderation to Hizballah. He noted
that Iranian President Khatami had told Chirac earlier this
month that Iran would support efforts to strengthen Lebanese
sovereignty as long as these measures did not harm Lebanese
or Syrian stability.


5. (C) DAS Dibble responded by stressing we agreed on most,
but not all, points. On the timing for Hizballah
disarmament, the U.S. was willing to accept a sequenced
approach and address the issue after elections, however we
continued to view disarmament as a precondition of Lebanon's
achieving full independence and sovereignty and did not
accept that Hizballah could retain both armed and political
roles . It remained essential, at the same time, for the
international community to keep pressure on Syria, and warn
President Asad against trying to use his covert agents,
loyalists or the Palestinian camps to stir up trouble. Boche
fully agreed, and noted that France had not given any
satisfaction to Syria for its troop withdrawal, and had
merely "taken note" of the move while calling for UN
verification. He added that Syria's diplomatic isolation was
made possible by the "prudence" of the U.S. and French
demarche on Lebanon, which was something which the Arabs,
Russia, and China could support.

MFA ON HIZBALLAH DISARMAMENT, ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT, OBSERVERS
-------------- --------------


6. (C) MFA A/S-equivalent Thibault, in his separate meeting
with Dibble April 29, stressed the importance of U.S. and
French cooperation on Lebanon, which had achieved remarkable
successes but was not yet complete. He noted that the U.S.
and France were on the same page on Syria, and the need to
continue to isolate the Asad regime so it didn't slip "slip
into its old ways." On Hizballah, Thibault stressed that the
GoF shared the objective of disarmament but differed with the
U.S. on the means and timing. The GoF agreed with the USG
that a free, independent Lebanon should not have private
militias on its soil; then again, he added, in the real
world, we needed to look to political realities. The GoF
continued to view EU designation of Hizballah as
counterproductive and potentially undermining Lebanon's
stability.


7. (C) Further on disarming and disbanding Hizballah, Jouret
stressed that the GoF agreed totally that there is no role
for an armed Hizballah in the new Lebanon and that Hizballah
must disappear as an armed force. The question remained how
long would this process take, and how would it proceed.
Jouret added that the GoF was telling Hizballah directly that
times were changing, and Hizballah must change its doctrines
and behavior. At the same time, France viewed Hizballah as
having a popular base in Lebanon and was ready to help
Hizballah find its place in Lebanese society. He added that,
although the GoF hadn't broached the issue to Hizballah,
there might be utility in a special economic development plan
for southern Lebanon, which would help create jobs and
restructure the economy, to accompany the disarmament
process. On EU designation of Hizballah, Jouret said the GoF
remained opposed and viewed this as largely a U.S.-Israeli
effort, noting that the GoI had demarched the GoF on the
issue a few days earlier.


8. (C) Jouret said France agreed that the EU should continue
to keep the association agreement with Syria on hold. He
commented that even if the accord made it to the next step of
the procedural process, referral to ratification by member
countries, France was prepared to hold out as long as
necessary, ten years or more, to keep the agreement frozen.
On election monitors, Jouret confirmed that there would be
French participation in the EU observer mission. He added
that it remained likely that French parliamentarians,
particularly those maintaining a longtime interest in
Lebanon, might decide on their own to observe the elections,
and the GoF would not stop them. Such parliamentarians, he
noted, were largely Aoun supporters, who tended to perceive
Maronites as representative of all Lebanese.


9. (U) This message was cleared by NEA DAS Dibble.
ROSENBLATT