Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS2944
2005-04-29 18:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

APRIL 29 BARNIER-AOUN MEETING

Tags:  PREL SY LE FR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002944 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2015
TAGS: PREL SY LE FR
SUBJECT: APRIL 29 BARNIER-AOUN MEETING

REF: A. STATE 78006

B. PARIS 2162

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002944

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2015
TAGS: PREL SY LE FR
SUBJECT: APRIL 29 BARNIER-AOUN MEETING

REF: A. STATE 78006

B. PARIS 2162

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (U) This message contains an action request for Washington
in para 5.


2. (C) During an April 29 meeting with visiting NEA DAS
Elizabeth Dibble, MFA A/S-equivalent for North Africa/Middle
East Jean-Francois Thibault offered a brief readout of FM
Barnier's meeting earlier that day with former Lebanese Armed
Forces Commander General Michel Aoun. Thibault said Barnier
stressed the need for Aoun to put his personal ambitions
aside and work to support the common goals and unity of the
opposition. Barnier also emphasized that Syria was looking
to complicate the situation in Lebanon and that Aoun's return
gave an opportunity to the pro-Syrian loyalists; Aoun had to
be careful to avoid being used by Syria or its supporters.
Aoun responded that he was a uniter, not a divider, and that
while he had been approached by the Syrians, he would never
give them anything or allow himself to be manipulated.


3. (C) Thibault commented that Aoun appeared old and somewhat
out of touch with current realities in Lebanon, viewing
himself as a "Lebanese de Gaulle." The GoF was unsure as to
Aoun's real influence or power base in Lebanon, but
considered it weakened since his departure into exile from
Lebanon 15 years ago. Most of the young Lebanese assembling
on Martyr's Square, for instance, were too young to remember
Aoun as a political force in Lebanon. Thibault noted that
Aoun's staff had told him, on the margins of the Barnier
meeting, that Aoun had a following among young people in
Lebanon, and they claimed that Aounists had prevailed in
recent elections in Lebanese universities. Thibault was
skeptical of the claim, and opined that if true, it was
likely limited to a few, but not most, universities in
Lebanon.


4. (C) In a conversation with poloff April 28, MFA
DAS-equivalent for the Levant Christian Jouret described the
Barnier decision to meet with Aoun as resulting from Aoun's
repeated requests for a meeting with President Chirac, which
the GoF had turned down, citing French neutrality. He said
Aoun found that explanation unconvincing, and cited Chirac's
prior meetings with Walid Jumblatt, Patriarch Sfeir, and Sa'd
Hariri. Jouret said Aoun was not enthusiastic about meeting
Barnier, since everyone knew French Lebanon policy was being
made at the Elysee. The GoF wanted to keep the meeting
discreet and insisted on having no journalists,
photographers, or press statements as a condition of the
meeting taking place. Jouret summed up that the GoF decided
that it was only right to say farewell to Aoun after France
saved his life, he spent 15 years here, and he fought Syria
for so long. In short, Aoun was not the GoF's enemy,
although the GoF remained concerned about the potential for
his return to undermine opposition unity.


5. (C) Action request: Aoun's staff here in Paris contacted
us recently to suggest another meeting with Aoun before his
planned May 7 departure. We believe it could be useful to
doubletrack the French message of moderation and the need to
maintain opposition unity with Aoun before his arrival in
Beirut. We would appreciate guidance from Washington on
whether to seek another meeting with Aoun, and, if so,
talking points for the discussion. End action request.

ROSENBLATT