SUA CONVENTION: FRANCE NOT FULLY ON BOARD WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000285

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NP/RA EYTHAN SONTAG; L/NP JULIE HERR AND L/LEI
DENISE MANNING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL KTIA PHSA EWWT FR
SUBJECT: SUA CONVENTION: FRANCE NOT FULLY ON BOARD WITH
U.S. NONPROLIFERATION AMENDMENTS

REF: A) STATE 4828 B) 1/10/05 SONTAG-RECINOS E-MAIL

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, REASON 1
.4 B/D


1. (C) We delivered January 11 ref A points on proposed U.S.
nonproliferation amendments to the Convention against the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA) January 11 to Veronique Vouland, MFA deputy
director for disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. She
and Hugues de Longevialle, MFA desk officer following SUA,
noted that the MFA's legal department had the lead on this
issue and that their legal experts were in contact with their
U.S. counterparts. The disarmament bureau has an advisory
role, especially on nuclear proliferation aspects, they added.


2. (C) Vouland and Longevialle said that French interagency
consultations on formulating a French position and a response
are ongoing. Initial reaction, however, is that the U.S.
proposals would need further refinement as there are several
aspects they viewed as unclear. Vouland asked whether the
U.S. planned for additional amendments and suggested that
additional meetings, beyond the January 17 COMAR meeting,
would be needed. In terms of our demarche, they shared the
following points, which they noted were not exhaustive:

-- Defining dual usage: a dual usage list would by
definition vary, which raises questions of how to define the
list and how to criminalize the transport of materials
intended for manufacture or delivery of prohibited weapons.
There will be a need to define clearly what is and isn't
transportable, Longevialle stated. Additionally, he made the
point that the final list or product would need to conform to
the NPT.

-- Non-state actors: while reiterating that the legal
experts would have a final say, Longevialle observed that an
agreement could only target the proliferator or transporter
and could not sanction the destination country. (Note:
Vouland and Longevialle did not directly address the issue of
non-state actors, but did state that it was important to find
a way to indict those that do not fall within legal
categories/definition.)


3. (C) In a final comment, Vouland volunteered that France
shares our view on the Canadian proposal dealing with
transport of nuclear materials. The proposal would
criminalize certain types of cases that ought not to be so
defined, she concluded.
Leach