Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS280
2005-01-14 13:56:00
SECRET
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH EX-HOSTAGE DISCUSSES "PLANET BIN LADEN"

Tags:  PGOV KPAO PTER IZ FR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000280 

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR HOSTAGE WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV KPAO PTER IZ FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH EX-HOSTAGE DISCUSSES "PLANET BIN LADEN"

REF: A. FBIS EUP20041227000250

B. PARIS 107

C. 04 PARIS 9048 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS
ONS 1.4 B/D

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000280

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR HOSTAGE WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV KPAO PTER IZ FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH EX-HOSTAGE DISCUSSES "PLANET BIN LADEN"

REF: A. FBIS EUP20041227000250

B. PARIS 107

C. 04 PARIS 9048 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS
ONS 1.4 B/D


1. (C) Summary: Georges Malbrunot, one of two French
journalists held hostage in Iraq for just over four months
and released on December 21, recounted to Emboffs on January
12 his experience in captivity and his surprise that his
captors were not focused solely on combating Coalition forces
in Iraq but rather, on the goals of radical Islam. Though
convinced at the outset of his captivity that the
hostage-takers were only interested in Iraq, Malbrunot's
thinking on this subject changed to the extent that the
account he wrote of his captivity, which came out nine days
after his release, is entitled "Malbrunot: I lived on Planet
Bin Laden" (reftel). End summary.


2. (S/NF) Malbrunot, who works for the center-right daily
newspaper Le Figaro, met with Emboffs at our request to
discuss his captivity. He and fellow ex-hostage Christian
Chesnot, who works for state-supported Radio France
Internationale, continue to be debriefed on the
operational/technical details of their captivity by French
intelligence, analysis of which will be sent through other
channels.

--------------
ENGAGING THEIR CAPTORS
--------------


3. (C) Georges Malbrunot and Christian Chesnot, two veteran
French journalists reporting from Iraq, were kidnapped on
August 20, 2004 by the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI). According
to Malbrunot, the two immediately stated in Arabic (both are
fluent) that they were French journalists and had no
connection with Coalition forces. Luckily, no shots were
fired and they were not physically harmed. This contrasted,
said Malbrunot, with treatment they witnessed of other
hostages, including Macedonians, Lebanese and an official of
Ahmad Chalabi's "INC" party (who Malbrunot said was later
beheaded). For example, they observed Lebanese hostages
being blindfolded and shackled. Though initially they were
put in a small, dark room and made to sleep on the floor,
their conditions soon improved and they were given blankets
and food. In keeping with the IAI's organized structure they
observed throughout their captivity, they were told that
their identity was being verified by a separate committee and

that following this, their case would be judged by a "Islamic
tribunal." They were also questioned a number of times by
IAI intelligence operatives. At first, the IAI planned to
execute their Syrian national driver, Mohamed al-Joundi,
because of suspicion that he was a CIA spy sent to keep tabs
on the two journalists and also due to a fake photo montage
in Joundi's possession which showed him with an American
general. Malbrunot and Chesnot convinced their captors not
to proceed with his execution, saying he was not a spy and on
the contrary, was extremely anti-American, and had even
turned down a scholarship to study in the United States.
(Note: As reported ref B, Joundi has filed suit in French
courts against U.S. military officials for alleged torture,
while claiming that the IAI treated him well and was beyond
reproach. The suit is pending and awaits a judge's decision
on whether to accept jurisdiction. End note.)


4. (C) In the first days of their captivity, Malbrunot and
Chesnot believed that their captors were interested solely in
"fighting the occupation," and that once it was clear to them
that the French people and government were opposed to
operations in Iraq, their liberation might be quick.
However, the two eventually realized that the IAI was
interested primarily in the goals of Salafism and other
tenets of radical Islam, with Iraq being a target of
opportunity because of the concentration and presence of
Western forces. It was around the time that the
hostage-takers cited France's "veil" law (which forbids the
wearing of 'ostentatious' religious symbols in French primary
and secondary schools) as an impediment to the journalists'
release that Malbrunot realized the IAI was not focused
exclusively on the Coalition presence in Iraq. Their captors
often discussed their Islamic beliefs and told the two
journalists that converting to Islam would increase their
chances of being freed.


5. (C) Malbrunot's captors said openly that they considered
Osama bin Laden their "chief" and that their long-term goals
were the restoration of the Caliphate, the battle with the
West, and the installation of Islamic regimes in Egypt and
Saudi Arabia. Also, the journalist was surprised at the
extent to which bin Laden was a reference point for the IAI.
The leader of the group guarding them had spent time in
terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, a fact that
increased the amount of deference he received from others.
Malbrunot did not believe that the Iraqis holding him and
Chesnot had been secular under Saddam and only recently had
taken up the banner of radical Islam. Rather, he surmised
that some were ex-Baathists who had kept their Islamist
leanings hidden under Saddam. Others were likely longtime
Islamists who had already been active in places like Samarra,
though kept under tight control by the former regime,
especially in the 1990s as Saddam tried to boost his Islamic
credentials. Their knowledge of France appeared dated - they
spoke of the French war in Algeria and French participation
in the 1990 Gulf War Coalition, another sign of pro-Saddam
sympathy among some IAI members. Paradoxically, other IAI
members (presumably anti-Saddam) suspected the US was allied
with Saddam and would soon restore him to power. When
Malbrunot said that was unlikely, they remained skeptical.
His captors often mentioned the presence and influence of
non-Iraqis in the IAI, especially Saudis and Yemenis, but
Malbrunot never saw anyone but those he believed by their
accents to be Iraqi.


6. (C) The hostage-takers did not focus on subjects such as
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the presence of U.S.
troops in the Middle East outside of Iraq. Instead, said
Malbrunot, they were consumed with what he termed "the logic
of destruction." Oftentimes, they would disappear during the
day and come back later only to explain that they had been
very busy placing bombs against the "occupiers" or destroying
pipelines. They never discussed plans or ideas for Iraq
following the withdrawal of Coalition troops. Their
single-minded focus, said Malbrunot, was destruction, both in
Iraq and outside. To this end, they spoke of "bringing the
fight to Europe," although they did not specify whether they
meant recruitment, fund-raising or operations. They also
discussed the need to isolate the U.S. by driving a wedge
between it and Europe.

--------------
RELATIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS
--------------


7. (C) Malbrunot's captors boasted that the IAI had 15,000 -
17,000 adherents, a figure that the journalist found
exaggerated. They said that other terrorist groups in Iraq,
including Zarqawi's Ansar al-Islam, shared their goals and
methods, but that they did not coordinate strategy. When
targets of opportunity and coordination existed - for
example, during the Coalition move on Fallujah - the Islamist
groups did cooperate, but only on an ad hoc and operational
level. Malbrunot said he had been told that the IAI
leadership were all based in Baghdad and furthermore, his
captors appeared to take instructions from the capital. He
added that the IAI hostage-takers spoke of other Salafist
groups such as the GSPC in Algeria and the GICM in Morocco,
and said they belonged to the same "family," although the IAI
didn't appear to have taken on the anti-French focus of the
North African terrorist groups.


8. (C) The journalist's Sunni IAI captors told him that their
enemies were Coalition forces, the Shiites and the Kurds,
although their focus was on operations against the Coalition.
Within the Coalition, they did not differentiate between the
U.S. and others; to the IAI, all were "dogs" and subject to
immediate execution. Malbrunot said the IAI showed contempt
as well for Ayatollah Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr, and viewed
President al-Yawer as the "Queen of England," i.e. above
politics and treated differently, but with no power.


9. (C) Malbrunot told Emboffs that he believes they were
captured as targets of opportunity. He had stopped by the
side of a road to place a satellite phone call to France, and
believes they were spotted by the hostage-takers at that
point. Furthermore, he believes that, in general, all
hostages in Iraq are taken as the opportunity and
circumstances arise, and that only those at the highest
levels are specifically targeted. He said the "top 3"
targets for the IAI were Iraqi PM Allawi, Defense Minister
Hazem Sha'alan and former Iraqi National Security Advisor
Mowaffah al Rubaiye.


10. (C) Malbrunot's captors were particularly interested in
French domestic reaction to the two hostages. They were less
interested in the international reaction organized by the
French government, to include statements condemning the
hijacking by Arab governments and even Hezbollah (who the IAI
considered as sharing their beliefs and doing a good job
fighting Israel despite being Shiite). Nevertheless,
Malbrunot believed that the international pressure helped, in
that it made it easier for the IAI to consider entering
negotiations with the French government to release them and
helped boost the group's ego given its raised profile.

--------------
LESSONS LEARNED
--------------


11. (C) The hostage-takers were remarkably at ease in their
surroundings, said Malbrunot. Even during periods when the
journalists were transferred to different areas, they never
seemed worried that they would be apprehended or discovered
by Coalition forces. One place they stayed was on a farm
with a family sympathetic to the IAI. Only at the end, when
transfer was imminent, did the hostage-takers seem nervous.
Malbrunot believed this was because of a constant paranoia
regarding plots and double-crossing. Despite all evidence to
the contrary, the IAI accused Malbrunot and Chesnot multiple
times of working with the CIA and even suspected at one point
that the French Ambassador to Iraq was a CIA agent.


12. (C) During the first days of their captivity, Malbrunot
and Chesnot asked questions of their captors. However, the
reaction of the IAI guards was very negative, and the French
journalists decided to remain quiet and only respond when
asked direct questions. This seemed to work better, and some
of their captors even began volunteering information.
Malbrunot believes that his and Chesnot's fluency in Arabic
was key to building a rapport with their captors, though he
speculated that such an ability would do nothing to help an
American or UK hostage, who would be killed regardless. Even
though they had no doubt that if the order arrived, the IAI
guards would execute them, the journalists' ability to speak
Arabic cut through some of the initial and subsequent
suspicions.


13. (C) Without offering specifics, Malbrunot said he
believes the French government paid a ransom to free them.
He applauded the actions of the GOF and specifically, the
DGSE (the French external intelligence service),saying that
in hostage situations, even democracies like the U.S. and
France have to engage with unsavory characters. He raised
the Iran-Contra affair in the 1980s to seek the release of
U.S. hostages in Lebanon as a past example. Only the UK does
not negotiate with terrorists, said Malbrunot. He also
praised the GOF's so-called "turban diplomacy" in securing
condemnation of the kidnapping from Islamic extremist groups
and clerics as a wise and effective strategy.


14. (C) In closing, Malbrunot said he remained a pessimist
regarding Iraq. Saying "Iraqis are very tough to occupy" and
the U.S. had made too many mistakes, he believed that the
situation had little chance of improving soon. He especially
criticized the decision to dissolve Iraqi intelligence
agencies, given that they had kept close tabs on Islamists
during Saddam's reign and subsequently, much of that
knowledge was lost.


15. (C) Comment: Many in France share Malbrunot's initial
belief that the insurgents in Iraq are focused primarily in
forcing the departure of Coalition troops from Iraq and
motivated by nationalist aspirations. Malbrunot's discovery
that, on the contrary, he was on "Planet Bin Laden" was, as
he said, a surprise. It may also have been surprising to a
France that often appears to react differently to radical
Islam depending on its distance from it. Within its borders,
it reacts proactively, with speed and harshness. Elsewhere
in the world, it is much more equivocal. (For example, FM
Barnier's decision to meet last September with extremist
cleric Yusufal Qaradawi, who later called for the killing of
Americans in Iraq without drawing a French rebuke.)
Malbrunot's realization of the true nature of the insurgency
may not change French intransigence on Iraq, but it may
demonstrate to his readers the stakes involved and the risks
to France. End comment.


16. (U) Minimize considered.
Leach