Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS248
2005-01-13 15:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

ELYSEE MIDDLE EAST ADVISOR ON UNIFIL RENEWAL,

Tags:  PREL LE SY PTER PINR FR UNSC 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000248 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015
TAGS: PREL LE SY PTER PINR FR UNSC
SUBJECT: ELYSEE MIDDLE EAST ADVISOR ON UNIFIL RENEWAL,
LEBANON-SYRIA DEVELOPMENTS, HIZBALLAH

REF: A. PARIS 208

B. STATE 4247

C. BEIRUT 98

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000248

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015
TAGS: PREL LE SY PTER PINR FR UNSC
SUBJECT: ELYSEE MIDDLE EAST ADVISOR ON UNIFIL RENEWAL,
LEBANON-SYRIA DEVELOPMENTS, HIZBALLAH

REF: A. PARIS 208

B. STATE 4247

C. BEIRUT 98

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment: The Elysee appears solidly behind
the MFA in opposing a preambular reference to UNSCR 1559 in
the UNIFIL renewal resolution, though it suggests greater
flexibility than the MFA on asking DPKO to review UNIFIL's
force structure (ref b). During a January 12 meeting,
Presidential Middle East advisor Andre Parant repeated
serious concerns expressed to us by the MFA (ref a) that a
preambular reference to UNSCR 1559 would serve Syrian
arguments and undermine both UNIFIL and prospects for 1559
implementation. Although Parant clarified that the GoF had
not made a "definitive decision" to reject the preambular
reference, we viewed this comment as an attempt to be
diplomatic, not a sign of greater flexibility. Parant
conceded that there could be value in signaling to Syria and
Lebanon that UNIFIL's presence was not open-ended, and he did
not repeat concerns expressed by the MFA (ref a) on the
dangers of reducing UNIFIL's size. Parant suggested that the
January 9 Blue Line clashes launched by Hizballah toughened
GoF resolve to see the GoL extend its authority in the South,
but will not affect the GoF position on EU designation of
Hizballah. On Lebanon/Syria developments, Parant dismissed
Syria's purported transfer of the Lebanon file to Walid
Muallim as window-dressing, though he cited the
marginalization of FM Shara as a side benefit. Parant added
that former PM Hariri had briefed the GoF on his recent lunch
with the SMI Chief in Lebanon (ref c),and the GoF was not
afraid that Hariri would cut a deal with the Damascus. At
the same time, the Elysee had advised Hariri to be more
forthright in aligning with the opposition and urged
opposition elements to develop a long-term strategy for
cooperation beyond the electoral law. In this context,
Maronite Patriarch Sfeir will visit Paris to meet with Chirac
in late January. Parant described the U.S. and French
Ambassadors in Beirut as a formidable team and concluded that

U.S. and French efforts on 1559 implementation were having a
positive effect, both in widening maneuvering room for the
Lebanese opposition and pressuring the SARG and GOL, which
were in increasing disarray. End summary and comment.

PREAMBULAR REFERENCE, EXAMINING FORCE STRUCTURE
--------------


2. (C) Poloff reviewed ref (b) talking points on U.S. views
on UNIFIL renewal with Presidential Advisor on the Middle
East Andre Parant late January 12. On including a preambular
reference to 1559 in the UNIFIL renewal text, Parant repeated
concerns expressed to us by MFA officials earlier this week
(ref a),though in a less categorical, more diplomatic
fashion. First stressing the GoF's desire to continue to
work "hand in hand" with the U.S. on this issue, Parant said
the GoF had not taken a "definitive decision" on the
preambular reference and was willing to discuss this further
in New York. Parant stressed, nevertheless that GoF saw
serious "dangers" in including the preambular 1559 reference,
which would break the "line of separation" which the GoF had
sought to maintain between 1559 and the peace process, and in
turn serve Syrian arguments that it would remain in Lebanon
until a comprehensive peace was achieved. The 1559 reference
could also potentially undermine confidence in UNIFIL, which,
as a Chapter 6 operation, required the consent of the
Lebanese government (and others) to remain in place.
Repeating points made by the MFA (ref a),Parant expressed a
strong preference for indirect references to 1559 in the
UNIFIL renewal, by toughening language on Lebanon's
territorial integrity and independence and restoring full
control in the South. He cautioned, though, that seeking to
shift UNIFIL's mandate towards supporting 1559's call for
dismantling of militias was "not realistic," as UNIFIL
remained a Chapter 6 operation. Parant summed up his view
that we would resolve the 1559 reference issue quickly in New
York, and added that the French Embassy in Washington had
surmised that the State Department was more adamant on the
1559 reference than the NSC. He quipped that one could hear
similarly differing messages, at times, between the MFA and
Elysee on Lebanon. Poloff expressed hope we would reach
agreement quickly, but stressed that the points we presented
fully represented USG views.


3. (C) Parant suggested that the GoF, while cautious on any
possible changes to UNIFIL's mandate, might be willing to
accept the U.S. proposal to ask DPKO to examine UNIFIL's
force structure and report back at a later date. Without
reviving the arguments made to us by the MFA on the need to
preserve, vice reduce, UNIFIL's size, Parant conceded that
there could be value in signaling to the GOL and SARG that
UNFIL's presence was not to be taken for granted. Although
Parant did not fully endorse this U.S. proposal, he
speculated that the GoF would be "ready to follow" the U.S.
on this point.

4. (C) Asked what impact the January 9 Blue Line clashes
initiated by Hizballah would have on the UNIFIL renewal and
GoF views on Hizballah, Parant stressed that the incident
only reinforced GoF convictions on 1559 implementation and
the need for the GOL to extend its authority throughout the
South. On the other hand, Parant stressed that there was no
change in the GoF reservations on EU terrorist designation of
Hizballah, which he said would result in the EU losing all
leverage it might have on Hizballah. At the same time,
Parant sought to stress that the GoF analysis of Hizballah
was not so far from that of the U.S., and that, typically, we
differed on means not objectives. (Comment: Other MFA
officials have responded in a similar negative fashion, when
asked recently whether the changed circumstances of UNSCR
1559 and the GoF crackdown on Al-Manar could presage a shift
on Hizballah designation. End comment.)

DISMISSIVE OF SARG, BUT CONFIDENT IN HARIRI
--------------


5. (C) Turning to Lebanon-Syria developments, Parant
dismissed the Syrian elevation of Walid Muallim to Vice
Minister and the purported transfer of the Lebanon file from
SMI to the Syrian MFA as so much "window-dressing." Parant
stressed that the GoF remained "totally skeptical" of this
and other superficial SARG gestures, such as a possible new
redeployment, which did not suggest any fundamental change in
the Syrian approach in Lebanon. While the GoF had no
illusions on the significance of Muallim's promotion, one
useful side-benefit was the public perception that that
Muallim's elevation was a disavowal of FM Shara, which was
largely how Arab governments were interpreting the SARG
decision.


6. (C) On former PM Hariri's recent lunch with Syrian
Military Intelligence (SMI) chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazale
(ref c),Parant noted that Hariri had briefed the GoF on the
discussion, which took place in a new dynamic, not the least
since Ghazale had to go see Hariri and not the other way
around. Hariri had told the GoF that he had a frank
discussion with Ghazale and assured the SMI chief that while
UNSCR 1559 was not "anti-Syrian," the old framework for
Syrian-Lebanese relations was no longer acceptable. Syria
needed to change, and there could be no more Syrian tutelage
of Lebanon. Parant said Ghazale reportedly responded by
stressing to Hariri that Damascus was aware of this situation
and thinking of ways for its Lebanon policy to evolve, citing
the Muallim decision.


7. (C) Parant noted that former PM Hariri was a more frequent
visitor to the Elysee, ever since he left government. The
GoF did not view Hariri as trying to "cut a deal" with the
Syrians, and saw Hariri as very sincere in trying to "stay
above the melee" and proceed carefully, without totally
associating himself with the opposition. The GoF had advised
Hariri, nevertheless, to do more to reinforce and associate
himself with the opposition, and to clarify ambiguity on
where he stood. On the possible structuring of electoral
districts, Parant speculated that the opposition would
achieve unity on the issue, as Hariri had shown willingness
to accept the smaller "kaza" districts which were not
advantageous to him electorally. Nevertheless, the GoF had
urged the Lebanese opposition to develop a long-term
governance strategy beyond a temporary alliance on the
electoral law, to plan for the expected arrival of a new
government after spring elections -- of which Hariri was the
only credible choice as PM. To shore up French support for
the opposition and keep pressure on the SARG and GOL,
President Chirac planned to welcome Maronite Patriarch Sfeir
to Paris in late January, following on Chirac's meeting with
Walid Jumblatt last December.

NEXT STEPS
--------------


8. (C) Looking beyond the UNIFIL renewal, Parant stressed
that the GoF's overriding preoccupation remained Lebanon's
spring elections and the need to remain vigilant on the
electoral law. The GoF hoped to see UN Envoy on UNSCR 1559
Terje Roed-Larsen in the region soon, and looked to the April
SYG report to deliver an important message on the electoral
law and the need for non-interference in elections prior to
their taking place. Parant commended Deputy Secretary
Armitage's January 2 visit to Damascus and Ambassador
Feltman's subsequent public remarks in Beirut which
effectively quashed Syrian attempts to distort the U.S.
position on Lebanon. Parant described the U.S. and French
ambassadors in Beirut as a formidable team, and assessed that
U.S and French efforts were having a positive effect, by
giving the Lebanese opposition more maneuvering room and
keeping the pressure on the GOL and SARG, which were in
increasing disarray on the issue. The GoF was seeking
greater EU support in calling for 1559 implementation, and
found no opposition, but not a great deal of enthusiasm among
other capitals. At the same time, Parant cautioned that we
all needed to be careful in "measuring" pressure on the SARG,
so as not to provoke a brutal reaction, of which Lebanon
would be the first victim.

BIOGRAPHIC NOTE
--------------

9. (SBU) Parant, who has concentrated on the Near East and
Africa throughout his career, has been nominated as French
Ambassador to Senegal; his last day in his current position
as Technical Advisor for Middle East/Americas will be January
21, before arriving in Dakar by February 25 (after the Chirac
state visist to Senegal in early February.) Septel will
report detailed biographic information on Parant and his
replacement, Dominique Boche (most recently MFA Special
Advisor on Religious Affairs),who takes up his functions
January 21.
Leach