Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS2391
2005-04-08 15:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

APRIL 5 KHATAMI VISIT TO FRANCE

Tags:  PREL IR SY LE MNUC PARM FR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002391 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2015
TAGS: PREL IR SY LE MNUC PARM FR
SUBJECT: APRIL 5 KHATAMI VISIT TO FRANCE

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002391

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2015
TAGS: PREL IR SY LE MNUC PARM FR
SUBJECT: APRIL 5 KHATAMI VISIT TO FRANCE

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: French officials described President Chirac's
April 5 discussion with Iranian President Khatami as cordial
and focused largely on Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian
question, and, to a lesser extent, the nuclear issue, which
was the main topic of the FM Barnier-FM Kharrazi discussion
earlier that day. Chirac stressed to Khatami French support
for Lebanese sovereignty, full withdrawal of Syrian troops
and intelligence, and implementation of UNSCR 1559, which he
explained was not aimed at overthrowing the Syrian regime.
Chirac also sought Iran's support in encouraging Hizballah's
full integration into Lebanese politics. Elsyee officials
described the Iranians as disquieted by U.S.-French
cooperation on Lebanon, and fearful of potential instability
on their periphery or a U.S.-approved Israeli strike against
Iran. On the nuclear issue, Chirac appealed for continued
Iranian dialogue with the EU-3, and stressed support for the
talks from the U.S., Russia and China. French officials
described Khatami as dismissive of U.S. gestures in support
of the EU-3 and misinterpreting the March 10 announcement as
signifying EU-3 readiness for UNSC referral. Chirac also
stressed the essential importance of the Israeli-Palestinian
issue and appealed for greater Iranian support for
Palestinian PM Abbas. FM Barnier and FM Kharrazi reportedly
discussed at length the definition of objective guarantees on
Iran's peaceful application of nuclear technology. Barnier
also stressed the need for Iranian impartiality in Iraq,
reiterated French positions on Syria/Lebanon, and addressed
the Israeli-Palestinian issue in passing. A meeting between
the French and Iranian MFA Secretaries-General addressed
technical and cultural cooperation, as well as the MEK. End
summary.


2. (C) Iranian President Khatami visited Paris April 4-5, his
second visit to France since 1998. The purpose of Khatami's
visit was to deliver the opening address at a UNESCO
conference on the five-year anniversary of the launch of his

"dialogue of civilizations" initiative, an event also
attended by Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Khatami
met with President Chirac at the Elysee April 5, while
Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi met with French FM Barnier
earlier that morning. The Iranian MFA Secretary-General also
had a meeting with his French counterpart on the margins of
Khatami's visit. We received a preliminary readout on the
Khatami-Chirac meeting from Presidential Middle East/Americas
Advisor Dominique Boche April 5, and a more detailed readout
on the Khatami and Kharrazi discussions from MFA
DAS-equivalent for Iran/Iraq/Arabian Gulf Affairs Antoine
Sivan April 7. Boche and Sivan both stressed that Khatami,
not the GOF, had initiated his visit to Paris to attend the
UNESCO event and the GoF had offered the bilateral meetings
as a courtesy. After departing Paris, Khatami was expected
to travel to Rome to attend Pope John Paul II's funeral.

KHATAMI-CHIRAC: LEBANON, EU-3 TALKS, ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN ISSUES
--------------


3. (C) According to MFA DAS Sivan, regional topics -- namely
Syria/Lebanon and the Israeli-Palestinian issue -- dominated
the Chirac-Khatami discussion, with the nuclear issue
discussed in much less detail. Boche added that the
discussion briefly addressed Iraq, and that Khatami did not
address internal political issues or Iran's upcoming
elections. Boche described Khatami as an interesting and
free-speaking interlocutor, but assessed his influence in
Iran as questionable. Though the discussions were friendly,
Boche said Khatami conveyed a sense of general worry on
potential instability on Iran's periphery (Lebanon, Syria,
Iraq),and that the Israelis might launch a strike against
Iran with U.S. blessing. Boche observed that the
long-standing problem with the Iranians was that they wanted
to be recognized as a regional power and play a big role, but
they believed Iran could attain such respect only by
demonstrating its capacity to threaten others or cause
damage. MFA DAS Sivan, meanwhile, described the tone of the
Chirac-Khatami discussions as "cordial and correct."


4. (C) Boche described the Iranians as disquieted by
U.S.-French cooperation on Lebanon, and said Khatami repeated
long-standing arguments that the GoF should distance itself
from the USG, which, unlike France, was not interested in
Lebanon's sovereignty and independence, but instead was
pursuing a pro-Israeli agenda aimed at overthrowing regional
governments. Boche said that Khatami emphasized that Iran
was playing a helpful role in moderating Hizballah and
Palestinian rejectionists, and encouraging Syrian withdrawal;
the overall message was that France did not need to rely on
the U.S. and could seek help from Iran instead.


5. (C) Sivan offered more detail on Chirac's message to
Khatami on Lebanon, which he said was intended to reaffirm
French support for Lebanese sovereignty and implementation of
UNSCR 1559 and the Ta'if accords. While Chirac stressed to
Khatami that all Syrian troops and intelligence services must
withdraw from Lebanon, he also explained that UNSCR 1559 was
not intended to threaten the Syrian regime. Sivan described
Khatami's response as "very nuanced." The Iranian President
described a sense of shock over Hariri's assassination, and
affirmed that Iran recognized France's special role in
Lebanon, which was not antagonistic. At the same time,
Khatami stressed that the Syrian regime should not be too
marginalized. Chirac also raised Hizballah with Khatami, and
stressed the need for Iran to encourage Hizballah's "full
integration" into Lebanese political institutions. Sivan
noted that Chirac did not enter into further detail on
disarming or dismantling Hizballah, as called for in UNSCR

1559.


6. (C) Sivan said the Chirac-Khatami discussion did not enter
much detail on the nuclear issue. Chirac reminded Khatami
that Iran needed to continue its dialogue with the EU-3,
which was the only way to reach a solution. Sivan described
Khatami as offering a very soft response, "a la Iranienne,"
confirming that Iran wanted to continue the talks, but needed
to protect its sovereignty. (Note: In press remarks in Paris,
Khatami declared that Iran would not give up its sovereign
right to civilian nuclear power, as it was entitled to under
the NPT. FM Kharrazi went further in an April 7 "Le Monde"
interview in asserting that Iran would never renounce its
right to enrich uranium to obtain fuel for civilian reactors.
End note.) Chirac described U.S. gestures of support for
the EU-3 talks as indicating a real opening in attitude, and
cited strong support for the EU-3 also coming from Russia and
China. Boche described Khatami as very negative on the USG
in general, and underestimating U.S. policy shifts on WTO
accession and sale of aircraft parts to Iran. Boche
reported that the Iranians had similarly misinterpreted the
EU-3 as having rallied behind the U.S. position to take the
Iran nuclear issue to the UNSC. Boche expressed doubt that
there would be any movement in the Iranian position before
Iran's June presidential elections, after which he hoped
there might be a wider negotiating margin, depending on the
results. Boche described the current Iranian strategy as
seeking to divide the EU-3, by telling each EU-3 interlocutor
that the other two EU-3 members were the problem. He
conceded that the most recent steering committee results were
not great, but opined that the fact that the talks were not
suspended pending elections was in itself positive.


7. (C) Sivan reported that Chirac pressed Khatami on the
essential importance of the Palestinian issue, and the need
for Iran to play a constructive role. Chirac cautioned that
Iran should not risk a deterioration of the situation and
should help Palestinian President Abbas, by restructuring its
support to Palestinian groups. Khatami reportedly responded
that Iran was not part of the problem and it did not want
divisions with France over the Palestinian issue.

BARNIER - KHARRAZI
--------------


8. (C) Sivan reported that the Barnier-Kharrazi meeting
focused on the nuclear issue, though Iraq, Syria/Lebanon, and
the Israeli-Palestinian issue were also discussed, Barnier
reminded Kharrazi of Iran's need to reach agreement with the
EU-3 on the exact definition of objective guarantees on full
cessation, and a lengthy discussion ensued, on which Sivan
offered no detail. On Iraq, Barnier reminded Kharrazi of the
need for Iran to "act with impartiality" and help ensure that
Iraqi Shi'a don't monopolize power and give a role to Sunnis.
According to Sivan, Kharrazi responded by citing the
important ties between Iran and Iraq. On Lebanon, Sivan
described Barnier as affirming the French position later
discussed during the Chirac-Khatami meeting. Like Chirac,
Barnier stressed French support for Lebanon's sovereignty,
implementation of UNSCR 1559 and the Ta'if accords, and a
complete Syrian withdrawal. Barnier also assured Kharrazi
that French action was not directed against Syria, and that
France did not want regime change in Damascus. According to
Sivan, Kharrazi said he understood French support for
Lebanese sovereignty, however Syria did not understand French
policy. Kharrazi also stressed the need to leave the
question of disarming Hizballah to the Lebanese, a point with
which Barnier did not disagree. Sivan said Barnier addressed
the Israeli-Palestinian issue in passing, and called for Iran
to show restraint and support for President Abbas.


9. (C) Sivan noted that the meeting between French MFA
Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lafon and his Iranian

SIPDIS
counterpart addressed technical and cultural cooperation.
The Iranian side also raised the MEK presence in France to
which the French side responded by explaining the GoF's
existing policy considering the MEK a terrorist organization,
and its opposition to terrorism in general.
LEACH