SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIALS DISCUSS LEBANON NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002305

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015
TAGS: PREL SY LE FR
SUBJECT: SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIALS DISCUSS LEBANON NEXT STEPS
WITH NEA DAS CARPENTER

REF: A. BEIRUT 1106

B. PARIS 2263

C. PARIS 2243

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment: Presidential Middle East
Advisor Dominique Boche stressed strong French support for
holding Lebanon's elections on time and expressed concern
over Syrian/loyalist delay tactics during discussions with
visiting NEA DAS Carpenter April 5. The MFA issued a tough
statement April 5 reaffirming that elections must take place
in May, cautioning against an election delay, and calling for
formation of a new government. Boche voiced pessimism on
Syrian intentions, concluding that Damascus was seeking a
good report from Larsen on its troop withdrawal while it
would continue to manipulate Lebanon from outside and seek to
delay elections until September or October, at which point it
would seek to regain control. Boche assailed the GOL
decision to revise the draft electoral law towards bigger
constituencies as a direct blow to the Maronite Patriarch.
Boche expressed hope that the opposition could secure
Hizballah's support for holding elections, describing this as
perhaps the only way to overcome Syrian/loyalist delay
tactics. Boche agreed with Carpenter that UNSYG Rep Larsen
should continue to press on elections and agreed that UNSCR
1559's call for free and fair elections provides him a
continuing mandate. He reported that Larsen will be received
in Paris April 6. On potential assistance to a
post-elections GOL, Boche cautioned against applying an
Iraq-style reconstruction model but conceded that some type
of international donor conference was likely. Carpenter
heard a different and less helpful emphasis from MFA
A/S-equivalent for NEA Thibault, who questioned the legal
basis for insisting that elections take place on time and
described elections as not being an element of UNSCR 1559.
Thibault also suggested that once Syria had withdrawn from
Lebanon, the U.S. and France would be under pressure to
recognize the Syrian gesture. The disconnect between Boche's
firm resolve and Thibault's caution is typical of the nuance
we have long observed between the Elysee and MFA on the
Syria/Lebanon dossier, which remains firmly in Elysee
control. End summary and comment.


2. (C) NEA DAS Scott Carpenter visited Paris April 5 and met
separately with MFA A/S-equivalent for North Africa/Middle
East Jean-Francois Thibault and Presidential Middle East
Advisor Dominique Boche. Carpenter briefed Boche and
Thibault on his just completed five-day visit to Beirut,
during which he met with the full spectrum of opposition
leaders and found them more united than before. The
opposition had the momentum of the Lebanese street behind
them, was showing new flexibility on government formation,
and delivering a clear message on the need for elections by
the end of May. The opposition strategy on the electoral law
was to debate the recently revised draft electoral law in
Parliament and press Speaker Nabih Berri to call for a vote;
if the revised law did not pass, the opposition would accept
elections on the basis of the electoral law from the 2000
election. Carpenter confirmed that the opposition was
confident that it could win under either electoral law, the
revised or year 2000 version. Carpenter stressed that
elections remained the opposition's overriding concern, and
they wanted high-level statements from the U.S., France and
others, to make clear that elections must take place by the
end of May. The U.S. believed that we could not waver in
insisting on elections by May.


ELYSEE SUPPORT FOR ELECTIONS ON TIME, CONCERNS ON SYRIAN
INTENTIONS
--------------


3. (C) Presidential Middle East Advisor Dominique Boche
responded enthusiastically to Carpenter's presentation, and
affirmed that the GoF, like the U.S., was pressing hard for
holding elections on time. He cited an MFA statement issued
earlier that day which reiterated that elections must take
place in May, that a delay in the electoral process would run
contrary to the will of the Lebanese people, and that
Lebanese political forces should find the means to form a
government, for which the first task would be launching the
electoral process. The MFA statement also condemned the
recent series of attacks in Lebanon and called for punishment
of the perpetrators.


4. (C) Boche reiterated that the GoF was not very optimistic
on the current situation in Lebanon, specifically Syrian
intentions and prospects for an elections delay. He
described the Syrians and loyalists as "trying to manipulate
us" and seeking to postpone Lebanon's elections until
September or October, at which point they anticipated less
international scrutiny and greater factional divisions within
Lebanon, which they could exploit to show that Lebanon could
not live alone without Syrian control. Boche observed that
Syria appeared focused on overcoming the immediate obstacle
of Larsen's April report, and that it would seek to get its
troops out in time to receive a good report. After the troop
withdrawal, he anticipated that the SARG would continue to
cause problems and manipulate Lebanon from the outside, while
postponing formation of a government and elections towards
creation of a new situation in September or October, at which
point Syria would seek to regain control of Lebanon. Boche
also cited Syrian efforts to agitate Palestinian camps in
Lebanon, which he described as a longtime zone of Syrian
control and beyond the reach of PA President Mahmoud Abbas or
other outside moderating influences.


5. (C) Boche described the GoF as very upset by the GOL
decision to further revise the election law and move towards
bigger constituencies, which he described as a direct blow to
Maronite Patriarch Sfeir. Carpenter pointed out that the
opposition's pragmatic flexibility on the election law
removed a potential factor delaying the election. Boche
expressed hope that the opposition could convince Hizballah
to engage on the election, which he viewed as perhaps the
only way to overcome SARG/loyalist delay tactics. Although
the U.S. and France needed to keep pushing for elections on
time, Boche said he did not believe we have the ability to
impose deadline. Boche agreed with Carpenter's assessment
that Hizballah had been destabilized a bit by the March 14
opposition demonstration, and that Nasrallah realized he had
made mistake by adopting an excessively pro-Syrian stance
during the March 8 Hizballah gathering. In Boche's view,
Hizballah now faced a dilemma in how to maintain its
political standing without Syria's presence, and it might be
tempted to work in the same direction with the opposition on
the elections. Carpenter observed that Jumblatt was already
pursuing such a strategy in seeking to reach out to
Hizballah, much to the loyalists' chagrin.


6. (C) Carpenter raised his April 4 meeting in Beirut with
UNSYG Special Envoy Larsen, noting Larsen had told him that
his mission would be to push for elections on time.
Carpenter observed to Boche that MFA North/Africa Director
Thibault (see paras 8-9 below),in an earlier discussion that
day, had questioned whether elections were part of UNSCR 1559
or Larsen's mandate. Carpenter reiterated the USG view that
UNSCR 1559 did provide a basis for insisting on free and fair
elections, a point with which Boche fully concurred. Boche
explained Thibault's caution by noting that Larsen had come
under attack from Algeria and others for exceeding his
mandate, and that Larsen therefore needed to be careful and
prepared to face criticism of going beyond UNSCR 1559. Boche
cited difficult, ongoing UNSC discussions on the draft UNSCR
on the commission of inquiry, and the numerous proposed
amendments, as an example of the obstacles we faced in
maintaining international pressure on the GOL and SARG.
Boche agreed with Carpenter that such criticism of Larsen or
accusations of interference were no reason for the U.S. or
France to stop pushing on the elections issue.


7. (C) Before closing the discussion, Boche expressed
interest in U.S. thinking on the "day after" Syrian
withdrawal and successful elections in Lebanon. Carpenter
confirmed that European Commission Deputy Director Christian
Leffler had invited NEA PDAS Liz Cheney to Brussels to
discuss a post-election action plan and potential package of
ideas for the new government, should it be in place. Boche,
revisiting points made last week to visiting NEA Ambassador
Satterfield (ref c),stressed that we should not seek to
apply an Iraq-style reconstruction model in Lebanon,
stressing Lebanon's strong democratic tradition and the need
to wait for the new Lebanese government to request what it
needs. Boche conceded that some type of international
conference, at Lebanese request, was likely to take place
after elections, but again rejected the idea of any type of
"international supervision," in the Iraq model. Carpenter
reassured Boche that no one in the USG was anticipating an
Iraq-style intervention in Lebanon. While it was important
to let a new Lebanese government articulate its needs, there
was a useful purpose in seeking to anticipate and plan for
what these needs might be. Carpenter also conceded that
perhaps more planning was needed for the contingency that
elections did not take place.

THIBAULT: 1559 DOES NOT ADDRESS ELECTIONS
--------------


8. (C) In response to Carpenter's emphasis on elections,
Thibault stressed caution on Lebanon's current political
situation, which he viewed as "very dangerous" due to Syrian
and loyalist election delay tactics, coupled with efforts to
sow fear and uncertainty via terrorist acts. Thibault
asserted that once the Syrian withdrawal was complete, UNSCR
1559 would have essentially achieved most of what was
feasible; disarming Hizballah or the Palestinian camps was
another issue, which was impossible to implement now. In
Thibault's view, this was why the draft UNSCR on the
international commission of inquiry was so important, since
it would give the international community cover to maintain
pressure and focus on Lebanese authorities even after a
Syrian withdrawal. Thibault added that we should seek to
avoid a situation in which France and the U.S. were accused
of internal interference in Lebanon, especially among Arab
governments who were less supportive of 1559. Carpenter, for
his part, stressed that elections were paramount, within the
framework of 1559, and that it was in the essential interest
of the Lebanese people and the international community that
these elections take place on time.


9. (C) Carpenter also raised with Thibault his April 4
meeting with Larsen, and expressed concern that Syrian
President Bashar al-Asad was looking for a reward for Syrian
withdrawal. With elections still up in the air, the
international commission of inquiry yet to deploy and no
accountability yet for Hariri's assassination, it was much
too early for any carrots for Syria, withdrawal or not.
Thibault responded, somewhat unhelpfully, that if the Syrians
did fully withdraw, there would be enormous pressure on the
U.S. and France to recognize the change. Carpenter responded
that there remained pressing issues beyond the withdrawal,
namely the elections and the international investigations.
Thibault backed down a bit, but explained that the GoF was
most comfortable when it had an international framework in
which to act; UNSCR 1559 gave it that framework in the
context of withdrawal, but, in Thibault's view, it did not
address the parliamentary elections. Thibault also voiced
concern over internal weaknesses within Lebanon, including
factionalization and the long tradition of its political
class in extracting political and economic benefits from
Syrian domination. He summed up that our joint efforts on
Lebanon had worked "remarkably" up to now thanks to the
extraordinary level of U.S.-French cooperation. The
situation now, however, was becoming more complex with Syrian
withdrawal, and we had a looser UN framework in which to
operate.


10. (C) On potential post-election international assistance
to Lebanon, Thibault asserted that assisting the army would
be a key issue. The GoF had in place a modest bilateral
assistance program to the Lebanese army, which could be
expanded. Thibault stressed the need to avoid too much of an
"imported mechanism" in assisting the Lebanese army, and said
we should look to fellow Arab governments first. He
counseled looking at the Lebanese army with a sense of
realism, and accepting that it would not be a major military
power, but would need to be capable of keeping order and
curbing factionalism.


11. (C) Comment: Though neither Boche nor Thibault was
optimistic about Lebanon's current situation or Syrian delay
tactics, we were struck by their differing messages on the
elections issue, with Thibault appearing out of step with GoF
policy and his own minister, who in a meeting that same day
with our Ambassador, stressed the urgent need for elections
on schedule (ref b). We view the Thibault-Boche disconnect
as symptomatic of the longstanding nuance we have observed
between the working-level MFA and Elysee on Syria/Lebanon,
with the MFA typically counseling caution and pointing out
the worst-case scenarios, while the Elysee stresses resolve
in pressing forward. Fortunately for us and for Lebanon, the
policy lead on this issue remains firmly in the hands of the
Elysee. End comment.
LEACH