Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS2162
2005-03-31 14:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

(C) GENERAL AOUN ON LEBANON DEVELOPMENTS

Tags:  PREL SY LE PTER FR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002162 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2015
TAGS: PREL SY LE PTER FR
SUBJECT: (C) GENERAL AOUN ON LEBANON DEVELOPMENTS

REF: 3/21/05 EMAIL DIBBLE-WOLFF AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alex Wolff, reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002162

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2015
TAGS: PREL SY LE PTER FR
SUBJECT: (C) GENERAL AOUN ON LEBANON DEVELOPMENTS

REF: 3/21/05 EMAIL DIBBLE-WOLFF AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alex Wolff, reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary and comment: At the Department's
recommendation (reftel),DCM met with former Lebanese Armed
Forces Commander General Michel Aoun at the latter's request
March 29. Throughout the hour-long discussion, Aoun stressed
his status as the most long-standing opponent of Syria's
occupation of Lebanon, and made a distinction between himself
and other opposition figures unwilling to voice public
support for UNSCR 1559 and willing to work with the Syrians
prior to Hariri's assassination. Aoun confirmed his
intention to return to Lebanon soon without offering a date,
said he expected that Syria's regime would fall post-Lebanon
withdrawal, and suggested that political negotiations with
Hizballah might be the best way to move towards eventual
disarmament and dismantling of the organization. On the
latter point, Aoun suggested that USG indication of
flexibility on court cases against Hizballah's top leadership
could help facilitate Hizballah's disarmament and
dismantling. DCM responded by reiterating that USG policy on
Hizballah's status as a terrorist organization remained
unchanged. Aoun also suggested that Lebanon's spring
parliamentary elections might be best delayed until August,
and asserted that if the elections were held on time,
Hizballah would win big. Aoun was relaxed and confident, but
relatively soft-spoken throughout the discussion; he appeared
not to be seeking USG support so much as a captive audience.
End summary and comment.


2. (C) DCM opened the discussion by reiterating the need for
full implementation of UNSCR 1559, a full Syrian withdrawal
from Lebanon before elections, free and fair elections, and a
credible international investigation into former PM Hariri's
assassination. DCM stressed that he was meeting with Aoun
privately at the latter's request and that he had no message
to convey from the USG, other than the need for the Lebanese
opposition to remain united and determined in its pursuit of
Lebanon's full independence and sovereignty. Aoun responded
by highlighting his Congressional testimony prior to adoption
of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Restoration of

Sovereignty Act, which he credited with leading to the
eventual adoption of UNSCR 1559. Aoun expressed confidence
that the criminal charges against him launched by the
Lebanese government after his 2003 Congressional testimony
would soon be dismissed, along with trumped up court cases
dating back to the 1990's which he said falsely accused him
of financial misdeeds and defamation of the State. Aoun
commented that the latter investigations had turned up
nothing, but essentially confiscated his savings, pension and
other financial holdings. (Comment: The meeting took place
in a spacious, but relatively sparsely furnished apartment in
Paris' 17th arrondisement, which did not appear to be a
residence. End comment.) Aoun opined that the Lebanese
government, in the face of continued pressure, appeared to be
ceding in its accusations against him and would likely
withdraw the court cases soon, which would permit his return
to Lebanon. (Comment: Aoun did not offer a specific time
frame for his return, though in a recent French press
interview he suggested that he could return to Lebanon by
late April, provided that the Syrians had fully withdrawn by
then. End comment.)


DISTINCTIONS WITHIN THE OPPOSITION, I WAS FIRST
--------------


3. (C) Asked whether he planned to assume a political role in
the opposition after returning to Lebanon, Aoun responded
with a confident yes. He clarified, though, that, in his
view, there was no "one opposition" but rather two; the first
group, which he called "my opposition," had taken on a
resistance role and refused cooperation with the Syrian
government since 1990. The second group, which he termed the
"parliamentary opposition," had accepted working with the
Syrian government and behaved more like the political
opposition in ordinary democratic countries, a category in
which occupied Lebanon was not a member. The assassination
of Hariri, in Aoun's view, had caused the second group to
move over to his camp of resisting Syrian domination. Aoun
stressed that for years, he had been alone in his calls for
Syrian withdrawal and was told by the other opposition
leaders that he was setting the bar too high in demanding an
end to the Syrian presence. He claimed to have faced similar
reprobation from the "parliamentary opposition" for his
efforts to seek greater USG involvement and contacts with
U.S. legislators, including those of Jewish background; he
asserted that Lebanese politicians, at Syrian instigation,
parroted anti-Israeli rhetoric more harshly than any other
Arab governments. Adding to the list of distinctions between
him and other opposition figures, Aoun said he was the only
opposition leader to support UNSCR 1559 openly, while others
had been afraid to do so. Despite the opposition's newfound
confidence, Aoun described it as not fully liberated and
still hesitant, still exhibiting a hostage mentality after 30
years of Syrian occupation.

4. (C) Commenting on specific opposition factions, Aoun
described the Sunnis as remaining "decapitated" for now, in
the wake of Hariri's demise. Aoun cited Mohammed Safadi of
Tripoli and Fouad Mahkzoumi as potential leaders of the Sunni
community; he noted that he was in regular contact with
Mahkzoumi. Aoun said he was unsure whether Hariri's sister,
Bahia, had staying power as leader of the Sunnis though she
had been temporarily propelled into her current high-profile
role by her brother's demise. Aoun commented that Druze
leader Jumblatt remained the symbolic leader of the
opposition though he represented the Druze only. Aoun coyly
declined to offer any comments on the political leadership of
Lebanon's Christian opposition.

DISARMING HIZBALLAH
--------------


5. (C) Though Aoun expressed full support for UNSCR 1559
implementation, he was cautious on the resolution's call for
disarmament and dismantling of militias, including Hizballah.
He opined that integrating Hizballah into Lebanon's
political society would be problematic and take time, and
that Hizballah's senior leadership might need "guarantees" in
order to lay down its arms. He added that it would be
helpful to know "U.S. limits" on the degree to which Aoun
might be able to engage with Hizballah's top leadership and
assure them that they were not being sought by U.S. courts.
Aoun, who claimed to have high-level contacts with Hizballah,
opined that it might be "comforting" for the organization's
leadership to know that it was not being sought by U.S.
courts, which could help negotiations to lead to Hizballah's
disarmament and integration into the political scene.
Resolving this concern, according to Aoun, was a key priority
for Hizballah's top leadership. DCM reiterated that U.S.
policy on Hizballah's status as a terrorist organization
remained unchanged, and that we continued to call for
unconditional implementation of UNSCR 1559. Aoun toughened
his language on Hizballah a bit, remarking that there was no
justification for Hizballah's remaining armed in the wake of
the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon, since both the
Israeli threat and Sheb'a farms issue were nothing more than
pretexts used by Hizballah. He added that he was seeking to
gradually deflate Hizballah's "sacred" image among the
Lebanese and Arab public as the victorious resistance to
Israel, and show that there was no continued justification
for militias independent of the central government. Aoun
concluded that Hizballah was increasingly isolated, and had
to lower its maximalist demands in the wake of the March 14
opposition demonstration, and that Hizballah Chief Nasrallah
appeared ready to make deals.


6. (C) Aoun added that Syrian and Iranian influence on
Hizballah remained an important external factor which would
contribute to a harder Hizballah line, particularly given the
Syrians' ties to Nasrallah. He opined, however, that the
fall of the Asad regime in Syria, with the likely arrival of
a Sunni government, would change everything, including by
ceasing Syria's support for Hizballah. Asked whether he
thought a fall of the Syrian regime was likely in the wake of
a full Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, Aoun responded that
such an outcome was a certainty, not a mere possibility.

AOUN'S PLAN
--------------


7. (C) Outlining his party's priorities for Lebanon, Aoun
stressed that reasserting Lebanese control over the nation's
security was imperative, through reorganization of the
domestic security services, which existed and operated as a
clone of the Syrian system, operating via terror and threats.
Lebanon's political institutions similarly would have to be
revived and change fundamentally in character to take on
their intended functions. He described the current
parliament as practically Syrian-appointed given the degree
of SARG domination. He dismissed the Lebanese judiciary as
totally corrupt and transformed into the instrument of the
executive to pressure opposition through "mafia laws" and
selective justice. Lebanon's economy also needed major
restructuring to battle corruption, eliminate the political
and economic "neo-feudalism" practiced by Lebanon's
oligarchs, and overcome the nation's overwhelming debt burden.


ELECTIONS THIS YEAR AND IN 2009
--------------


8. (C) On Lebanon's spring parliamentary elections, Aoun
said he would be willing to accept a slight delay of a few
months, to about August, in the wake of continued delays over
formation of a government. He opined that if elections were
held on time, Hizballah would "win all the seats." He
speculated that a government composed of "familiar old
figures" might soon emerge. Delaying elections by a few
months, in Aoun's view, would give Lebanon the chance to
emerge from the current emotionally charged atmosphere, and
give time to convince the public that Hizballah's continued
maintenance of a separate militia was unwarranted. Aoun
stressed that Lebanon's democratization process would take
time, and require the development of institutions reduced to
irrelevancy by Syria. He opined that the real battle of
Lebanon's political future would therefore be elections in

2009. Aoun added that his party was the only one in Lebanon
to offer a secular alternative for the Lebanese people, and
that the rise of secular democracy in Lebanon could be an
inspiration for the rest of the region.


COMMENTS ON U.S., FRANCE AND OTHERS
--------------


9. (C) Aoun described current U.S. efforts on Lebanon as
"perfect." He cautioned, at the same time, that the U.S.
should be careful to make sure that it was clear in its
Lebanon policy and not play a double-game. The U.S., he
advised, should remain similarly vigilant regarding those in
Lebanon who say privately that they want to be close to the
U.S. while participating in anti-U.S. demonstrations. Aoun
was less generous in his comments on French President Chirac,
whom he said had been angered by criticism Aoun made of
Chirac's 1996 visit to Lebanon, during which the French
president asserted that implementation of the Ta'if accords
could not precede a full and comprehensive Middle East peace.
Aoun said that after the 1996 flap, over remarks Aoun made
to the press, French authorities essentially banned him from
giving interviews and practically put him under a gag order.
The situation, of course, had evolved considerably by today,
with Aoun now free to talk to the press, such as a February
2005 LBC interview, which he claimed had attracted a TV
audience of two million in Lebanon -- perhaps not all
supporters. Aoun added that he had no contact with the
French government, though he enjoyed support among some
French parliamentarians, who had shown greater activism in
supporting his anti-Syrian occupation message since 2000. On
other Arab governments, Aoun described Jordan as the most
forthright in supporting Lebanon's independence, which he
attributed to ties to Lebanon among former AUB graduates in
the top levels of Jordan's government. Aoun added that Egypt
had helped pressure Syria to withdraw, though he quipped that
the GOE remained wary that the images of a million Lebanese
opposition protesters would inspire popular demands for
political freedom in Cairo.


10. (C) Comment: Aoun was relaxed, confident, and somewhat
soft-spoken throughout the meeting, which offered few
surprises. He appeared gratified that the meeting took
place, and more eager to pontificate before a captive U.S.
audience than convey a specific message or request to the
USG, beyond his probing about the legal status of Hizballah
leadership figures. While Aoun was detailed in recounting
his status as the first to call for Syria's withdrawal from
Lebanon, he did not offer details on current efforts to
support Lebanon's opposition or describe the extent of his
base of support in Lebanon. Aoun seemed more intent in
pointing out his credentials as an opposition leader and the
distinctions between himself and other opposition figures
rather than focusing on what unites them. End comment.
LEACH