MOD ADVISOR UPBEAT ON BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP; SEES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001823

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM, NP, AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2015
TAGS: PREL PARM CH FR NATO EUN
SUBJECT: MOD ADVISOR UPBEAT ON BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP; SEES
RAPPROCHEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST; NO CHANGE ON EU CHINA ARMS
EMBARGO


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1
.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: Defense Minister Alliot-Marie's Diplomatic
Advisor Bertrand Besancenot provided Political
Minister-Counselor with a readout of the Minister's March
9-10 visit to the United States. He described at length the
positive tone in the bilateral relationship, as reflected in
Alliot-Marie's meetings at the NSC, the Pentagon, and the
Department. He also welcomed the convergence in our views on
Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and the Middle East. He said the U.S.
and Europe needed to better convince the Sunnis in Iraq to
engage in the political process and for the Shi'ites to
include them. On Afghanistan, the French remain unconvinced
about participating in PRTs, but continue to support the NATO
ISAF mission. In contrast, Besancenot maintained that U.S.
concerns over the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China
were misplaced, that further consultations were needed, and
that as a result of Alliot-Marie's visit, Paris has a better
appreciation of the intensity of U.S. opposition to an
embargo lift. Besancenot, however, did not confirm GOF
support for consultations on the embargo as part of a
strategic dialog on China. End summary.

Middle East
--------------


2. (C) Bertrand Besancenot was very expansive and pleased
with Alliot-Marie's meetings in Washington. He said there
had been an open exchange of views, reflecting the new and
positive tone in the bilateral relationship. Alliot-Marie's
speeches at Harvard and SAIS, accordingly, emphasized the
excellent dialog between the United States and Europe, each
side "complementing" the efforts of the other in seeking
solutions to world problems, without glossing over our
differences. By way of example, he turned to a discussion of
the Middle East, noting that it was a region where our
differences had been most prominent, but where we now are
experiencing a general rapprochement of views. On Lebanon,
he noted that there is unity of purpose and action, even if
our point of departure was not the same. The original French
focus was on strengthening Lebanese sovereignty, while the
U.S. sought to ratchet up pressure on Syria. Besancenot,
nonetheless, stressed that now we need together to push for
full implementation of UNSC 1559; Syria must depart Lebanon
even if it will lose the economic and financial advantages it
derives from being in Lebanon. Turning to Iran and the EU3
negotiations, Besancenot commented favorably on our shared
non-proliferation goal for the region. Iranians are sharp
and devious, he observed, and they need to understand that
the United States and the EU are not divided. We have a
division of labor with the EU demonstrating firmness at the
negotiations and the U.S. flexibility, following the recent
U.S. decision to more strongly support the EU3 negotiations.
He made a similar point about the situation on the
Palestinian territories and Israel, stating that we are in
agreement on helping Abbas and Sharon, especially as Sharon
faces pressures from the settlers and within his own party.

Iraq/Afghanistan
--------------


3. (C) We pressed Besancenot on French integration of its
proposed bilateral training program for security forces with
NATO's own training mission. Besancenot responded that
France was doing its share. We both wish to see the
successful stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq, he
stated, and then recited French contributions to date:
support for the NATO decision to establish a training
mission, support for a debt cancellation, substantial
contribution to the NATO trust funds, and agreement to assign
one French officer to the NATO "clearing house." Alluding to
the French decision not to allow French participation in
Iraq, Besancenot stressed that France wanted to avoid having
decisions on the NATO training mission adversely affect the
improved bilateral relationship. That said, the GOF did not
intend to link its own bilateral training program (once stood
up) with the NATO mission.


4. (C) Regarding Iraq's future, Besancenot reiterated that it
is in our mutual interest to help train security forces and
to push the Iraqis to better integrate the Sunni community so
that they have a stake in the country. For success in Iraq,
we need to see the Sunnis included in the emerging political
structures, but the current signals to the Sunnis are not
clear. The U.S. and the EU need to help send a stronger
political message to the Iraqis that the Sunnis must be
brought into the political process. He also observed that
the U.S. and France have disagreed on the issue of Iraqi
sovereignty and the timing for a withdrawal of foreign
troops. The Political Minister Counselor reminded Besancenot
that the U.S. is currently focused on enhancing stability in
Iraq, and providing the wherewithal for Iraqi forces to deal
with security threats -- after which a withdrawal of foreign
troops would become possible. However, it would be premature
and counter-productive to set a withdrawal date up front. In
response, Besancenot voiced uncertainty over U.S. long-term
plans in Iraq, indicating that the French Embassy in Baghdad
had learned from senior officials at our Embassy in Baghdad
that the U.S. wished to maintain a long-term presence in
Iraq, which, if true, would send the wrong message to the
Sunnis.


5. (C) We pressed Besancenot on further French contributions
to ISAF in Afghanistan. He said Alliot-Marie had signaled in
Washington that France agreed in principle to the OEF/ISAF
merger, but disagreed on the timetable. France believes it
could only happen when the terrorist threat had diminished.
On ISAF expansion, Besancenot was noncommittal on French
participation in PRTs or the Quick Reaction Force, and
cryptically cited Secdef's alleged criticisms of the German
PRT in Kunduz during his meeting with Alliot-Marie.
Nonetheless, he was careful to emphasize French support for
ISAF. France, he stressed, will also reinforce its support
for the Afghan elections (provision of combat planes and
support staff) and increase its training of the Afghan army.

EU China Arms Embargo
--------------


6. (C) Besancenot contrasted the excellent atmospherics of
the minister's visit and our convergence of views on Middle
East issues with our different perspectives on the EU arms
embargo on China. While praising the improved tone of the
bilateral relationship that can only contribute to the
current U.S.-EU discussions over the embargo, he volunteered
that EU capitals have clearly misunderstood the intensity of
the U.S. opposition to lifting the embargo. The EU had
concluded from the President's discussions with French
President Chirac last February, that the Administration was
against the lift, but that the "real problem" was with
Congress. Now, it has become clear that USG is firmly
opposed to the lift, with Secdef, NSC Advisor Hadley, and the
Secretary conveying this message firmly to Alliot-Marie.

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Besancenot expressed the fear that we are headed for a
"tsunami" on this issue. The Political Minister Counselor
reiterated the U.S. position that we remain opposed to the
lift and had made clear for quite some time that lifting the
embargo would lead to unacceptable technology transfers to
China, which would threaten the regional strategic balance.
Besancenot, recapitulated Alliot-Marie's often-stated message
that France has the strictest export-controls on dual-use
technology and that it would never sell technology or weapons
that would be of concern to "our U.S. ally." France, he
added, is cognizant that the U.S. is a Pacific power with
direct interests in the region, that it shares our concern
not to see sophisticated technology in China, and that it is
prepared to push its EU colleagues to tighten their own
export control regimes. Besancenot further explained that the
embargo only covers lethal weapons, and not dual-use
technology, nor does it have any affect on China's principal
arms suppliers, Russia, and other suppliers such as Israel.


7. (C) Returning to Alliot-Marie's visit and her meeting with
Senators and members of Congress, Besancenot said they heard
three main arguments in the U.S. against lifting the embargo:
China's inadequate human rights progress, adverse affect on
the region, especially Taiwan and Korea, and concern over
technology transfers. Besancenot admitted that the human
rights situation in China is not good, but added that it is
better than it was in 1989. He believes Europe is aware of
the regional concerns. He dismissed the technology transfer
argument by emphasizing that Europe agreed with us on
controlling dual-use exports. The MOD has concluded that
U.S. arguments are mostly invalid and that the only new
argument presented by the Congress was an "emotional" one
against lifting the embargo. Along this line, he said one
senior Senator, without agreeing with the French position,
confided that the Congress was not fully informed of all the
points of discussion on the embargo and asked the French for
a paper, which the French Embassy subsequently delivered.
Besancenot concluded that Europe needed to do a better job
through an expansion of its contacts with the U.S. to explain
the substance of its arguments and pointed to the visit to
Washington of Solana nonproliferation advisor Annalisa
Giannella as the latest EU effort. He linked the Giannella
visit to a proposed EU-U.S. strategic dialog on China, which
the EU was awaiting U.S. views on. The Political
Minister-Counselor suggested that a strategic dialog on China
should logically precede any EU discussion with regard to the
arms embargo; it should not be conceived as merely a next
step after a lift. Besancenot took the point, but recalled
that the EU had agreed at the December 2004 EU Council
meeting to lift the embargo, which he still foresaw happening
during the Luxembourg Presidency.


8. (C) In defense of China, Besancenot took up the Chinese
argument that blocking arms exports was incompatible with
Western recognition of China's influence in the world as
evidenced through its participation in the WTO and the
Olympics Games. He described China as an important player in
a multipolar world, which should be treated as a responsible
partner and not lumped in the same league as Zimbabwe and
other countries on the embargo list. He explained that
multipolarity is not a concept designed to irritate the
United States, but is simply the recognition of a reality: in
20-30 years Brazil, China, and India, among others, will
become serious powers. Europe and the U.S., linked through
the common bonds of history, must work together to ensure
that they influence China's development. Lifting the embargo
would only make China a more responsible player, he stated.


9. (C) Comment: The MOD has often been more supportive than
other ministries of U.S. positions. Senior officials are
more forthcoming than their counterparts at the MFA, for
instance. Besancenot and his colleagues were clearly pleased
with the Defense Minister's visit, are eager to put
differences on Iraq behind us, and welcome our close
coordination on Lebanon. Besancenot's comments in defense of
the planned decision to lift the arms embargo, while
otherwise not new, included an awareness that they, and other
EU member states, may have misread the President's and the
Secretary's message during their meetings in Europe. While

SIPDIS
senior MFA officials have previously voiced a desire for
broad consultations with us on China, Besancenot, perhaps not
wishing to exceed his brief, stopped short of supporting a
strategic dialog before any further steps are taken with the
embargo. End comment.


10. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

Leach