FRENCH WELCOME DEMARCHE ON GBAGBO

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001805

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IV FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH WELCOME DEMARCHE ON GBAGBO

REF: STATE 42762

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Embassy Africa watcher met March 15 with Nathalie
Delapalme, FM Barnier's Africa advisor, to share the elements
of the demarche on Ivoirian President Gbagbo (reftel) and to
discuss the situation in Cote d'Ivoire generally.


2. (C) Delapalme welcomed the demarche on Gbagbo, noting that
France had also found it necessary to take a stronger line
with Gbagbo regarding his responsibility for the actions of
militia groups. She also commented favorably on the USG
points on the way forward, noting that criticizing Gbagbo
without showing him a plan for addressing issues was
unproductive. Delapalme agreed that Gbagbo should be
reminded that it was in his power as head of state to move
events forward, rather than continue to complain about the
failures of the opposition. Gbagbo, she said, had difficulty
in abandoning his oppositionist's mentality in favor of
acting as a national leader.


3. (C) Delapalme revealed that FM Barnier had had a
one-on-one meeting with Gbagbo while in Lome for the funeral
of Togolese President Eyadema. She declined to speculate
what may have been said, noting that Barnier was a latecomer
(i.e. not involved in Marcoussis) to Ivoirian affairs.
Delapalme took the opportunity to comment that it was Barnier
who was maintaining communication with Gbagbo, as President
Chirac and Gbagbo had not spoken since the FANCI attack on
French forces in Bouake in November.


4. (C) Africa watcher and Delapalme reviewed the familiar
disconnect between USG and French thinking with regard to
ONUCI. We noted that our support for ONUCI had, from the
outset, been contingent on progress on the political front.
With the parties making little progress, and showing less
good faith, it would be difficult to support a large increase
in ONUCI force levels or additional tasks. Delapalme
presented the French view that having ONUCI engage on
planning for elections, DDR, and generally creating a context
of security could encourage the parties to move forward.
Delapalme also noted the imbalance between the force levels
approved for UNAMSIL and UNAMIL and that approved for ONUCI.
She continued that she feared that conditions were being
created whereby combatants could continue to receive UN DDR
funds in one country for weapons which could be cheaply
replaced with the replacements being turned in for DDR funds
in a neighboring country.


5. (C) We sought to draw Delapalme out on the issue of the
continued presence in Cote d'Ivoire of French Licorne forces.
In particular, we queried whether President Chirac's
comments in Senegal about France remaining only if the
Ivoirian government so requested, had been designed to force
an explicit request from Gbagbo. Delapalme was (even by her
normally closed-lipped standards) cautious in her reply.
France, she said, was not planning to withdraw, and had no
desire to withdraw from Cote d'Ivoire. Licorne, she noted,
was present as a UN-mandated force, and it was for the UN to
decide whether or not Licorne should remain. She allowed,
however, that a public demand by Gbagbo for Licorne's
withdrawal would place the issue in a different context.


6. (C) Finally, we asked Delapalme whether she planned to
meet with Gbagbo's advisor, Pastor Moise Kore. Delapalme
acknowledged having met him previously, and was aware that
Kore was in Paris, but said there had been no request in
either direction for a meeting. Had Kore requested a
meeting, Delapalme said, she would have declined.
Leach