DAS CARPENTER'S MARCH 9 CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001802

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2015
TAGS: PREL KDEM PHUM KMPI LE IZ SY EG KPAL FR
SUBJECT: DAS CARPENTER'S MARCH 9 CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR
FRENCH OFFICIALS ON MIDDLE EAST REFORM


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alex Wolff, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary and comment: During March 9 discussions with
visiting NEA DAS Scott Carpenter, senior French officials
expressed full GoF support for U.S. objectives on reform in
the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA),but
stressed their continued desire to keep our messages separate
and stay focused on the Barcelona Process. President
Chirac's Middle East advisor voiced strong support for U.S.
reform objectives and disdain for Arab governments (namely
Syria) who had used the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a
pretext for oppression. Carpenter heard a less helpful
message from MFA Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye,
who stressed GoF intent to make the Barcelona Process the
EU's priority, and linked the success in the region of reform
initiatives to the degree to which the U.S. continued to
pressure Israel. Laboulaye also suggested that democracy in
the Arab world meant that secular dictatorships could be
replaced by Islamic fundamentalist governments, citing Iraq
as a cautionary example and advising that the U.S. might have
to rethink its stance on Hizballah and Hamas. Laboulaye
conceded, with unusual candor, that the GoF had long relied
on secular dictatorships and authoritarian regimes in the
region, partly to protect Arab Christian populations. In a
separate meeting, MFA representatives briefed DAS Carpenter
on the scope of EU and French bilateral assistance to the
region, noting that, of the MFA's 128 million euros in annual
assistance to the region, 40 percent was for education, while
10 percent was devoted to governance. While GoF officials
were keen to exchange views on the reform issue, they did not
offer a concrete response to Carpenter's proposal that the
U.S. and EU accelerate consultation on BMENA and consider
setting up a coordination mechanism in Brussels. In a
separate press roundtable, DAS Carpenter clarified U.S.
reform objectives and stressed the need for partnership to a
receptive audience of 14 French and Arab journalists. End
summary and comment.


2. (SBU) NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) Scott Carpenter
visited Paris March 8-9 and met separately March 9 with
Presidential Advisor on the Middle East Dominique Boche, MFA
Political Director (P-equivalent) Stanislas de Laboulaye, and
MFA Director (A/S-equivalent) for the Near East and North
Africa Jean-Francois Thibault. The Thibault discussions
consisted of a roundtable session, at which MFA Policy
Planning Director Pierre Levy and several officials from the
Directorates of European and Middle East/North African
Affairs and Directorate General of International Cooperation
offered perspectives on French views on reform and bilateral
and EU programs in the region. Thibault also hosted a
working lunch for Carpenter, attended by the French G-8
Sous-Sherpa and Director (U/S-equivalent) for Economic
Affairs Alain Le Roy and MFA action officer on Middle East
reform issues Brigitte Curmi. Attending Carpenter's meetings
on the U.S. side were DCM Alex Wolff, Political
Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, EUR/ERA action officer
Louis Bono, and Political Officer Uzra Zeya (notetaker).


STRONG SUPPORT FROM ELYSEE
--------------


3. (C) Carpenter opened his discussion with Presidential
Middle East Advisor Dominique Boche by stressing U.S.
interest in working with Europe to promote economic,
political and social reform in the BMENA region. Carpenter
described U.S. bilateral efforts via the Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI),and emphasized that the U.S.
was not seeking to supplant the Barcelona Process or deny its
accomplishments. At the same time, with the U.S. and Europe
spending billions in assistance to the region, we shared a
common interest in better information sharing and
coordination between U.S. and European programs. Boche
responded to Carpenter's presentation by asserting that
France "totally shares" U.S. objectives for reform in the
BMENA region. Conditions were ripe for an evolution towards
democracy throughout the region, which had been in
development for years. The Arab public was now rejecting the
"archaism" of the past, and all the governments of the region
had problems of popular legitimacy. Boche added that a
number of Arab regimes remained "barricaded behind a myth" of
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, citing Syria as an example of a
country which "never fired a bullet against Israel in 30
years," but used Israel as a pretext to maintain a state of
emergency and repress its own people and those of Lebanon.
Boche also noted that a number of "sacred cows" had
disappeared in recent months, noting that in Egypt, for
example, the press had crossed the red-line of not discussing
President Mubarak's family. Boche cited Jordan, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and Iraq as other examples of
positive democratic developments, and concluded that a
democratic evolution was taking place nearly everywhere in
the BMENA region.

4. (C) At the same time, Boche cautioned that the U.S. and
Europe should be careful to ensure that their reform efforts
were not viewed as the imposition of outside models on the
Arab world. For this reason, it was important to preserve a
"diversity of messages and messengers" and avoid the
impression of a "Western front" pushing reform on the region.
The U.S. and Europe each had their own policies and means to
pursue reform and should continue to do so, while both
working in the same direction. The GoF remained intent on
strengthening the Mediterranean partnership, especially as an
expanded Europe looked increasingly to the east. The EU New
Neighbors policy -- as well as the vast amounts the EU
already gave the region in terms of direct assistance,
subsidies, and loans -- all went in the same direction as
U.S. efforts, but France wanted to preserve the autonomy of
EU initiatives.


5. (C) Carpenter and Boche agreed that there was harmony
between U.S. and French views on reform, and that we need not
put our efforts under one umbrella. Boche added that we
needed to show the region that there was no incompatibility
between the G-8 BMENA initiative and the Barcelona Process,
as Arab governments must understand that they could be
friends of the U.S. and Europe. Carpenter agreed, noting
that we should dispel suspicions of U.S.-European conflict on
reform efforts. In closing, Boche stressed that reform
efforts would have to be accompanied by engagement on
addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was
already the case under the second term of President Bush. He
concluded that events on the ground were changing quickly,
and that it was already "another world" since Arafat's death
last November.

SUPPORT, MIXED WITH CAUTION FROM MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR
--------------


6. (C) In a separate meeting with MFA Political Director
Stanislas de Laboulaye, DAS Carpenter described in more
detail the U.S. desire to accelerate and regularize
high-level consultation with the EU on BMENA efforts, while
stressing that the U.S. is not seeking to supplant the
Barcelona Process. Carpenter cited a number of upcoming
events which offer context for the U.S. and EU to move such
dialogue forward, such as the U.S-EU ministerial and summit,
the Barcelona Process ten-year anniversary in November, and
the next Forum for the Future in Bahrain. Carpenter
concluded that when the U.S. and Europe speak with the same
voice, we can achieve greater progress; there was also room
for the U.S. and Europe to emphasize different aspects of the
same message, such as rule of law within the larger context
of democratization. Laboulaye responded by stressing, first,
that the U.S. and France had moved closer on the reform
issue, with the U.S. becoming less "ideological" and the GoF
"more accepting" of the idea that the status quo in the Arab
world was not the answer. Clearly, things in the region were
moving, Laboulaye asserted, though it was unclear whether
this was due to U.S. intervention in Iraq; what was important
now, was for the U.S. and Europe to try and ensure that
change underway moves in the right direction.


7. (C) Laboulaye stressed that the Barcelona Process would be
the GoF's "absolute priority" on reform efforts. He
described the record of the Barcelona Process, after ten
years, as highly positive, as the EU had put lots of money
into the same sectors identified in the BMENA initiative.
The main problem in the Barcelona Process was that it was
always weak on the political side, as momentum was always
"sapped" by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition,
political enthusiasm had always been low on the Barcelona
Process, and the EU, ten years ago, was not the political
union which it is today. For these reasons, France, together
with Spain under the UK EU presidency, would seek to overhaul
and revitalize the Barcelona constitution and convention, to
make the Mediterranean understand why it was so important,
and remind newer EU members what the region meant to the EU.
In stressing Barcelona, Laboulaye concluded that the GoF
wasn't underestimating the importance of BMENA; he conceded
that BMENA was in fact one of the main factors which prompted
the revitalization of the Barcelona Process in the first
place.


8. (C) Laboulaye also emphasized the need to work in close
partnership with Arab governments, and to be careful that
external pressure does not result in stiffening of government
positions. Laboulaye cited Egypt as an example of the latter
trend, and commented that coaxing or "nudging" Arab
governments worked better than stiff outside pressure.
Laboulaye also stressed the "absolute centrality" of the
Israeli-Palestinian issue to reform efforts, describing this
as a difference between the U.S. and France from the start.
At the same time, Laboulaye commended March 1 remarks by
Secretary Rice at the London Conference, asserting that the

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Secretary's remarks would help reform efforts "tremendously,"

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as long as we follow through on them. He added that putting
pressure on Israel remained "key" to the success of the BMENA
initiative. Carpenter agreed that the ongoing momentum in
relaunching the roadmap could only help reform efforts, but
pointed out that, at the recent Forum for the Future in
Rabat, only a few governments raised the Israeli-Palestinian
issue and that -- increasingly -- governments in the region
are seeing internal reform as a key objective, independent of
the conflict.


9. (C) Laboulaye sounded a cautionary note on the "Shi'a
ascendancy" in Iraq, describing this as a major worry for
Iraq's neighbors, despite the Iraqi elections success.
Laboulaye was unsure whether Iraq would play for better or
worse for the region or for France, noting that French
nationals who had gone to Iraq to fight jihad were returning
to France and were more capable than those who had pursued
similar training in Afghanistan. Laboulaye also described
Iraq within a larger trend of secular dictatorships in the
Arab world being replaced by religious-oriented governments.
He conceded that, in the past, French policy in the Arab
world had been built upon favoring secular dictators, such as
Bourguiba, Arafat, or even Mubarak. These governments served
as "instruments" of French influence, in addition to having
close ties with the French intellectual class and offering a
means to protect Christians in the region. Now, with such
secular regimes being increasingly a thing of the past, the
question remained to what degree Islamists would replace
them. With Hamas enjoying broad support in the Palestinian
territories and Hizballah bringing out one million in the
streets of Beirut, Laboulaye suggested that we needed to
rethink our approach to both groups. He added that we should
recognize that civil society in the Arab world is Islamic in
nature; we couldn't say we want to deal with civil society
and ignore this reality. With over 5 million Muslims in
France, this was a domestic issue for the GoF; increasingly,
French Muslim youth were having closer ties with their
countries of origin, and those who might have become
communists in the past were turning towards Islamism, in
rejection of French and western society. France faced a
basic problem in how to adapt to the new Arab world, and
Laboulaye questioned whether this new neighborhood was the
one we really wanted. Carpenter responded by stressing that
the lack of political openness which fueled Islamic extremism
was exactly why we needed to pursue the reform agenda
underway; he stressed further that U.S.-led reform efforts
were generational and not bent on toppling regimes.

THIBAULT: APPROACH REGION WITH DETERMINATION AND DELICACY
--------------


10. (C) MFA A/S equivalent for Middle East/North Africa
Jean-Francois Thibault, accompanied by a panel of MFA
officials from the Cooperation and European and Middle East
Directorates, offered Carpenter an overview of French views
on regional reform, combined with specific briefings on
French and EU cooperation programs. Like Boche, Thibault
stressed that France shared "exactly" U.S. values on regional
reform, and shared the U.S. view that greater democratization
would mean greater longterm stability in the region.
Thibault added, however, that while U.S. and French
objectives were largely the same, there was a difference in
some of our perceptions. In the Gof view, we needed to
approach the reform issue with determination and "delicacy,"
due to the fragility of Arab society and the difficult
process of introspection already underway in the region.
Thibault also stressed the need for a diversity of messages
and messengers, and to be aware of Arab and Muslim
sensitivities to the perception of a "Western front" against
them. Newly-appointed MFA Director for Policy Planning
Pierre Levy added that the GoF agreed with the U.S. that the
status quo in the Arab world was not sustainable any more; at
the same time, the region was in France's neighborhood, so
regional stability remained a strategic priority. Carpenter
responded to Thibault saying that, while he understood the
need for a diversity of messengers, it made no sense to have
a diversity of messages. Dissonance would only create
confusion and the sense that we could be played off against
one another.


11. (U) On EU assistance programs to the region, European
Cooperation Directorate action officer Stephane Crouzard
reported that MEDA II (years 2000-2006) disbursements had
increased progressively since 2000 and were now 115 percent
of allocations. Egypt and Morocco were the top recipients in
EU funding, with Morocco the "star pupil" and Egypt receiving
some 700 million euros in European Investment Bank Facility
loans in 2004, out of some 2 billion euros in loans which the
EU provided the region annually. Crouzard described the EU
Neighborhood Policy as a means of accelerating reform
efforts, as the country-specific action plans were intended
to last only three years. On French bilateral assistance to
the region, MFA Cooperation officials reported that France
provided the region some 715 million USD per year in
assistance, of which some 128 million euros was controlled by
the MFA. Some 80 percent of the 128 million in
MFA-controlled assistance went to Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco,
Egypt and Lebanon. 40 percent of the MFA-directed assistance
to the region was allocated for education, while some 10
percent was allocated for governance. One MFA official
described the creation of a new "office for Governance,"
within the MFA Directorate General for Cooperation as a
revolutionary development for the GoF. French governance
programs focused largely on "twinning" French government or
administrative bodies to counterparts in the region, to help
in the overall modernization of regional governments, while
building local capacity. French assistance programs also
promoted human rights, via programs for strengthening rule of
law, judicial reform, penal reform, and improving access to
and administration of justice.


12. (C) During a more informal working lunch, Thibault asked
Carpenter his impressions of Iraq, specifically why the Iraqi
Transitional Government was taking so long to form, and what
would happen in Kirkuk. Citing the deepening of Kurdish
nationalism, Thibault picked up a point raised earlier by
Laboulaye that perhaps what resulted from democracy in the
Middle East was not always what we wanted. Thibault cited
Lebanon, and specifically the massive March 8 demonstration
organized by Hizballah, as another example. The GoF had long
counseled the need to deal cautiously with Hizballah and see
it not only for its unacceptable behavior, but for its
political importance. Lebanon was the oldest democracy in
the Middle East and France wanted to see Lebanese democracy
succeed. To do so, Thibault suggested, we needed to try and
separate Hizballah from Syria and Iran and hope that
Hizballah would be interested in its own political future
within Lebanon. Carpenter said that it would be a mistake
to read too much into the Hizballah numbers. To protest when
your life is at risk is one thing; to do so with the aid and
encouragement of two friendly governments is another.


13. (U) During a May 9 press roundtable, Carpenter clarified
the distinctions between MEPI and BMENA programs and stressed
the U.S. desire to accelerate reform efforts in partnership
with Europe and the region. The audience of some 14 French
and Arabic-language journalists appeared receptive to
Carpenter's presentation and asked largely non-polemical
questions seeking greater detail on U.S. efforts, for
example, to promote the rights of women and enhance dialogue
between NATO and the region. The briefing also offered the
opportunity for Carpenter to dispel misperceptions, such as
rumors that the U.S. had sought to quash the most recent UNDP
Arab Human Development report.


14. (C) Comment: Carpenter's visit took place at an opportune
moment, as the French press is increasingly (and grudgingly)
conceding that the Bush administration deserves some credit
for the "Arab springtime" taking place in the region. FM
Barnier, in recent press remarks, has also sought to stress
that liberty is a European, not just American, value. French
officials were eager to invite DAS Carpenter to Paris and
took care to offer him a packed, high-level schedule. At the
same time, GOF officials were largely unresponsive on
Carpenter's specific proposal to enhance U.S.-EU consultation
on BMENA in Brussels. We view this as more typical of the
GoF style of consulting, which is to state the French
position and tell us what is wrong with ours first, before
moving on to a new course of action. As French officials
told us, the GoF's top priority will be to focus on
revitalizing the Barcelona Process, not on improving EU
coordination with us. While we don't expect the GoF to lead
the charge to support greater U.S.-EU consultation on BMENA
in Brussels, we don't anticipate the GoF opposing the idea
either. As for the difference in tone and emphasis between
the MFA and Presidency, we see this as reflecting different
aspects of the French position: the GoF is convinced the
status quo in the Arab world can't last, but for reasons of
pragmatism more than principle, and is worried about what
comes next. End comment.


15. (U) This message was cleared by DAS Carpenter.
Leach