FRENCH OFFICIALS ON LARSEN VISIT, LEBANON NEXT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001765

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014
TAGS: PREL SY LE PTER FR UNSC
SUBJECT: FRENCH OFFICIALS ON LARSEN VISIT, LEBANON NEXT
STEPS

REF: A. BEIRUT 816 (EXDIS)

B. BEIRUT 805 (EXDIS)

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: MFA and Elysee officials are stressing the
need for continued insistence on a full Syrian withdrawal
from Lebanon before elections, in the wake of UN Special
Envoy Larsen's meetings in Beirut and Aleppo. The GoF views
a four to six-month Syrian withdrawal as too long. According
to Chirac's Middle East advisor, Larsen expressed worry to
the GoF that Syria may seek to sow inter-communal violence by
targetting Lebanon's pro-Syria camp, including a possible
Nasrallah assassination. Larsen also expressed a preference
for delaying release of the Fitzgerald report, and criticized
the Lebanese opposition for not being more pragmatic on the
need for a new government. French officials agree with
Larsen that continued delays in forming a new Lebanese
government could delay elections and full Syrian withdrawal,
and view the "dump Lahoud" demands of the opposition as
counter-productive. French officials continue to commend
U.S.-GoF cooperation on Lebanon, but suggest that we may
eventually part ways on the Hizballah issue or regime change
in Syria. MFA officials also report that the GoF has no
enthusiasm for an international force in Lebanon, that the EU
may soon send election observer trainers to Lebanon, and that
FM Barnier may attend the March 22-23 Arab League summit,
where he will avoid contact with Lebanese or Syrian
officials. End summary.

LARSEN VISIT
--------------


2. (S) UN Special Envoy for UNSCR 1559 implementation Terje
Roed-Larsen visited Paris March 14 and had a working lunch
with Presidential Diplomatic Advisor (NSA-equivalent) Maurice
Gourdault-Montagne, MFA A/S-equivalent for Near East
Jean-Francois Thibault, and MFA IO A/S-equivalent
Jean-Maurice Ripert. We received readouts on Larsen's visit
from Presidential Middle East Advisor Dominique Boche March
16 and from MFA DAS-equivalent for the Levant Christian
Jouret March 15. Jouret stressed that the GoF opted to
receive Larsen with maximum discretion and not at the
presidential or ministerial level to avoid feeding
perceptions that Larsen is controlled by the GoF and USG.
Jouret said the GoF was encouraged by Larsen's meeting with
Bashar and cautiously optimistic that Bashar would follow
through on his commitments, but concluded that the lack of a
timetable for full withdrawal was insufficient. Jouret
described Larsen as optimistic (more so that the GoF) and
determined, and convinced that Bashar understood the gravity
of the current situation and the accusations against him on
Hariri's assassination. Both Jouret and Boche concurred that
the four to six month full withdrawal suggested by Bashar to
Larsen (ref b) was "too long."


3. (S) According to Elysee Advisor Boche, Larsen stressed
four additional points to the GoF: 1) the need for the
international community to continue to insist upon a full
(troops and security services) Syrian withdrawal before
elections, to avoid giving the impression of being satisfied
by Syrian steps so far; 2) worry that Syria may seek to sow
inter-communal violence by assassinating a major figure in
the loyalist camp, possibly Hizballah leader Nasrallah; 3)
the need to delay release of the Fitzgerald report, to avoid
the impression that it is linked to Larsen's visit; and 4)
the need for the Lebanese opposition to be more realistic on
the urgency of forming a new Lebanese government, without
which full Syrian withdrawal and timely parliamentary
elections would not be possible. Boche stressed that the GoF
shared the view that a forming a new GOL was imperative, and
opined that a neutral, technical government might be a more
feasible option than a national unity government, given GOL
unwillingness to meet opposition demands to fire GOL security
officials. Boche added that the calls by some oppositionists
for a Lahoud resignation were counterproductive, as Lahoud's
dismissal would result in a further impasse that would serve
Syrian interests.


4. (C) Jouret told us separately that FM Barnier, during a
March 11 meeting with a visiting Lebanese opposition
delegation led by Marwan Hamade, urged the group, to no
avail, to show more flexibility in forming a national unity
government with PM Karami. Jouret described the delegation
as unrealistic on its prospects for winning elections; the
group expressed confidence that it could win at least 50
percent of the vote if elections were free and fair. Jouret
also commented that the group did not appear to have a
political plan beyond getting Syria out of Lebanon and
clearing the GOL of pro-Syrian elements after their presumed
electoral victory. Jouret conceded that the massive March 14
demonstration changed the dynamic in the opposition's favor
since Barnier's March 11 meeting, and that the degree to
which both camps could mobilize numbers in the street would
affect the political jockeying now underway.
PARTING OF WAYS OVER HIZBALLAH?
--------------


5. (C) Both Jouret and Boche commended GoF-U.S. cooperation
on Lebanon and U.S. willingness to "listen to" French views;
at the same time, they both speculated that our common
approaches may diverge eventually over Hizballah, once full
Syrian withdrawal is achieved. Jouret described Hizballah
dismantling as the real problem in UNSCR 1559 implementation,
now that Bashar had already caved, in principle, to Larsen on
full withdrawal. Jouret asked rhetorically how we could
achieve the dismantling of Hizballah, expressing doubt on the
Lebanese army's capacity to do so. He added that the
Lebanese opposition, during their meeting with Barnier,
stressed the view that Hizballah was a longterm internal
question, not an international issue. In the opposition
view, dismantling of Hizballah could only come after
Hizballah's full integration as a political player, and not
the other way around, as previewed in UNSCR 1559. The GoF,
meanwhile, was trying to approach the Hizballah issue on a
pragmatic basis, rather than an ideological one, which meant
we should not expect a shift on EU Hizballah designation.
Boche reiterated the latter point with us, and reiterated
that the GoF wanted to avoid alienating Lebanon's majority
Shi'a community, for which Hizballah remained the most
credible political force. Boche added that the GoF hoped
that a Syrian withdrawal would make Hizballah realize there
was no alternative to political integration, however he was
not confident this was the case. Syrian withdrawal would
make Hizballah more dependent on Iran, whose intentions were
unclear, though it had claimed to the GoF that it was playing
a moderating influence on Hizballah in the current crisis.
Boche opined that the Iranians had the tendency to see
themselves as respected internationally only when they are
perceived as dangerous.


6. (S) Jouret and Boche also expressed concern on prospects
for the fall of Bashar's regime, an outcome which the GoF was
not deliberately seeking. Jouret stressed the need for the
U.S. and France to think about the implications of a full
Syrian withdrawal and whether it might result in Bashar's
overthrow and replacement by a more hardline leader, a
prospect which Boche viewed as entirely possible. Boche
described Bashar al-Asad as weak, lacking the experience and
intelligence of his father, and losing control over the
circle which surrounds him. He cited Larsen's description of
the Syrian leader's nervousness during the recent Aleppo
meeting, and added that the fact that recent pro-SARG
demonstrations in Damascus had rallied such low numbers -- in
the 30,000 range -- showed that Bashar was being sabotaged by
others within his security services, possibly his powerful
brother-in-law, SMI Chief Asif Shawkat. Jouret opined that
he still viewed Bashar, despite all his weaknesses, as
redeemable, but said the question remained whether the Syrian
leader would rid himself of the circle around him, including
the negative influence of FM Shara.

NEXT STEPS: ARAB LEAGUE, UN, OBSERVERS
--------------


7. (C) On next steps, Jouret stressed that the GoF would
continue to advise Larsen to issue a tough report in April,
and would continue to seek maximum pressure from Arab
governments on Syria for full withdrawal. On the latter
point, Jouret noted that next week's Arab League summit did
not have Lebanon on the agenda, though the issue might be
discussed in a smaller "group of seven" (NFI) within the
gathering. Jouret reported that FM Barnier was likely to
attend the Arab League summit, at the invitation of Algeria,
but that the French FM would studiously avoid any contact
with Lebanese or Syrian officials. On further UN action,
Jouret said the MFA originally had been favorable to the idea
of a PRST to follow the Larsen visit to Syria and Lebanon,
but was overruled by the Elysee. Jouret stressed that the
GoF was entirely negative on the idea of an international
force or expanded UNIFIL filling the void left by a Syrian
withdrawal, and cited the French experience of losing troops
in Lebanon in the 1980's as weighing heavily on GoF thinking.
On observers for the May elections, Jouret reported that the
EU planned to send a small-sized team, to include two French
nationals, to Lebanon to train Lebanese election observers in
advance of the ballot and would not seek GoL permission to do
so; the GoF was also intent on participating in an
international observer mission, once the GoL relents on the
issue. Boche, meanwhile, stressed to us that the real
determinant to whether elections would be free and fair was
whether or not Syrian troops and security services fully
withdrew prior to the ballot.
Leach