FRENCH POSITION ON THE JOINT EU-CHINA STATEMENT ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001580

SIPDIS

NP/CBM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2025
TAGS: PARM FR JA CH MTCR
SUBJECT: FRENCH POSITION ON THE JOINT EU-CHINA STATEMENT ON
NONPROLIFERATION: A BEHIND-THE-SCENES LOOK

REF: TOUNGER/DURHAM CONSULTATIONS 25 FEBRUARY 2005

Classified By: EST COUNSELOR ROBERT W. DRY FOR REASONS 1.4 (C),(D),AN
D (H).


1. (S) Following a demarche delivered on 01 March on a
separate matter, French Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) Point of Contact David Bertolotti provided EST Officer
comments on the French position regarding the joint European
Union-China statement on nonproliferation issued o/a October

2004. Bertolotti's comments shed light on the Government of
France's (GOF) perspective on the statement.


2. (S) According to Bertolotti, the Dutch EU
representative negotiated the joint nonproliferation
statement without prior consultations or coordination with EU
partners, an approach that irked the French. The GOF
expressed to the Dutch EU representative its dissatisfaction
regarding the portion of the joint statement that addressed
China's bid to join the MTCR, arguing that it would give the
Chinese unrealistic expectations regarding their short-term
prospects for joining the group. The Dutch EU representative
told the French that he had included the MTCR language under
Chinese pressure, and that he had concluded that the value in
having a joint EU-Chinese statement on nonproliferation
warranted some compromise on the MTCR portion of the final
text. He assured the French that he had explained to the
Chinese that the statement regarding MTCR membership should
not be interpreted as a signal that China would soon gain
admittance to the MTCR, as several EU and other MTCR partners
still had significant concerns about China's export control
system and nonproliferation activities. Bertolotti noted to
EST officer that he could not confirm the Dutch
representative's claim to have tempered China's expectations,
and indicated that he had doubts as to the veracity of the
Dutch official's claims.


3. (S) Bertolotti further commented that while the GOF
did not have major problems with the bulk of the EU-China
nonproliferation statement, during EU meetings in November
and December 2004, the GOF had formally raised their
objections and concerns regarding the MTCR portion of the
text. According to Bertolotti, the French were the lone
dissenters both times; they had formally raised their
objections and the French were pressured to join EU consensus
on the joint statement. He added that he had been
particularly surprised by the mild reaction to the MTCR
portion of the statement on the part of the United Kingdom
(UK). He added that in private conversations, the UK's EU
representative had remarked to him that the statement was
only an EU text, and that individual EU MTCR partners would
be at liberty to raise objections on their own in the future.
Bertolotti noted that this approach highlighted a
fundamental difference in philosophy between the UK and
France regarding the significance of EU statements. To
further make his point regarding French objections to the
MTCR portion of the statement, Bertolotti said that France
was leading the EU charge to lift the arms embargo on China,
and that in contrast to its position on the arms embargo, the
GOF had taken a strong stance against the overly optimistic
statement regarding MTCR membership for China contained in
the EU-Chinese nonproliferation text.


4. (S) Bertolotti also informed EST officer that during
his January 2005 EU visit to Beijing to discuss export
controls, the French delegation made it clear to the Chinese
that several EU members, including France, as well as other
MTCR members, such as Japan, had serious concerns regarding
China's export control system, and that wide-ranging,
meaningful improvements would have to be made to this system
before China would have a realistic chance of joining the
MTCR. Bertolotti added that the French delegation was
careful not to make promises or suggest specific quid pro
quos regarding China's MTCR membership bid, and that its
intention had been to propose general markers for China to
shoot for in the near-term.


5. (S) Bertolotti also noted that during a private
conversation, his Chinese government counterpart in Beijing
had candidly asked Bertolotti if U.S. government objections
to China's bid for MTCR membership were the primary reasons
that China's application was being held-up. The Chinese
official also asked Bertolotti if Russia's zealous support
for China's MTCR membership bid had in fact worked against
China's efforts to join the group. Bertolotti told EST
officer that he had made it clear to his Chinese counterpart
that several MTCR partners had concerns about China's export
controls and other nonproliferation activities, and that U.S.
government objections were shared by many in the group.
Bertolotti also admitted to the Chinese official that
Russia's approach had not been well-received by the majority
of the MTCR partners, and had been largely counter-productive
to China's bid for membership in the group. Bertolotti added
that what had particularly struck him about the Chinese
official's questions was his strong grasp of internal
dynamics and debates within the MTCR, which suggested that
China might have an unauthorized window into private MTCR
deliberations.
Leach