Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS1356
2005-03-02 14:35:00
SECRET
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON DESIGNATING HIZBALLAH AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

Tags:  ETTC PTER EFIN FR EUN 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001356 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2014
TAGS: ETTC PTER EFIN FR EUN
SUBJECT: FRENCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON DESIGNATING
HIZBALLAH AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

REF: STATE 34900

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS
ONS 1.4 B/D

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001356

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2014
TAGS: ETTC PTER EFIN FR EUN
SUBJECT: FRENCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON DESIGNATING
HIZBALLAH AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

REF: STATE 34900

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS
ONS 1.4 B/D


1. (S) Summary: On March 1, poloffs delivered reftel demarche
on designating Hizballah as a terrorist organization to
Julien Deruffe and Yves Trotignon from the MFA's office of
counter-terrorism and Remy Bouallegue, Lebanon/Syria desk
officer. Poloff also informed Dominique Boche, President
Chirac's technical advisor on the Middle East, of the
demarche. Post will follow-up in the coming days at senior
levels to emphasize the importance of reftel demarche to the
USG. GUIDANCE REQUESTS AT PARA 4. End summary.


2. (S) Deruffe, Trotignon and Bouallegue took careful notes
of the details of the demarche and complimented it as
"well-reasoned" and "thorough." Furthermore, they said our
demarche would be of great importance as the French
government continued its inter-agency debate on the
designation of Hizballah. Nevertheless, they responded with
lengthy counter-arguments of their own. Trotignon said that
French intelligence services remained unconvinced that
Hizballah was a terrorist organization. As an example, he
noted that the presence of Hizballah procurement agents in
Europe did not convince France that Hizballah was a terrorist
(and not a purely military) organization. In addition to
this "technical" debate, Trotignon said there were numerous
political reasons why France was hesitant to designate
Hizballah. Bouallegue cited U.S.-French efforts in Lebanon
through UNSCR 1559, and asked how designation of Hizballah
(especially after the recent assassination of former PM
Hariri) would stabilize an already enflamed region? The
French preference, said Bouallegue, was to continue to focus
on UNSCR 1559 and not to risk that resolution's legitimacy in
Arab countries that were initially suspicious of it. When
poloff cited Hizballah's efforts to destroy prospects for
Israel-Palestinian peace -- the test of the transatlantic
relationship, according to France -- Bouallegue responded by
describing Lebanon as France's "first priority." He stressed
the potential destabilizing impact of EU designation on
Lebanese internal stability, especially the potential to push
Lebanon's Shia community further in the pro-Syria camp.
Bouallegue also argued that EU designation was inadvisable
before the crucial Lebanese parliamentary elections in May.


3. (S) Trotignon said France also feared Israel would take
designation of Hizballah as a green light to assassinate
Hizballah leaders and deputies, citing Israeli strikes
against Hamas leaders following EU designation in 2003.
Trotignon commented that Israel had demarched the French on
designating Hizballah, but had not given the GOF any judicial
or investigative proof of Hizballah's terrorist activities.
Instead, said Trotignon, Israel had focused on political
statements, which had diluted the effectiveness of their
demarche. Trotignon and Bouallegue both emphasized that the
moment was "too delicate" in the Middle East to consider
taking what they considered a rash step: supporting the
designation of Hizballah as a terrorist organization. Poloff
argued that Hizballah was a tremendously destabilizing force
within the Middle East, and that Europeans should make an
objective assessment regarding Hizballah as a terrorist
organization.


4. (S) Although Trotignon said he was very pleased with the
detail contained in the demarche, he asked who the French
intelligence services should turn to if, upon analyzing the
demarche's detail, they had additional questions. He also
expressed interest in further information on Hizballah's
involvement in recent terrorist attacks in Israel. Post
requests guidance on how to respond to possible follow-up
questions of an intelligence nature. In addition,
Bouallegue's linking of UNSCR 1559 and Lebanon's internal
situation with the debate on designating Hizballah is a
frequent point raised by French officials and one we expect
they will deploy at the upcoming EU Clearinghouse meeting.
Post requests Department guidance on responding to this
linkage, specifically to answer the French assertion that EU
designation now would undercut our mutual efforts to push for
1559 implementation.


5. (S) Comment: Although the MFA officials said French
intelligence agencies remained unconvinced that Hizballah was
a terrorist organization, political counter-arguments that
focused primarily on the danger to Middle East stability of
designating Hizballah were clearly the most important to
Deruffe, Trotignon and Bouallegue. This tracks with previous
conversations the Embassy has had with the GOF, and
demonstrates the difficult road ahead to convince France to
designate Hizballah. The French appear paralyzed by their
analysis that designating Hizballah has no chance of a
positive outcome and that such an action can only lead to
instability and crisis. End comment.
Leach