Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS1268
2005-02-28 17:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

ELYSEE ON POSSIBLE THREAT TO LEBANESE OPPOSITION

Tags:  PREL LE SY FR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001268 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015
TAGS: PREL LE SY FR
SUBJECT: ELYSEE ON POSSIBLE THREAT TO LEBANESE OPPOSITION
PROTEST, NEXT STEPS ON UNSCR 1559 IMPLEMENTATION

REF: EMAIL ZEYA-FELTMAN 2/28/2005

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001268

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015
TAGS: PREL LE SY FR
SUBJECT: ELYSEE ON POSSIBLE THREAT TO LEBANESE OPPOSITION
PROTEST, NEXT STEPS ON UNSCR 1559 IMPLEMENTATION

REF: EMAIL ZEYA-FELTMAN 2/28/2005

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Presidential Middle East Advisor Dominique
Boche summoned us February 28 to pass on urgent, unverified
threat information that possible sniper attacks might take
place at the planned Lebanese opposition demonstration today
in Beirut's Martyr's square. The targets of the possible
sniper attacks could include unnamed opposition leaders.
Boche described the GoF as looking at possible options in the
event Syria does not take any steps to implement UNSCR 1559,
including working with the U.S. on a second UNSCR. The GoF
was also reflecting on Lebanon's spring parliamentary
elections, and whether they would be legitimate in the wake
of no Syrian gestures on 1559. For now the GoF supported
keeping the election date, and applying maximum pressure in
the interim. Boche speculated that Syria was likely to
redeploy some troops, but questioned the significance of such
a gesture given Syrian military intelligence (SMI) control
over Lebanon. Speaking in unusually blunt terms, Boche said
the implementation of UNSCR 1559 spelled the end of Syria's
Alawite-dominated regime, which had shown, in assassinating
Hariri, that it was willing to risk international reprobation
rather than cede anything on Lebanon. At the same time,
Boche stressed that we should continue to press Syria via the
Lebanon issue rather than directly confront Damascus, which
could backfire and generate Arab support for the embattled
Syrian regime. He also cautioned against taking steps on
Hizballah, such as EU designation, which he said could
further push Lebanon's Shi'a community into Syria's camp.
The Gof is seeking dialogue with Parliament Speaker Nabih
Berri to seek to explore prospects for Shi'a support for the
Lebanese opposition. End summary.

THREAT INFORMATION
--------------

2. (C) Presidential Advisor on the Middle East summoned Pol
M/C and poloff February 28 to convey urgent, unverified
threat information regarding possible sniper attacks at the
February 28 Lebanese opposition demonstration. The
information, which the French Embassy in Beirut had received
from sources it would like to protect, suggested that snipers

might target the crowd of protestors or specific, unnamed
opposition leaders. While cautioning that he could notassess
the reliability of the information, Boche said the GoF had
wanted to share this with us right away, especially given
PDAS Satterfield's ongoing visit to Beirut. (Note: We passed
the threat information to Beirut, NEA and EUR, via ref email
immediately after conclusion of the meeting. End note.)
Commenting on the possible motivations for such an attack,
Boche speculated that Syria might be pursuing a Machiavellian
strategy, by seeking to generate panic among Lebanese that a
departure of Syrian troops meant a return to instability.
Nevertheless, the threat had not been borne out yet; citing
wire service reports, Boche commented that as of 1300 local,
the Beirut protest appeared to be proceeding peacefully with
some 20,000 to 50,000 protesters seeking to converge on
central Beirut.


NEXT STEPS ON 1559 IMPLEMENTATION
--------------


3. (C) Boche confirmed the MFA was working on an options
paper on next steps, in the event Syria did not make any
gestures on UNSCR 1559 implementation, to include possibly
initiating a second UNSCR in collaboration with the U.S. The
MFA was also examining the question of how to address
Lebanon's May parliamentary elections, especially if Syria
failed to allow a free and fair electoral process. For now,
the GoF supported maintaining the election date, and applying
maximum pressure in the interim. If, however, the Karame
governnment were to fall, this would call into question the
elections timing and likely result in a delay. On a possible
Syrian redeployment, Boche speculated that some Syrian move
was likely given the public pronouncements already made by
Damascus. He questioned, however, whether such a
redeployment would be significant, particularly if it simply
involved the move of a few 100 soldiers "here or there."
Boche further downplayed the possible significance of a
redeployment, noting that Syrian troops were already largely
out of Beirut and that Syrian military intelligence remained
in real control of Lebanon.

THE END OF THE ALAWITE REGIME...
--------------


4. (C) Speaking in unusually tough terms, Boche asserted that
full implementation of UNSCR 1559 equaled the "programmed
destruction" of the Alawite-dominated regime in Damascus,
which had come to depend on Lebanon as a vital source of cash
for sustaining its rule in Syria. Boche added that "the fact
that the Syrians had assassinated Hariri" showed that the
SARG was willing to provoke international anger rather that
cede anything on Lebanon. Boche asked for USG views on
whether Syrian President Bashar al-Asad was cognizant of the
assassination plot against Hariri. When we responded that we
were not aware of any smoking gun on culpability and that
there may never be one, Boche signaled eagerness to hear
further U.S. views if and when the USG reaches conclusions on
this matter. Commenting on French relations with Syria, Boche
reported that contacts between the GoF and SARG were
completely suspended, with the French Ambassador in Damascus
doing "only technical work," without meeting Syrian
officials. Boche added that he and other French officials
had rebuffed attempts at dialogue from the SARG and its Arab
intermediaries.


5. (C) With Lebanon being a matter of SARG survival, Boche
added, we needed to think carefully about next steps. In the
GoF view, it was best not to confront the Syrian regime too
directly, but continue instead to use the Lebanon "angle of
attack," which had the same weight as a direct confrontation
anyway. By keeping the focus on Lebanon, there was no way
that anyone, including Arab states, would oppose us. On the
other hand, if the U.S. and France appeared as though they
were using Lebanon as a way to bash Syria, this would further
the lie that Syria is defending the interests of the Arab
world. Boche expressed passing concern over efforts by
Syrian FM Shara to curry support through visits to Cairo and
Riyadh. He concluded, nevertheless, that the Egyptians and
Saudis were looking for a face-saving way for Syria to leave
Lebanon, with the Saudis privately enraged, and feeling
personally targeted, by Hariri's assassination.

UNCERTAINTY ON OPPOSITION
--------------


6. (C) Asked to comment on the state of the Lebanese
opposition, Boche remarked that the mass popular opposition
to Syrian occupation was a welcome and new development. At
the same time, the political direction of the opposition
leadership appeared uncertain, due in no small part to the
fact that its leaders lived under constant fear of being
killed. Boche quipped that a number of opposition leaders
had begun receiving threat messages on their cell phones. In
addition, no figure had yet emerged who could fill the void
left by Hariri's demise. Much would depend on the evolution
of the situation on the ground, particularly if there was a
recourse to violence. Continued Syrian control over
southern, eastern, and northern Lebanon meant that the SARG
continued to control most of Lebanon's political class. The
GoF, for its part, was seeking further contact with Lebanon's
Shi'a community, especially via Nabih Berri, to see to what
degree the Shi'a could be interwoven into the opposition.
The GoF continued to remain reserved on EU designation of
Hizballah, largely because it did not want to create too many
targets in Lebanon and push the Shi'a community further in
the Syrian camp. Boche remained adamant on this point,
despite February 28 press reports which cited Palestinian
officials suggesting that Hizballah may have had a role in
the February 25 Tel Aviv suicide bombing.



7. (C) Comment: The GoF's passing of this threat information
is a sign of continued GoF eagerness to collaborate and share
information on Lebanon. Based on Boche's pointed
questioning, it appears that the GoF is interested in U.S.
views on the culpability of the Syrian regime at the highest
levels in Hariri's assassination. Boche's tough talk on "the
end of the Alawite regime" in Syria is unusual for French
officials. End comment.
Leach