Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS1041
2005-02-17 18:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

STOCKTAKING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENCY DIPLOMATIC

Tags:  PREL FR SY IR LE NATO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001041 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2025
TAGS: PREL FR SY IR LE NATO
SUBJECT: STOCKTAKING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENCY DIPLOMATIC
ADVISOR

REF: STATE 27178

Classified By: DCM Alex Wolff for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001041

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2025
TAGS: PREL FR SY IR LE NATO
SUBJECT: STOCKTAKING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENCY DIPLOMATIC
ADVISOR

REF: STATE 27178

Classified By: DCM Alex Wolff for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: DCM spoke with President Chirac's Diplomatic
Advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) February 17 to
review French position on key issues in advance of President
Bush's February 21 meeting with President Chirac and the
subsequent meetings with NATO and EU leaders.
Gourdault-Montagne said the French side was preparing for the
meetings in the spirit of cooperation and was convinced all
three would be successful. He said there would be no
surprises from the French side, and hoped none would come
from ours. On specific issues, Paris is taking a more timid
approach to Syria than ours; there is no shift in France's
cautious approach toward Hizbollah; there is some hope for a
French contribution to NATO's trust fund for Iraqi training;
and Paris is willing to consider an ISAF-OEF merger. End
Summary.

Syria
--------------


2. (C) DCM reviewed steps the U.S. had taken with Damascus
and Beirut following the death of former Lebanese PM Hariri
(reftel),noting that we had not seen signs of similar
actions by the French. Clearly uncomfortable with being
pressed on this point, MGM eventually affirmed that the
French would not recall their Ambassador and had not yet
delivered a strong message to the Syrians. DCM said that
Washington and Paris had maintained a common approach to the
Syrians up to this point, but now there seemed to be growing
distance in our respective responses to the latest
developments. MGM insisted that France remained committed to
UNSCR 1559 and wanted to ratchet up pressure. At the same
time, it had only been a few days since Hariri's death and it
was important to think carefully about next steps and to act
deftly with Damascus in order to be effective. He added that
President Chirac would want to discuss the situation with
President Bush, and to explore the questions of sanctions,
particularly how the Syrian Accountability Act was being
applied.

Hizbollah Designation
--------------


3. (C) DCM emphasized the importance of designating Hizbollah
in the context of the latest developments in Lebanon and

asked if the French position would now change. MGM said
there would be no change in the French position. Recent
events, he explained, demonstrated how fragile the situation
was in Lebanon. The Shia element was extremely important:
any such measures targeting Hizbollah would be useless and
would contribute to further destabilization. He concluded
that President Chirac would explain his reasoning to
President Bush.

NATO Trust Fund for Iraqi Training
--------------


4. (C) DCM pushed for a French contribution to the NATO Trust
Fund for training Iraqi security forces, noting that France
was the only country yet to contribute to the collective
effort. MGM responded by citing the French offer to train
1,500 Iraqis, at a cost of 15 million Euros, and support for
a proposed EU training program for administrative personnel.
He claimed that France's contribution in both these efforts
would make it the single largest European contributor to
Iraqi training, and could not be compared with modest amounts
paid by other European countries to the NATO effort. DCM
said we were not interested in comparing contributions, but
ensuring that there was solidarity among the allies in this
effort. He reiterated that France was the only government
not doing its part in the NATO effort and it would be
important in connection with the President's visit to show
transatlantic unity through a program that involves all
allies. MGM, acknowledging that the French side had not yet
made a decision whether to contribute said "we'll see,"
adding that there were still five days before the Brussels
meeting to consider this further.


5. (C) MGM returned to the French offer to train 1,500
Iraqis, questioning why there had been no response from
Baghdad taking up the offer. He said this continued to
puzzle the French government, which was beginning to wonder
if there was any outside influence telling the Iraqis not to
respond. DCM stated that if by "outside influence" MGM was
suggesting the U.S. had any role in the matter, he could
categorically deny it. We, too, were puzzled by the absence
of an Iraqi response and were seeking further insights from
our experts. Perhaps, DCM concluded, we were all
underestimating how much residual anger existed among Iraqis
toward France for its perceived relationship with the former
regime. But the U.S. remained supportive of French efforts
to help Iraq.

Afghanistan
--------------


6. (C) MGM said the French position on further contributions
to Afghanistan had not changed since Defense Minister
Alliot-Marie addressed the issue at the Nice Defense
Ministerial. There was no shift in France's position on
PRTs. Paris was considering the proposal to merge ISAF and
OEF, but would want guarantees that U.S. forces would not
leave Afghanistan. (He said the French would welcome similar
guarantees regarding U.S. forces in the Balkans.) DCM
responded that the U.S. had no intention of leaving in an
uncoordinated manner when the situation eventually allowed
for our departure.
No Surprises for the President
--------------


7. (C) DCM referred to U.S. concerns about elements of
Chancellor Schroeder's Munich speech. As we were headed
toward a series of extremely important meetings next week in
Brussels, how did the French perceive the situation? MGM
said we shouldn't exaggerate Schroeder's comments, noting
that there was a "big fuss over very little". DCM noted that
we had an important opportunity next week to build on recent
efforts by both sides to improve both the tone and level of
cooperation between us. MGM said the meetings were bound to
be a success since both sides wanted this very much: "There
would be no surprises from the French side." By the same
token, he continued, he hoped there would be no surprises or
pressure from the U.S. side that would emerge at the last
minute as an unexpected test of Allied fidelity: "give the
Allies breathing space; its better when the Allies have
breathing space; the Allies like breathing space". He
reiterated that the French side was approaching the meetings
in the same good spirit that characterized Secretary Rice's
visit and the Nice Ministerial. MGM concluded that the
French side would be working to prepare for the meetings
through the weekend. DCM asked that the French side keep us
apprised of any decisions that might have an effect on the
meetings.


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