Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARAMARIBO764
2005-11-28 17:10:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Paramaribo
Cable title:  

INFORMATION ON AVIAN AND PANDEMIC FLU - SURINAME

Tags:  TBIO SENV ECON EAGR EAID PREL NS 
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UNCLAS PARAMARIBO 000764

SIPDIS


SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR WHA/CAR: LLUFTIG; STATE FOR OES

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO SENV ECON EAGR EAID PREL NS
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON AVIAN AND PANDEMIC FLU - SURINAME

REFS: (A) STATE 209622 (B) PARAMARIBO 692

(U) In response to ref A, the following information is
provided on avian and pandemic influenza detection,
prevention and response in Suriname:

PREPAREDNESS/COMMUNICATION


Q. (U) Does the government have a preparedness
plan/strategy for preventing avian flu from becoming a
pandemic and containing a pandemic once it occurs? If the
country has a strategy, how capable is it of implementing
it?


A. (U) Plans for avian flu detection and prevention seem to
be focused initially on efforts by Suriname's Agricultural
Ministry (LVV) to detect the potential outbreak in poultry
and export birds. The heightened concern is due to the
recent news that a Suriname parrot in quarantine at
London's Heathrow airport was allegedly infected with the
deadly H5N1 strain--although it was later determined that
the bird was infected by Taiwanese birds also in quarantine
(see ref B). The incident has made government and industry
acutely aware of the economic consequences which can result
if the disease is not addressed. A broader national
strategy is being developed in cooperation with
representatives from the Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO). Suriname is presently preparing a contingency plan
for the threat of pandemic avian influenza, which will
include provisions for potential human-to-human
transmission of the virus. Planning is still in the early
stages. Post will forward a copy of the plan as soon as it
is made available.


Q. (U) How truthful will the government be in reporting the
scope of any disease outbreak among people? Among animals?
What incentives could be offered that would likely result
in more transparency?


A. (SBU) The Government of Suriname does not have a good
record of communicating information to its citizens. The
Ministry of Public Health would have responsibility for
reporting human outbreak, but their track record has been
spotty, based on the recent handling of an increased
incidence of dengue fever cases this year, for which the
government has received criticism for lack of an adequate

response. Belatedly, the government, in cooperation with
PAHO, launched a well-publicized awareness campaign
stressing prevention measures (clearing garbage and
standing water) and symptoms of dengue fever. In the case
of animal outbreak, the LVV would assume reporting
responsibility. There is always the possibility that
reports issued by government officials may be filtered for
political reasons.


Q. (U) Where does preparing for an avian flu human pandemic
rank among government priorities? Who and what would
influence the country to give the issue a higher priority?
Who is the key "go-to" person, office or department?


A. (U) Currently, avian flu is fairly low on the list of
priorities of the Suriname government; however, there is
heightened awareness, particularly within the Agricultural
Ministry which has stepped up testing of animals. The
government, following PAHO's lead, seems to be taking the
potential threat more seriously. The responsibility of
implementing the plan in the case of a pandemic lies with
the Director of Public Health, Dr. Martheliese Eersel,
whose office is in the Ministry of Public Health. The go-
to person in the LVV is Dr. Edmund Rozenblad, Director of
Animal Production and Health.


Q. (U) Have national laws been reviewed to ensure that they
are consistent with the international health regulations
and do not pose barriers to avian influenza detection,
reporting, containment, or response?


A. (U) National laws generally conform to international
standards. The largest barrier to avian flu detection,
reporting, containment and response is a lack of financial
resources.


Q. (U) Is the host country already working with
international organizations or other countries on the avian
flu issue? Are government leaders likely to ask for
assistance from the U.S. or other countries? Would
government leaders be receptive to messages from U.S.
leaders through a bilateral approach, at a multilateral
forum such as the UN (WHO, FAO, etc.) or APEC, or through
bilateral contacts by a third country?


A. (U) A multi-ministerial and disciplinary task force has
been established, headed by the Ministry of Public Health.
World Health Organization (WHO) and PAHO are working
closely with the Ministry; both organizations are members
of the task force. Other UN agencies in Suriname are
investigating what additional support they can provide to
Suriname, both in the preparedness phase and in the case of
a possible pandemic. In the event of an outbreak, the
government would likely ask for assistance from the EU, the
U.S. and international organizations. The government is
receptive to messages from U.S. leaders and experts, and
would be willing to participate in multilateral fora.
However, communication and coordination between home
ministries and representatives to International
Organizations is sometimes problematic.


Q. (U) Does the country currently administer annual flu
shots? If not, might it consider doing so? What is the
production capability for human influenza vaccines in the
country? Does the country produce influenza vaccine for
poultry?


A. (U) Suriname does not administer flu vaccinations for
humans, nor do they produce vaccines. It might consider
widespread administration if stocks of the vaccine were
available. Outside of the major metropolitan area of
Paramaribo the medical infrastructure is underdeveloped and
a mass vaccination program would tax the country's
resources.


Q. (U) How well informed is the population about the avian
flu threat and about measures they should take to mitigate
the threat? What mechanisms are available for providing
additional information to the population, particularly in
rural areas and how effective are these measures?


A. (U) Avian influenza receives very little press coverage
in local media, apart from the incident involving the
Surinamese parrot. Residents in the country's interior
would need to be informed through medical missions (semi-
private health clinics associated with city hospitals).
There is some experience with earlier efforts to improve
the public's awareness of HIV/AIDS.

SURVEILLANCE/DETECTION


Q. (U) How capable are the medical and agriculture sectors
of detecting a new strain of influenza among people or
animals respectively? How long might it take for cases to
be properly diagnosed, given other endemic diseases? Can
influenza viruses be subtyped in the country, if so by who,
and if not, where are they sent? Does the country send
samples to a WHO/EU/U.S. reference laboratory?


A. (U) Medical and agricultural staff are currently
incapable of detecting new strains of the influenza virus.
In the case of dengue fever, samples are sent to the
Caribbean Epidemic Center (CAREC) in Trinidad for testing
to confirm suspected cases, with results returned in two to
three weeks. Businesses in the agricultural and trade
sectors, as well as officials in the LVV, appear willing to
conduct regular tests in order to detect the virus in
animals, but equipment and other resources are inadequate.
Birds for export, because of stricter international
standards, are tested for avian flu, using testing kits
received from Canada (see ref B),but the procedure has yet
to be applied to poultry or other animals.


Q. (U) What are the critical gaps that need to be filled in
order to enhance the country's disease detection and
outbreak response capabilities? What is the country's
greatest need in this area from the U.S. or international
organizations?


A. (U) The government is willing to enhance their
capability for disease detection; however, Suriname is in
need of the proper equipment. There is currently one ELISA
machine in the country, used for HIV/AIDS testing.
Ideally, in order to accommodate avian flu testing, the
testing agency would have at least two machines, one to
serve as a back-up if/when the primary machine is under
maintenance or repair. A limited supply of test kits from
Canada is also currently available in Suriname.

RESPONSE/CONTAINMENT


Q. (U) Does the country have a stockpile of medications,
particularly of antivirals, and if so how much? If some
has been ordered, how much and when is it expected?


A. (U) There is no stockpile of antivirals, and no

medications have been ordered.


Q. (U) Does the country have a stockpile of pre-positioned
personal protective gear?


A. (U) Some protective gear is available, but the quantity
and quality are largely inadequate.


Q. (U) What is the rapid response capacity for animal and
human outbreaks? Are guidelines in place for the culling
and vaccination of birds, disinfection of facilities, and
limitations on animal movement?


A. (U) There is little experience with mass culling and
vaccination, so response is likely to be very slow
initially. Suriname would likely seek international
assistance to engage in a large-scale response.


Q. (U) How willing and capable is the government of
imposing quarantines and social distancing measures
(closing schools, public gatherings, mass transit)? Would
its military enforce quarantines?


A. (U) It is uncertain whether the government, which has
not had any experience with an event of this nature, would
be capable of implementing quarantine or social distancing
measures. The military would likely play a role, as the
National Disaster Coordination Center falls under the
purview of the Surinamese military.

BARNES


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