UNHCR UNHAPPY WITH PANAMANIAN REFUGEE POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PANAMA 001711

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/AND, AND PRM
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/16/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL PHUM PM
SUBJECT: UNHCR UNHAPPY WITH PANAMANIAN REFUGEE POLICY


Classified By: CDA LUIS ARREAGA FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) UNHCR Representative Gonzalo Vargas Llosa believes
the Torrijos government is starting down the same path as the
previous Moscoso administration in failing to meet its
international obligations under the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention. One never-ending issue is that the Government of
Panama (GOP) believes its own immigration law trumps whatever
the Convention requires. In recent meetings with PolOffs
Vargas Llosa accused the GOP of endless foot-dragging in
resolving refugee issues and noted a slowing of efforts since
the start of 2005. He believes Panama trumpets its fear of
large refugee inflows as an excuse to avoid meeting minimum
international standards, while trying to leverage its
relatively tiny refugee population to demand international
aid. Vargas said Foreign Ministry (MFA) officials are the
chief "culprits" in Panamanian procrastination and questioned
why the GOP sees refugees as a foreign policy issue at all.
He also argued that the USG, as the largest donor to UNHCR's
budget, could help convince Panama to resolve its refugee
issues. Vargas also is frustrated by the unresolved status
of 800 Central American refugees present in Panama for over
20 years and by the GOP's refusal to properly process several
Cuban refugees in late 2004 and to grant them refugee status.
The GOP believes special legislation will resolve the
problem by year's end but Embassy doubts that will provide a
long-term fix. Panama's vacillations on refugees largely
stem from fear and resentment of Colombia, its giant, violent
neighbor. End summary.

Loss of Momentum on Refugee Issues
--------------


2. (C) In recent meetings with PolOffs, Panama UNHCR chief
Gonzalo Vargas Llosa, who departs his position on September
15, said the GOP improved its handling of refugees during the
last 2-3 years. (Note: UNHCR plans to replace Vargas Llosa
with Bolivian national Jose Euseda. End note.) Acceding to
combined USG, NGO, and UNHCR pressure, the GOP gave UNHCR
guaranteed access to refugees, opened a dialog with the UN
and NGOs, and reactivated the Oficina Nacional para Attencion
del Refugiado (ONPAR). The new GOP, which took office on
September 1, 2004, showed even more interest in resolving
refugee issues. But Vargas believes progress halted at the
beginning of 2005, as processing of asylum applications
slowed down. ONPAR, which is supposed to meet quarterly, has
met only once in 2005. Vargas says GOP officials have
convinced themselves that Panama will be swamped by refugees
if they liberalize refugee policies. He faults the GOP's
"lack of political will" to achieve a solution.

Modern History of Panama's Refugee Problem
--------------


3. (SBU) During 1997-1998, due to pressure from Colombian
FARC guerrillas, 500-600 Colombian villagers fled to Panama's
remote, Darien frontier province. Occasional refugees still
arrive in the region but UNHCR doesn't have exact figures
available and plans to visit the area in September to do a
census. Unwilling to consider the Colombians as legitimate
refugees, Panama granted them three-month renewable temporary
protection status as "temporarily displaced persons" by
executive decree. ONPAR gave the Colombians ID cards but
does not permit them to work or to leave their villages, much
less the region. Since 1998, the refugees have depended on
UNHCR (working out of Venezuela) for health care, rent, food,
and clothing.

A Second Forced Repatriation Narrowly Averted
--------------


4. (SBU) In April 2003, apparently in breach of
internationally accepted procedures, Panama returned 109
refugees to Colombia in what UNHCR and many NGOs derided as a
"forced" repatriation. In November 2003, Panama planned a
repatriation of a further 70 families to Colombia without
coordinating with UNHCR. At Embassy's insistence, Panama at
the last minute agreed to bring UNHCR into the repatriation
process and the families were repatriated to Colombia in
December 2003. After protracted negotiations, UNHCR opened a
Panama City office in April 2004. In December 2004, GOP
denied refugee status to three Cubans who entered Panama in
the Darien. Vargas Llosa claimed that at least one Cuban was
deported without being interviewed, which he called a clear
breach of Panama's international obligations. Partly out of
frustration with the GOP's reluctance to regularize the
Colombians' status, in July 2005 UNHCR ended food
distribution to concentrate on sustainable development, such
as small business grants (for seamstresses, bakeries, and
cooks),agricultural loans and is building houses to replace
wooden shacks.

MFA Delaying Tactics
--------------


5. (C) Vargas believes the MFA is manufacturing delays to
hinder resolving refugee issues, just as it did under the
previous Moscoso administration. Vargas claimed that MFA
Legal Affairs Director Iana Iana Quadri and MFA officials
Vladimir Franco, and Ivette Quiel are responsible for the
delays and accused them of hijacking and weakening ONPAR.
After four-and-a-half years of discussion, in January 2005
ONPAR approved regularization of the Central Americans by
executive decree. But Vargas's satisfaction quickly turned
to annoyance when Quadri then decided that that a new law was
needed instead of an executive decree. MFA also wants
special legislation for the displaced Colombians in Darien.
Vargas sees that as delaying tactics. Although ONPAR reports
to the Ministry of Government and Justice (MOGJ),MFA uses
its status as refugee commission member to influence ONPAR's
decisions. He speculates that Quadri, a naturalized Chilean
refugee, wants to appear tough on refugees. (Comment: There
is little love lost between Quadri, a Chilean, and Vargas
Llosa, an English-educated Peruvian with a famous last name.
End comment.)

Central American Refugee Issues
--------------


6. (SBU) Vargas Llosa also complained that Panama has not
granted permanent residence status to 800 refugees from
Nicaragua and El Salvador present in Panama for over 20
years, allegedly in breach of Panama's international
obligations. Vargas described a case he had presented to the
GOP involving a man who had lived in Panama for 30 years,
still in refugee status, unable to open bank accounts or
obtain credit. As a non-permanent resident he has no
permanent legal status in Panama and cannot obtain a driver's
license or credit or sign his name to legal documents. There
are hundreds of others like him.

What Does Panama Gain by Delay?
--------------


7. (SBU) Vargas implied that Panama wants to delay
regularizing the Colombians, hoping to leverage the situation
to receive international assistance. At a bilateral
Colombia-Panama meeting Vargas attended in late May,
Panamanian MFA Foreign Relations Director Dario Chiru
insisted that regularizing the 500 displaced Colombians
should be tied to a frontier development plan and that the
international community -- Colombia included -- should pay.
According to Vargas, none of those conversations appeared in
the official record of the meeting. (Note: At a May 2005
conference in Bogota, the Governments of Panama and Colombia,
UNHCR, and the International Migration Organization (OIM)
pledged $300,000 to Panama for resettlement assistance. End
note.)

MFA's Point of View
--------------


8. (SBU) In June, PolOffs met with Iana Quadri to discuss
refugee issues. Quadri explained the need for new laws to
regularize both Colombians and Central American refugees.
(Comment: The new laws may be introduced as a rider to a
larger Immigration bill. Many of UNHCR's criticisms could be
met by a new law, although it only would offer a one-time
fix. Any future refugees entering Panama would be subject to
the same problems and delays. End Comment.) Quadri argued
that many of the Colombians no longer would qualify as
refugees due to improving conditions in Colombia and that
they should be subject to Panamanian immigration law if they
choose not to return to Colombia.

ONPAR Confirms UNHCR Need For Legislation
--------------


9. (SBU) In late July PolOff and Pol Specialist met with
ONPAR Director Pablo Perez on refugee issues. Under
Panamanian law, Perez confirmed, refugees cannot become
permanent residents or citizens of Panama. Perez said Panama
did not grant refugee status to the Colombians in 1998
because the Darien was a "no-man's land" that neither Panama
or Colombia could control. Granting refugee status in his
opinion would have encouraged a massive inflow from Colombia.
According to Perez, the Colombian Army's presence near the
border now prevents an inflow of refugees.


10. (SBU) Perez downplayed Vargas's concerns about the
Central Americans and provided a more sanguine view. He
pointed out that ONPAR works with Immigration authorities to
issue identification cards which allows them to live and work
legally in Panama. According to Perez, refugees can open
bank accounts and obtain credit if they meet a bank's normal
criteria, i.e. hold a steady job and pay taxes. Immigration
assists many refugees by providing them with letters for
banks certifying their refugee status. Refugees annually
must renew their status through ONPAR and Immigration to
obtain new ID cards.

With A Little Help From My Friends...
--------------


11. (SBU) In a July meeting, Vargas told POL Counselor that
UNHCR needs a little "help from its friends, like the United
States." He believes that as the U.S. supplies 25% of
UNHCR's budget for Panama ($150,000 in 2005),it should try
to shape policy in the organization. POL Counselor offered
to invite Bogota PRM representative to travel to Darien with
Vargas to see the situation first hand. (Note: PolOff is
planning a visit to the Darien with Vargas Llosa in
early-September. End note.)

"Poor Communication" To Blame?
--------------


12. (SBU) In an August 4 meeting, MFA Officials Chiru,
Franco, Quiel and Migration Sub-Director Carmelo Gonzalez
told PolOff and Pol Specialist that poor communication with
UNHCR was mostly to blame for creating misunderstandings
about refugees. Franco pointed out that the Colombian
refugees live in conditions no worse than many Panamanians in
the Darien. The officials also contended that UNHCR does not
understand Panamanian law or their personal liability if they
do not obey it. Gonzalez cited the inability of many Darien
refugees to prove their identity and citizenship as an
important delaying factor, despite help from a Colombian
consular officer based in the Caribbean border town of Puerto
Obaldia. Franco also spoke of Panama's ongoing concern about
a large inflow of refugees to the Darien from Colombia and
the potential overwhelming impact on public services such as
schools in the region.


13. (SBU) Franco explained that the GOP first saw the need
for special legislation to resolve the Colombian and Central
American refugee issue in 2003. The 2004 Presidential
election campaign then intruded. When the ruling Arnulfista
party lost the election, the issue was left for the new
Torrijos government to resolve. The GOP officials agreed the
legislative assembly will approve a bill granting regular
status to the Colombian and Central American refugees before
the end of 2005. In the case of the Central Americans,
Quadri said the Refugee Commission never reached a decision
on whether a new law was needed and that the Procuraduria
(Attorney General) had not yet given advisory opinion.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) There are several reasons for Panamanian
foot-dragging on refugees. With the exception of blowback
following the April 2003 "forced" repatriation of Colombians,
Panama has paid little or no price for violating its
international agreements. The all-but-inaccessible Darien
province is under-populated and remote and the problems of
Colombian refugees can be easily ignored. Also, time has
softened some issues. Many Colombians -- who are culturally
and physically indistinguishable from the locals -- are now
married to Panamanians.


15. (C) At root, Panamanians resent spending money to help
Colombians, who they see as coming from a much richer, more
powerful country. They feel threatened by and resent the
100,000-200,000 Colombians who live illegally in Panama City,
who they suspect are taking jobs from Panamanians. They fear
being swamped by Colombians arriving at Tocumen airport
claiming refugee status. That may explain why, according to
UNHCR, GOP officials routinely return such persons to
Colombia without interviews. Meanwhile, Panama detains
scores of other Colombians for months at a time in squalid
conditions at Panama's crowded Immigration Jail until they
finally ask to be deported. Calls by Panamanian officials
for better communication with UNHCR may not be fully
ingenuous.


16. (C) When GOP officials are asked why Panama does not
follow the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, which Panama
ratified in 1977, they cite contradictions between it and
Panamanian law and the GOP's position that Panamanian law has
precedence over international agreements. UNHCR argues, on
the contrary, that Panamanian law legally obligates the GOP
to follow the UN Convention and that Panama currently is out
of compliance with its own laws on the granting of asylum.


17. (C) Attitudes about Colombia do not explain Panama's
slowness to resolve the status of its Central American
refugees, who, along with the Colombians, also require full
integration into society. GOP attitudes toward Cubans may
reflect sensitivities of a government with more pro-Cuba
voices than the last one, one which also is eager to
reestablish relations with Cuba following the rupture of
August 2004. Embassy will monitor the proposed legislation.
Whether or not it resolves the existing problems, the new law
will be tailor-made to fix an existing problem. It will not
resolve issues related to future inflows of refugees to
Panama.

ARREAGA