A/S RADEMAKER,S MEETINGS WITH CANADIANS ON ARMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 OTTAWA 000304

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PARM CD CA NPT FAC
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER,S MEETINGS WITH CANADIANS ON ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES

REF: A. (A) OTTAWA 269 (BWC/CWC) (NOTAL)

B. (B) OTTAWA 124 (MISSILE DEFENSE)

Classified By: POL M/C BRIAN FLORA. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (SBU) SUMMARY. During a day of consultations in Ottawa
on January 11, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Stephen
Rademaker and AC/PDAS Frank Record exchanged views with
Canadian Foreign Affairs (FAC) and National Defense officials
on U.S. and Canadian arms control and disarmament policy.
This cable covers discussion of FMCT and this year's vote in
the UN First Committee (UNFC),the Conference on Disarmament
(CD),differences on landmine policy, the 2005 NPT Review
Conference, and space security. Canada proposed follow-on
discussions in Washington to better understand aspects of
U.S. concerns about FMCT verification, including the cost and
intrusiveness of a credible verification regime. Discussion
of Canada's prospective participation in ballistic missile
defense and status of progress relative to BTWC and CWC are
reported septels (refs A and B). END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In welcoming remarks, FAC Director General for
International Security Paul Chapin summarized the current
political landscape in Canada, noting that the government's
"minority" status very much was driving the domestic agenda
and had an impact on all Canadian government policies. At
the same time, Prime Minister Martin wanted to leave a
positive mark on his tenure. A preoccupation with Canada's
place in the world was reflected in the PM's extensive travel
abroad his first 6 months in office, and efforts to cultivate
strong relations with the Administration in Washington. The
Martin government considered the U.S. relationship to be
"damn important", as reflected in the government's commitment
of funds and expenditure of efforts on homeland security
issues. The upcoming renewal of the North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) agreement in 2006 presented a key
opportunity for Canada and the U.S. to examine and improve
upon their joint defense of the continent. Globally, Canada
continued to work with the U.S. to combat terrorism as
evidenced in its commitment to standing up a Provincial
Reconstruction Team in Kandahar in the second half of 2005
and, in due course, a "battle group" (early 2006). Chapin
noted that the Cabinet was due to approve an overall plan for
Afghanistan this month. Though Canada did not have troops in
Iraq, Chapin said, it had committed reconstruction funds for
Iraq and was participating in the NATO training of Iraqi
soldiers.

THE "MEDIUM-POWER" PERSPECTIVE


3. (C) Alluding to Canada's preference for a multilateral
versus bilateral approach on all issues, Chapin sought
insight on U.S. policy approaches under the new
Administration. Rademaker said that the ultimate test of the
effectiveness of multilateralism is whether it is working or
not. In the CD, the veto of states like North Korea and Iran
tended to undermine effectiveness. But the U.S. was not
nave enough to believe that it alone could get Iran to
adhere to norms to which we all needed them to adhere. He
acknowledged that the debate within the USG was colored by
the Iraq experience. Advocates of multilateralism, he said,
had a tough case to make in view of how multilateralism was
applied to Iraq from 1991 on. It simply hadn't worked.
Multilateralism had to be taken seriously. PDAS Record noted
that the problem went beyond the UN, citing the OSCE and
problems with Russia in other organizations. Chapin agreed
that effective multilateralism, as opposed to "mindless" or
"feckless" multilateralism, was key, and observed that the
use of the qualifying adjective "effective" increasingly had
become standard within the Canadian bureaucracy.

4. (C) FAC Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament
Director Rob McDougall said he saw multilateralism in the
nonproliferation context as a "toolbox" approach, where the
Proliferation Security Initiative, Sea Island initiatives,
UNSCR 1540 and the Global Partnership constituted component
parts. The best way to improve the effectiveness of the
approach was to bolster existing regimes, he said. In some
situations, such as North Korea, McDougall went on,
multilateralism didn't work. Canada did not support
multilateralism as the "only" approach, but did favor
"robust" multilateralism. A/S Rademaker agreed, but with the
caveat that there had to be acknowledgement of situations
where professed support for a multilateral approach was, in
effect, intended to be a self-defeating strategy.

KEEPING THE CD ALIVE


5. (C) Paul Chapin characterized the situation in the
Conference on Disarmament as a "knot we need to untie;" it
was important to re-start FMCT negotiations with fresh ideas.
To this end, Canada had some modest proposals that it wanted
to run by the U.S. notwithstanding, he added, the fact that
Canada had "dumped on" the U.S. ideas last summer. A/S
Rademaker said the CD had proved itself historically capable
of producing good results; keeping the institution available
to us was important. Nonetheless, there was a risk that the
forum was approaching irrelevance and in this context new
issues were needed -- hence, the USG landmines and FMCT
proposals.


6. (C) Rademaker said the U.S. was "dismayed" at Canada's
reaction, noting that it was clear that the proposals had
struck a nerve in Ottawa. In presenting its FMCT proposal,
it was not the USG's intention to target the 1998 "Shannon
mandate," he said. Rather, the fundamental motivation was to
give the CD something meaningful to do. The concept of an
FMCT was an "old" idea that asked virtually nothing of
non-nuclear weapon states beyond what already is required of
them under the NPT. For non-nuclear weapons states, it was
the equivalent of suspenders to go with the belt they were
already wearing . A case in point was Iran: If a country
chose to defy its NPT obligations in the first place, then
the FMCT had little added value as a restriction on that
state. With the exception of China, FMCT was no longer about
the NWS, because they are no longer interested in producing
fissile material for weapons purposes. Rather the real
target of FMCT is the "borderline" states like India and
Pakistan. After the 1998 tests, the rationale for FMCT had to
shift from preventing a nuclear breakout in India and
Pakistan to "capping" their nuclear weapons programs.

... WITHOUT VERIFICATION


7. (C) The USG's review of its FMCT policy took into
consideration the end of the cold war and whether a legally
enforceable ban still served a purpose. The situation of the
threshold countries had changed. India and Pakistan were on
similar trajectories: when their need for fissile material
was satisfied, they probably would be glad to accede to the
FMCT. Though FMCT still made sense, its value diminished
with every year that went by. With regard to verification,
some aspects to consider were the prospective cost and
whether verification was effective, i.e. could we reasonably
expect it to detect cheating. In addition, we needed to be
satisfied that the U.S. could agree to the level of intrusion
that would make verification effective.


8. (C) Rademaker noted that in light of its cold war arms
control legacy, the U.S. probably had taken a closer look at
these questions than most governments. For effective
verification to take place, a highly intrusive regime would
be needed, he said. It would be costly, the magnitude of
investment probably similar to that in the IAEA. What likely
could be agreed in Geneva would fall short of what was
needed. Any treaty submitted to the U.S. Senate would
require a certification regarding whether the treaty was
effectively verifiable. The CTBT experience had been
instructive: The Senate had rejected the Treaty largely out
of concern that it was not effectively verifiable, rejecting
the Clinton Administration's judgment that CTBT was
verifiable. Negotiations in Geneva on the FMCT would take
many years. Many governments in the CD had reservations
about FMCT, and they would be able to use the verification
negotiations to delay the treaty for years. For example,
Pakistan wants verification of existing stocks knowing that
the U.S. opposes verification of existing stocks. The
Shannon mandate requires effective verification but USG
doesn't believe that is realistically achievable at this
time.


9. (C) Chapin responded that it was incumbent upon both sides
to explore the rationale for policies over which we disagree.
He proposed traveling to Washington to learn in greater
detail the elements of USG concerns about verification.
Canada might be in a better position to "nuance" its views as
a consequence, he said, and could work with the UK, France
and others to try and move forward. Rademaker welcomed the
offer of follow-on expert consultations on verification.

CANADA WANTS FMCT NEGOTIATED UNDER THE SHANNON MANDATE; U.S.
SHOULD BE AT THE TABLE


10. (C) Director for Arms Control, Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Rob McDougall ardently defended Canada's position
that the 1998 "Shannon mandate," so-named for the Canadian
chair under whom the CD agreed to negotiate an FMCT, was the
"most expeditious" way to re-start stalled FMCT negotiations.
In Canada's view, McDougall said, the CD should be making it
as complicated and difficult as possible for countries to
make nuclear weapons. Acknowledging that this was a "medium
power" approach, McDougall recognized that "most of the P-5
would be inconvenienced." Nonetheless, he continued, the
advantage of an FMCT was that it provided an opportunity to
engage with countries like India, Pakistan and Israel, and
"gray area" countries. He argued that the treaty would give
a better handle on what Iran is up to.


11. (C) Responding to U.S. objections to verification,
McDougall said that a number of countries were not prepared
to go ahead without the possibility of a verification regime.
At the same time, the U.S. had some of the best expertise
and experience in the world. If the Shannon mandate were
re-opened, he argued, "things could fall apart" completely,
as many issues finessed by Shannon might be overridden in the
current environment. Countries like Pakistan would "fall
off." The Shannon mandate, McDougall asserted, set
verification as a goal, not a requirement. Similarly, the
USG goal should be an effective, intelligent agreement. In
entering negotiations USG would not/not have to accept that
verification is final outcome, or that it should be part of
the outcome. Regardless of what the Mandate says, the U.S.
can always say it is unacceptable. McDougall urged the U.S.
to enter FMCT negotiations "with the understanding" that USG
does not accept that verification is a necessary component.
Discussion about verification concerns could then take place
in the context of negotiations.


12. (C) Negotiations on technical issues would help find a
way around U.S. redlines, McDougall continued. He floated
the notion of a "black box" approach to set aside topics of
concern to the U.S., such as nuclear propulsion. FAC Arms
Control Deputy Director Marina Laker added that nothing in
the mandate required that stocks be negotiated. That would
be a side discussion, she said. A/S Rademaker responded that
stocks don't even come into the picture if we drop
verification altogether and deal only with a ban on fissile
material production.


13. (C) P/DAS Frank Record expressed appreciation for
McDougall's perspective adding, however, that those who
disagreed would "throw it back at us." The very fact of our
sitting at the table would be taken as a signal that our
bottom line had changed, he said. Rademaker reiterated the
USG's conclusion that the Shannon mandate needed to be
changed. Pakistan did not want to be isolated, and China,
which also does not want verification, was protecting
Pakistan. Russia had indicated that it would go for FMCT
without verification. Canada's intentions were beyond
reproach, Rademaker concluded, but it inadvertently was
giving protection to Pakistan's position. The U.S. proposal
was for a construct similar to what we have in the BWC: Get
the prohibition in place.

CANADA'S UNFC VOTE NOT A "ROGUE" OPERATION


14. (C) P/DAS Record raised Canada's conduct at UNFC, noting
that there was a "lingering bad feeling" over the fact that
Canada had forced the FMCT vote in spite of U.S. concerns and
after it had indicated that these would be taken into
consideration. Many in the U.S. arms control community felt
that Canada had been duplicitous, he said, and it was
important to be able to clear the way forward if progress was
to be achieved.


15. (C) DG Chapin insisted that Canada's vote in New York was
not a "rogue" operation by Permanent Staff and that it had
the "full weight of the government" behind it. He stressed
that this was not a Canadian effort to force the U.S. to
repudiate its policy. With regard to moving on, Chapin
proposed that the U.S. and Canada work to hold discussions
well in advance of the next meeting. The objective, he said,
would be to find common ground before a critical time.

2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE


16. (C) Rademaker stated that the upcoming NPT Review
Conference loomed large on the AC Bureau's calendar. The
U.S. arms control agenda with Russia continued to move along,
he said. On prospective missile defense cooperation, the
U.S. was "more eager than them." While Russians professed
interest in cooperation, they tended to be rigid and
bureaucratic, needing an umbrella agreement and a lot of
documentation. This approach was holding up cooperation in
other areas as well. Marina Laker underscored Canada's
perspective that the U.S.-Russia relationship was vital and
that it had a direct impact on a range of multilateral
relations.


17. (C) McDougall posited two "realistic" outcomes out of
three possible for the Review Conference:
-- an all-rhetorical outcome that would be fairly
even-handed, with "no new promises."
-- some hard-nosed commitments on disarmament,
nonproliferation and peaceful use
-- some combination of the first and second scenarios (which
he deemed highly unlikely)

Canada would be pushing for the second outcome, McDougall
said. For this to be achieved, in his view, the NWS would
have to be willing to agree to additional disarmament steps
beyond what had been agreed in the past. Operation of the
treaty mattered and all states parties were responsible for
implementation of the treaty. Canada was not after a
secretariat with a budget and complicated rules of

SIPDIS
procedures. At the same time, an "interim approach" was
needed to handle inter-sessional activity. McDougall recalled
that the Indian and Pakistani tests and decisions to withdraw
from the Treaty had transpired at a time when NPT adherents
could not convene for several months. An interim approach
was needed.


18. (C) Another area Canada hoped to address was the
inclusion of NGOs at relevant meetings. From the perspective
of non-nuclear weapons states, McDougall said, it would be
important to increase the participation of NGOs. A great
deal of Canada's nuclear expertise was with NGO groups.
Moreover, it was through the NGOs that the Canadian
government maintained public support for its policies.


19. (C) Nuclear and Chemical Disarmament Agency Deputy
Director Terry Wood raised the need to address inconsistency
in the relationship of Article 4 to Article 3 of the Treaty.
He noted that under the IAEA statute, a finding of
non-compliance automatically triggered a report to the UNSC.


20. (C) A/S Rademaker responded that the U.S. wants a
successful Review Conference. He agreed with McDougall's
take on three possible outcomes but said it was not realistic
to expect the U.S. to commit to more disarmament beyond what
was as outlined in the "13 steps" agreed at the 2000 Revcon.
Laker said that the U.S. should implement existing
commitments set forth in the 13 steps. Canada believed that
a large group of "middle countries" would go along. Nobody
expected the Bush Administration to ratify the CTBT, but some
of the 13 steps could be palatable. Rademaker noted that
some of the steps were already over taken by events. It was
unlikely, he said, that the U.S. could agree to anything that
would be seen as progress beyond 2000. McDougall noted that
adherence to the 13 steps was unlikely and said he didn't see
the necessity of reinforcing the 13 steps. The real question
was how to present new concrete steps with which the U.S. was
comfortable.


21. (C) McDougall said that on tactical nuclear weapons, for
example, the U.S. had carried out its commitments to the
letter. But we get no credit for this. PDAS Record observed
that it would be useful if Canada could say something
publicly about its views on this issue, including its
assessment of the extent to which NWS have implemented their
Article VI commitments.

CANADA AND THE NEW AGENDA COALITION


22. (C) A/S Rademaker raised U.S. unhappiness over the New
Agenda Coalition resolution in the UNFC. Canada had
supported the resolution, as had some other NATO allies,
including some that hosted non-strategic nuclear weapons
(NSNW) on their territory. There were very few NSNW left in
NATO, but when a European government voted to say that NSNW
should be reduced further, it had the effect of actively
recruiting others to the New Agenda Coalition. Governments
needed to think through what they wanted, Rademaker said.
Russia had not fulfilled its Yeltsin commitment. PDAS Record
noted that in some forums (NATO and HLG),the issue was
handled behind closed doors. But in public forums like the
UNFC, the approach was quite different. It seemed that some
government were "subcontracting" crucial policy issues to
NGOs, which at some point might not be in the government's
best interests. Though NATO wanted NSNW left in Europe,
continued support by NATO governments for resolutions like
the one just adopted could ultimately make this untenable.


23. (C) McDougall said that the 2004 resolution calling on
"states to withdraw all non-strategic nuclear weapons" from
foreign territory was a reflection of Canadian policy. It
was a general statement only, he said, applicable more to
Russia than the U.S. In general, he said, the matter had
been left up to the Alliance and the basing states, which in
retrospect was out of sync with a "changed environment."
There were arguments against any nuclear weapons, McDougall
continued, but the matter had never been seriously addressed.
The 2004 resolution was a "considerable improvement" and
Canada's position carried the full weight of the government
behind it, he asserted. Rademaker responded that the
Alliance clearly had made a judgment that there was continued
utility to nuclear weapons. He acknowledged that the
Alliance would continue thinking about these things.
McDougall said that Canada supported a more up-front public
posture on nuclear weapons, as more could be done with
documents and information available. If you are going to
have an NPT, he affirmed, nuclear weapons have to be a topic
of discussion. NATO had to make the case that it was a good
disarmament citizen, McDougall concluded.

CANADA WANTS DISCUSSION OF "SPACE SECURITY" AT THE CD


24. (C) Robert Lawson of FAC's International Security
Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) presented a briefing
on "space security," including the assessment by advocates of
the "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)" group
that space security had been reduced in 2003. The briefing
underscored the panel's conclusion that developments related
to national space security policies and doctrines, space and
terrestrial military operations, space systems negation, and
space-based strike weapons were "assessed to have had
negative impact on the sustainability of space security over
the longer term." In this regard, Canada was focusing on
establishment of a PAROS Ad Hoc Working Group with a
discussion mandate at the CD as a first step to development
of a ban on space-based weapons. Canada would continue to
engage key players in the space security debate, Lawson said,
"to explore shared interests and seek means to move forward
cooperatively." He identified the U.S. as a key potential
partner for this endeavor and proposed an exchange of experts
on space security policies and doctrines.

LANDMINES


25. (C) Opening the discussion on landmines, A/S Rademaker
stated that the U.S. had not sought to embarrass Canada in
presenting a proposal at the CD to ban the sale or export of
persistent landmines. Rather, a review of U.S. landmine
policy had presented a possible opportunity to revive the CD,
which was at gridlock over its traditional agenda. It was an
important multilateral institution that was atrophying. The
U.S. considered raising the landmines transfer ban at the
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW),but determined that
the CCW would not be able to handle an additional landmines
proposal.


26. (C) Rademaker commended the success of the Ottawa
Convention and its signatories for drawing attention to the
humanitarian problem of landmines and mobilizing U.S. funding
for humanitarian de-mining. However, the Convention was a
means to an end, not an end in itself. Though not obsolete,
the Convention was a fine solution for countries that don't
need landmines. It was not a realistic scenario for the
U.S., however. Rademaker noted that Germany had not given up
landmines until the end of the cold war, and the U.S. and ROK
were still in a cold war scenario on the Korean Peninsula.
Moreover, the U.S. was giving up persistent landmines.
Because non-persistent landmines were built to self-destruct
or de-activate in a matter of hours or days, the humanitarian
concern behind the Ottawa Convention would be fully addressed
by the new U.S. policy. In some respects, the U.S. policy
was better than Ottawa, Rademaker said, because it also
covered anti-vehicle mines. Under the policy, the U.S. would
eliminate all of its persistent anti-vehicle mines, which are
permitted under Ottawa. The Convention also was susceptible
to evasion of its stated goals in the case of anti-vehicle
mines with anti-handling devices, which can function like
anti-personnel mines. Finally, Rademaker noted that Russia
was unlikely to adhere to the Ottawa Convention and senior
Russian officials had told Rademaker that Russia "needs"
non-detectable anti-vehicle persistent mines. At the same
time, it was prepared to negotiate a transfer ban on
landmines.

27. (C) Acknowledging that there were obvious policy
differences between the U.S. and Canada, Special Envoy for
Landmines Ambassador Ross Hynes said that a great deal of
progress nonetheless had been made in collaborations with A/S
Bloomfield and senior PM staff. The Ottawa Convention, he
asserted, was the only multilateral disarmament agreement on
landmines and the U.S. proposal had serious implications for
the parties to the Ottawa treaty. Canada and parties to the
OC could not negotiate a separate treaty on a sub-category of
landmines, Hynes asserted. Canada continued to advocate a
ban on all persistent antipersonnel and anti-vehicle
landmines; participation in negotiations would imply that
Canada "accepted" trade in other categories of landmines.
The U.S. should not expect Canada and 144 signatories to the
Ottawa Convention to negotiate a "lesser" standard than a
comprehensive ban.


28. (C) Rademaker said there was a difference between caring
about the "problem" of landmines and simply wanting to
promote the Ottawa Convention. Russia's willingness to
negotiate a specific ban on transfers seemed to be a critical
opportunity, and senior Russian officials had said they did
not desire an ad hoc process similar to Ottawa. Chapin
responded that there was a tremendous debate about the
Convention, even in Canada. It was important to think of
ways to associate as many people as possible with efforts to
mitigate the problem of landmines. For Canada, a parallel
treaty was undesirable. But there were downsides to doing
nothing and he acknowledged that Rademaker had raised some
key points that should be addressed in another meeting.


29. (C) Hynes countered that the new U.S. policy on landmines
was a disappointment and it seemed that Washington had not
come to grips with the problem of landmines. There were
humanitarian arguments and concerns about non-persistent
landmines. There was no acknowledged trade anywhere in the
world, Hynes said. Canada was not wedded to the Ottawa
Convention for ideology or "amour propre." It was keen to
address aspects of Convention but could not negotiate on
proposals that sought to distinguish between persistent and
non-persistent. Finally, the higher technological standards
of anti-vehicle mines were a luxury that only the U.S. could
afford - hence why the U.S. had gotten nowhere with its
proposal.


30. (U) This cable has been cleared by Assistant Secretary
Rademaker.

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