Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05OTTAWA269
2005-01-28 17:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:  

A/S RADEMAKER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH CANADIANS ON CWC

Tags:  PARM CA CWC BWC FAC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000269 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2015
TAGS: PARM CA CWC BWC FAC
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH CANADIANS ON CWC
AND BWC

REF: (A) OTTAWA 124 (MISSILE DEFENSE) (NOTAL)

Classified By: POL M/C Brian Flora. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000269

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2015
TAGS: PARM CA CWC BWC FAC
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH CANADIANS ON CWC
AND BWC

REF: (A) OTTAWA 124 (MISSILE DEFENSE) (NOTAL)

Classified By: POL M/C Brian Flora. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. During consultations in Ottawa on January
11, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker
and AC/PDAS Frank Record discussed with Canadian Foreign
Affairs (FAC) and National Defense officials progress on the
BTWC and CWC. Discussion of Canada's prospective
participation in ballistic missile defense, FMCT and the
Conference on Disarmament, differences on landmine policy,
the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and space security are
reported septels (ref A). END SUMMARY.

OPCW
--------------

2. (C) FAC Director General for International Security Paul
Chapin saw no fundamental disagreement between the U.S. and
Canada regarding the OPCW. He observed that there was
greater impetus on the industry side to deal with chemical
weapons issues and acknowledged the USG-driven focus on
anti-terrorism and the need down the road to address the
question of non-lethal weapons. Chapin voiced concern for
the financial well being of the institution, stating that
changes to the financial rules would help the significant
arrears. Member states should honor their declaration
obligations and their financial obligations, he said.


3. (C) A/S Rademaker said the U.S. was pleased with the
direction in which the OPCW is headed. He indicated that he
and OPCW Technical Secretariat Director General Rogelio
Pfirter had exchanged views on the future of the
organization. It seemed unlikely that Russia would meet the
2012 deadline for destruction of all CW stocks. Rademaker
noted that unanticipated legal, environmental and technical
challenges had slowed U.S. progress on its own destruction
efforts, though USG was still hoping to make the deadline.
Toxic waste was an ongoing issue of concern. Albania and
Libya had come clean. In short, there was no great risk the
OPCW would run out of things to do in the near future.
Regarding U.S. arrears in payments to the OPCW, Rademaker
noted that the U.S. Congress had not appropriated sufficient
funds. It was the subject of some debate within the U.S.
government.

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
--------------

4. (C) On the BTWC, Nonproliferation, Arms Control and
Disarmament Director Rob McDougall said that his government
was pleased with the inter-sessional work program process,
and noted Canada's submission of eight papers to date.
Canada had found the dialogue useful and was engaged in
"forward planning" for the 6th Review Conference in 2006.
McDougall thought that the BTWC could be improved to deal
with additional challenges, such as terrorism. Advocating
acceptance of "modest" proposals (e.g. science and technology
body) to move the agenda forward, he cited Russia's 1992
acknowledgment of some of its bio-weapons facilities to
illustrate the success of the annual confidence building
measures submission towards development of stronger
compliance and verification mechanisms in the BTWC.


5. (C) A/S Rademaker said the USG was satisfied with the work
progress of the last two years and did not have any
conclusions about the objectives for or outcome of the 6th
Review Conference. Nonetheless, there was apprehension that
many ideas being put forth were designed to resurrect the
Protocol negotiations that had failed in 2001. U.S.
experience of the past decade had made us extremely cautious
on this count, Rademaker said. McDougall asserted that
high-priority, limited "variable" things could lead to
strengthening of the regime. It was in Canada's interest to
"make it happen," he said. It was important to move forward,
not necessarily back to the Protocol.


6. (C) Observing that one more year remained under the
existing work program, Rademaker welcomed any observations
from Canada's access to facilities in the former Soviet
Union, including on the re-employment of former bio-weapons
scientists. Arms Control Deputy Director Marina Laker said
that Canadian officials had sought and gained access to some
facilities in Russia through Global Partnership efforts and
the ISTC. They had concluded from these visits that former
scientists really wanted cooperation. McDougall and Chapin
offered to organize de-briefs for U.S. arms control experts
by their Canadian counterparts.


7. (U) This message has been cleared by A/S Rademaker.


Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa

DICKSON

Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa

DICKSON