Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05OTTAWA1902
2005-06-23 15:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:  

SCENE-SETTER FOR AIRMEN TALKS NORTH, OTTAWA,

Tags:  PARM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 OTTAWA 001902 

SIPDIS

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN

SIPDIS

C-043-05

FOR CSAF, CDR USNORTHCOM, COMUSAFE, COMAFSPC, COMACC, HQ USAF/XO, HQ US
AF/XI, CMSAF.

TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR AIRMEN TALKS NORTH, OTTAWA,
CANADA, 28-29 JUN 2005 (U)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 OTTAWA 001902

SIPDIS

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN

SIPDIS

C-043-05

FOR CSAF, CDR USNORTHCOM, COMUSAFE, COMAFSPC, COMACC, HQ USAF/XO, HQ US
AF/XI, CMSAF.

TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR AIRMEN TALKS NORTH, OTTAWA,
CANADA, 28-29 JUN 2005 (U)


1. (C) CANADA-U.S. POL-MIL RELATIONS. PRIME MINISTER MARTIN
LEADS A MINORITY GOVERNMENT THAT OPERATES WITH EXTREME
CAUTION AND LACKS STABILITY. MARTIN,S OVERRIDING CONCERN IS
POLITICAL SURVIVAL AS HE FACES A POTENTIAL NO-CONFIDENCE,
VOTE 18 OR 19 MAY WHICH MANY BELIEVE WILL LEAD TO ELECTIONS
BEING CALLED AT THE END OF JUNE 2005. THE PRESSURE ON THE
LIBERALS COMES FROM THE RESIDUAL EFFECTS OF A CHRETIEN-ERA
SCANDAL INVOLVING QUEBEC. SEALED EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY
BY THE LIBERAL PARTY, LIKELY TO COME OUT IN THE JUNE TRIAL OF
A KEY PLAYER IN THE SPONSORSHIP SCANDAL, HAS RATCHETED
POLITICAL TENSIONS TO A FEVER PITCH AND FORCED THE LIBERAL
AGENDA INTO NEAR-GRIDLOCK.


A. (C) PM MARTIN HAS WAFFLED BETWEEN SENDING STRONG SIGNALS
THAT HE WISHES TO IMPROVES CANUS RELATIONS AND CAMPAIGN
RHETORIC THAT FOCUSED ON CANUS DIFFERENTIATION, TO BUILD
ROOM BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE CONSERVATIVES WHO SUPPORT MUCH
STRONGER TIES TO THE U.S. AND A MORE PROGRESSIVE DEFENSE AND
SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. MARTIN ESTABLISHED AND CHAIRS A NEW
CABINET COMMITTEE ON CANUS RELATIONS, CREATED A DHS-LIKE
HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT (DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA) HEADED BY THE DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER, AND HAS DEVOTED MORE RESOURCES FOR BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY AND TIGHTER IMMIGRATION SCREENING. STILL,
AN AUDITOR GENERAL,S REPORT RELEASED 5 APRIL 05 CRITICIZES
CANADIAN BORDER SECURITY EFFORTS AND COORDINATION.


B. (U) IN APRIL, 2004 MARTIN PUBLISHED CANADA,S FIRST-EVER
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY WHICH FOCUSES ON:

(1) (U) PROTECTING CANADA AND CANADIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD;
(2) (U) ENSURING CANADA IS NOT A BASE FOR THREATS TO ITS
ALLIES;
(3) (U) CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

MARTIN ALSO PUSHED THROUGH THE AMENDMENT TO THE NORAD
AGREEMENT, ALLOWING NORAD TO PERFORM THREAT WARNING
(INTEGRATED TACTICAL WARNING/ATTACK ASSESSMENT) FOR THE
MISSILE DEFENSE MISSION.


2. (C) PRO-U.S. DEFENSE MINISTER WILLIAM ((GRAHAM)),
PREVIOUSLY FOREIGN MINISTER, WAS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF CANADA
JOINING MISSILE DEFENSE, BUT HAD TO BACK AWAY FROM HIS
POSITION WHEN PM MARTIN MADE THE POLITICAL DECISION IN
FEBRUARY 2005 NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN MISSILE DEFENSE. THOSE
IN SECURITY AND DEFENSE CIRCLES WERE ALMOST UNIFORMLY IN

FAVOR OF JOINING BMD AND THEY ARE STILL SMARTING AND
DEFENSIVE OVER THE DECISION. MANY ARE LOOKING FOR
DELIVERABLES TO APPEASE THE U.S. IN THE WAKE OF WHAT THEY SEE
AS A DAMAGING STEP TO CANUS SECURITY COOPERATION AND
RELATIONS OVERALL. PUSHED BY INDUSTRY AND LOCAL POLITICIANS
LOOKING FOR A NEW MISSION FOR A BASE IN DECLINE, MINDEF
GRAHAM IS IN FAVOR OF INSTALLING AN X-BAND RADAR AT CFB GOOSE
BAY, LABRADOR TO CONTRIBUTE TO NORAD ITW/AA. (MDA SEES
LIMITED UTILITY IN BASING AN X-BAND RADAR AT GOOSE BAY).


3. (C) ON 1 APRIL 05, GEN HILLIER UNVEILED HIS VISION IN THE
TANK FOR THE SERVICE CHIEFS AND THE JOINT STAFF. SINCE
BECOMING CDS IN FEB 05, HE REWROTE MOST OF THE DEFENCE
REVIEW, REALIGNED SENIOR CANADIAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND
FORMED FULL-TIME ACTION GROUPS TO ENSURE HIS VISION IS
ARTICULATED AND IMPLEMENTED. CHARGED WITH REGAINING RESPECT
FOR THE CF, HE MUST SMARTLY INCREASE CF CAPABILITY AND
CAPACITY WITH ONLY MINOR BUDGET INCREASES, ALL WHILE
APPEASING THE CANADIAN PUBLIC,S PENCHANT FOR THE CF TO
REMAIN A DOMESTIC FORCE WITH THE ABILITY TO SUPPORT
MULTINATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND STABILITY OPERATIONS ABROAD.
THE KEY THEMES OF GEN HILLIER,S VISION:

A. (U) INCREASE CANADA,S INFLUENCE WITH DEPLOYMENTS IN
SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS IN ONE FOOTPRINT AND MAKING CANADIAN
FORCES MORE RESPONSIVE TO MODERN CONTINGENCIES WHERE
ASYMMETRIC THREATS ARE THE NORM.

B. (C/RELCAN) CREATE A COMMAND-CENTRIC, KNOWLEDGE-BASED AND
TACTICALLY DECISIVE ARMY USING KEY ENABLERS LIKE C4ISR
(CALLED ISTAR IN CANADA: INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET
ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE). THE PROGRESS IN C4ISR
TRANSFORMATION IS NOW UNDER CRITICISM AS FRAGMENTED AND
LACKING VISION IN A 5 APRIL 05 AUDITOR GENERAL REPORT.

C. (C/RELCAN) FOCUS ON CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT A 3-BLOCK
WAR, (CONCURRENT COMBAT, STABILIZATION, AND HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE).

D. (C/RELCAN) PACKAGE DISPARATE CF DEPLOYMENTS INTO ONE JOINT
FOOTPRINT AND COMMAND STRUCTURE. THIS IS TO BUILD CANADIAN
INFLUENCE VIA LARGER IMPACT DEPLOYMENTS, RATHER THAN GETTING
ONLY FLEETING CREDIT FOR PIECEMEAL EFFORTS DONE IN MULTIPLE
LOCATIONS. CANADA,S AFGHANISTAN PRT IN AUG 05 WILL USE SUCH
A STRUCTURE AND THE PLAN WAS TO BUILD TO A MAJOR BATTLE GROUP
DEPLOYMENT OF 1,300, PROBABLY WITH 6 CF-18S IN EARLY CY2006.
THIS PLAN IS ON HOLD FOR THE TIME BEING AS THE GOVERNMENT IS
MARTIN GOVERNMENT IS FRANTICALLY TRYING TO GAIN POLITICAL
TRACTION WITH IMMEDIATE FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH ARE
POPULAR WITH THE PUBLIC AND WITH FENCE-SITTING POLITICIANS
WHOSE VOTE COULD KEEP THE GOVERNMENT FROM BEING BROUGHT DOWN.
CHIEF AMONG THESE IS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DARFUR REGION OF
SUDAN. CDS GENERAL HILLIER WAS IN DARFUR 26-28 APR 05 AND PM
MARTIN AND OTHER SENIOR CANADIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE
VISITED THE REGION AS WELL. WHILE WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE
CANADA MAKE ANY CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NATO AND TO NOT DILUTE
THEIR COMMITMENT TO AFGHANISTAN THEY ARE LOOKING FOR THE MOST
EXPEDIENT WAY TO CONTRIBUTE (DUE TO THE POLITICAL
CLIMATE/SCHEDULE) AND THAT SEEMS LIKELY TO BE BILATERALLY
WITH THE AFRICAN UNION (AU). PM MARTIN HAS ORDERED A DELAY
ON PLANNING FOR AFGHANISTAN UNTIL 30 MAY WHILE A DECISION IS
MADE ON DARFUR CONTRIBUTIONS (WIDELY THOUGHT TO BE 150-180
TROOPS IN A TRAINING AND LOGISITICS SUPPORT ROLE). WE EXPECT
GENERAL HILLIER WILL GIVE YOU THE GOVERNMENT POSITION DURING
YOUR MEETINGS. WE BELIEVE HE IS ADAMANT ON MAKING THE
PLANNED CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHANISTAN AND IS LOATHE TO DILUTE
THE AFGHANISTAN PLAN BY PLACING A LARGE FOOTPRINT IN SUDAN.

E. (U) DEVELOPING A SUSTAINABLE EXPEDITIONARY SCHEDULE,
INCLUDING ALL ELEMENTS OF THE FORCE (E.G., CF-18S).

F. (C/RELCAN) FOCUS ON MISSIONS IN FAILED/FAILING STATES AND
MOVE AWAY FROM CAPABILITIES NOT CONTRIBUTING TO THIS MISSION
BUBBLE.,

G. (C/NF) IMPROVING CANADA,S JTF-2 SOF, TO INCLUDE NEW
TIER-2 CAPABILITIES. FORM A SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP
INTEGRATING SOF AIR, NAVAL, AND ENABLER ASSETS UNDER ONE
COMMANDER.

H. (C/RELCAN) DESIGNATE CANADA AS AN AREA OF OPERATIONS AND
MAKING CONTINENTAL SECURITY JOB ONE, IMPROVING MARITIME
SURVEILLANCE, HLD C2 AND ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY.

4. (C/RELCAN) GEN HILLIER WANTS TO RAPIDLY CREATE CANADA
COMMAND (CANCOM) AS A CONTINENTAL COUNTERPART TO USNORTHCOM
WITH CANADA AS AN AOO. GEN HILLIER WILL DESIGNATE A CANCOM
COMMANDER AND ESTABLISH A HEADQUARTERS ON 1 JUL 05, BUT THE
COMMAND WILL TAKE TWO TO THREE YEARS TO BECOME FULLY
OPERATIONAL. CANCOM WILL HAVE SIX REGIONAL JOINT HEADQUARTERS
(MOST LIKELY HALIFAX; QUEBEC/MONTREAL; KINGSTON; WINNIPEG;
ESQUIMALT/VICTORIA; YELLOWKNIFE). UNDER HIS PLAN, CANCOM
WILL BE THE SINGLE DEFENSE POC FOR:
A.(C/RELCAN) DOMESTIC OPERATIONS AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
IN CANADA AND FOR OTHER CANADIAN SECURITY PARTNERS.
B.(C/RELCAN) NATIONAL COORDINATION FOR PUBLIC SAFETY AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA (PSEPC, THE CANADIAN EQUIVALENT
TO DHS).
C.(C/RELCAN) ALL MIL-TO-MIL PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF
DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA).

5. (C) GEN HILLIER,S NEW VISION IS REFRESHING AND MARKS A
SIGNIFICANT NEW DIRECTION FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
CANADIAN FORCES, BUT IT FACES MANY CHALLENGES IN
IMPLEMENTATION:


A. (C) THE CANADIAN ACQUISITION CYCLE IS NOT POSTURED TO
FIELD THE SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT THE VISION IN THE TIMEFRAME GEN
HILLIER WANTS. THE ACQUISITION SYSTEM IS HYPER-POLITICIZED,
HIGHLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND MANUFACTURING
COUNTRY LOBBYING, AND HAS AVERAGED 10 YEARS TO MAKE
ACQUISITIONS. EVEN THE NON-CONTROVERSIAL ACQUISITION OF A
NEW FIXED-WING SEARCH-AND-RESCUE (SAR) AIRCRAFT WHICH WAS
SUPPOSED TO BE OUTSIDE THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND FAST-TRACKED
FOR DELIVERIES IN 18 MONTHS (BY SEPT 2005) IS MIRED IN
INTERNAL REVIEW AND THE REQUIREMENTS ARE YET TO BE FIRMLY
DEFINED. A MORE TROUBLING EXAMPLE IS THE CASE OF THE
MARITIME HELICOPTER PROJECT WHICH, AFTER 15 YEARS, FINALLY
WENT TO CONTRACT IN 2004. ON 6 APRIL 05, A FEDERAL JUDGE
OPENED THE SELECTION TO LITIGATION BY THE LOSING COMPETITOR
AND THAT ACQUISITION PROGRAM MAY BE REOPENED AND DELAY
FIELDING OF A NEW HELICOPTER UNTIL AFTER THE POINT WHERE
CURRENT SEA-KINGS WILL HAVE TO BE GROUNDED FOR SAFETY REASONS.


B. (C) CANADA FACES A MAJOR SHORTFALL IN STRATEGIC LIFT )
BOTH STRAT AIRLIFT (THEY HAVE NONE) AND SEALIFT (THEY HAVE
VERY LITTLE). COSTS OF RENTING STRATAIR ARE INCREASING AT
THE SAME TIME AVAILABILITY IS DECREASING. CANADIAN TACTICAL
AIRLIFT IS ON LIFE SUPPORT WITH ONLY 6 OF 32 C-130S NORMALLY
AVAILABLE. CANADA IS ALREADY RENTING CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT TO
FILL C-130 MISSIONS SUCH AS NORTHERN BASE RESUPPLY, OFFICIAL
DELEGATION TRAVEL IN CANADA, AND PARACHUTE TRAINING. CANADA
DESPERATELY NEEDS AIRLIFT BOTH TO DEPLOY FOR NATO AND
COALITION OPERATIONS AND TO SUPPORT DOMESTIC OPERATIONS SUCH
AS MOVEMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES, DISASTER RELIEF, AND
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT SHOULD IT BE REQUIRED. GEN HILLIER,S
VISION OF AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP WITH A BATTALION ON CALL
IS YEARS AWAY AND MANY DOUBT CANADA CAN EVEN AFFORD THE
LPD-CLASS SHIP REQUIRED, EVEN IF ONLY ONE IS PURCHASED AND
BASED FOR OPERATIONS JUST ON THE EAST COAST
(HALIFAX/SHEARWATER).


C. (C) EVEN GIVEN THE BUDGET PLUS-UP BEGINNING IN FY07, IT
WILL BE DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO
CAPITALIZE GEN HILLIER,S VISION. USED EQUIPMENT MAY SEEM
ATTRACTIVE FROM A TIMING AND FINANCIAL STANDPOINT, BUT ANY
USED EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS WILL FACE EXTRAORDINARY SCRUTINY,
AND LIKELY NOT GAIN POLITICAL APPROVAL, IN THE WAKE OF THE
SUB FIRE FIASCO WITH A USED UK SUBMARINE (HMCS CHICOUTIMI).
CANADIANS ARE ADAMANT ABOUT GIVING THEIR TROOPS THE BEST
EQUIPMENT ) THEY JUST DON,T WANT TO HAVE TO PAY FOR IT.


D. (C) WHILE CANADA DOES WHAT IT NEEDS TO FOR HOMELAND AND
CONTINENTAL DEFENSE THEY ARE FAR BEHIND THE U.S. IN PREPARING
FOR ASYMMETRIC THREATS, WORKING DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL
AUTHORITIES (DSCA) CHALLENGES, AND WORKING THE INTERAGENCY
PROBLEM. GEN HILLIER WILL WANT TO BENCHMARK FROM NORTHCOM,S
EXPERIENCE WITH THE IACG. CANADA DOES ALSO NOT HAVE THE SAME
PERCEPTION OF NOR SENSE OF URGENCY TO DEAL WITH POTENTIAL
THREATS. THEY ARE JUST NOW REACHING IOC WITH A CBRNE
REACTION TEAM (ONE).


E. (C) CANADIANS EXPECT THE CANADIAN FORCES TO DEFEND CANADA
AND WILL SEVERELY CRITICIZE THEM IF THE TIME COMES WHEN THEY
CANNOT, BUT CANADIANS LIKE TO SEE THEIR FORCES ABROAD HELPING
IN FAILED/FAILING STATES -- AND THE POLITICAL MASTERS DEMAND
IT. CANADA HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO REFUSE A MISSION ABROAD
BECAUSE OF HLD, FOR EXAMPLE. THIS IS WHY GEN HILLIER IS
FOCUSED ON THE 3-BLOCK WAR BUBBLE, AND
PROGRAMS/CAPABILITIES THAT DO NOT CONTRIBUTE WILL BE
DISCONTINUED. FOR EXAMPLE, ONE OF GEN HILLIER,S FIRST
ORDERS WAS THE CANCELLATION OF THE ADVANCED SHORT-RANGE
AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE (ASRAAM) TO SAVE USD 150 MILLION FOR OTHER
PROJECTS. THIS FLIES IN THE FACE OF THE
HOMELAND/CONTINENTAL DEFENSE FIRST, MANTRA AND COULD HAVE
A SUBSTANTIAL HLD/NORAD IMPACT. CF-18S WILL BE UNABLE TO
ATTACK (EXCEPT WITH GUN) IN THE EVENT OF RADAR/AMRAAM FAILURE
ONCE THEIR AIM-9MS ARE RETIRED. AMAZINGLY, THE
HELMET-MOUNTED SIGHT (JHMCS) TO SUPPORT THE NEW ALL-ASPECT IR
MISSILE IS STILL FUNDED, ALTHOUGH DELIVERIES MAY BE DELAYED
BECAUSE THE CANADIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON MISSED THE
CONTRACT SUSPENSE. SAO CANADA AND INDUSTRY (RAYTHEON) ARE
WORKING ON A PROPOSAL TO EQUIP CF-18S WITH AIM-9X WHICH WOULD
BE INTEROPERABLE WITH U.S. NORAD FIGHTERS. A SMALL NUMBER OF
MISSILES FOR ALERT AIRCRAFT (40-50) COUPLED WITH CAPTIVE
TRAINING MISSILES (CATM) FOR THE ENTIRE CF-18 FLEET COULD BE
ACQUIRED FOR USD 10-20 MILLION DEPENDING UPON THE COSTS
ASSOCIATED WITH REMANUFACTURING RETIRING AIM-9M MISSILES.
AIM-120 AMRAAM BEDDOWN IS OVER A YEAR BEHIND BECAUSE THE
CANADIANS DID NOT UPGRADE THEIR WEAPONS STORAGE AREAS (WSA)
TO THE REQUIRED SECURITY STANDARD FOR THE STORAGE OF AMRAAM.
CANADIAN MISSILES ARE BEING STORED AT THE RAYTHEON FACTORY IN
TUCSON, AND THEY WILL LIKELY NOT BE IOC IN CANADA UNTIL MID-
CY2006. THE NEW RADAR WARNING RECEIVER (ALR-67V3) HAS YET TO
BE FUNDED AND IS ALSO AT RISK IN THE CONTEXT THAT IT DOES NOT
CONTRIBUTE TO DEPLOYED OPERATIONS IN THE 3-BLOCK WAR
BUBBLE, WHERE GEN HILLIER ENVISIONS A BENIGN AIR THREAT
ENVIRONMENT.


F. (C) GEN HILLIER IS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER BOTH POLITICAL AND
BUREAUCRATIC PUSHBACK ON MANY OF HIS INITIATIVES. THE
SENATE, AN APPOINTED BODY WITH LIMITED REAL, POWERS, HAS
ALREADY SAID ITS DEFENSE COMMITTEES WILL TAKE UP TO A YEAR TO
DO THEIR OWN REVIEW OF THE DEFENCE REVIEW AND TRAVEL AROUND
CANADA PULSING THE POPULATION ON THE STRATEGY AND
IMPLEMENTATION. THE BUREAUCRATIC CHALLENGES WILL BE TO
PREVENT THE RETURN OF INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY (LARGELY STAMPED
OUT IN RECENT YEARS) OVER BUDGET AND ACQUISITIONS AND TO GET
THE ACQUISITION SYSTEM TO BE RESPONSIVE TO MILITARY
TIMETABLES.


6. (C) AS YOU KNOW, AS PART OF CANADA,S CAMPAIGN TO CONVEY
THAT IT IS SERIOUS ABOUT THE DEFENSE REVIEW AND INCREASING
MILITARY CAPABILITIES, AND IN HOPES OF SOFTENING THE BLOW ON
MISSILE DEFENSE, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTED TO BOOSTING
THE DEFENSE BUDGET BY USD 10 BILLION OVER FIVE YEARS. OF
THIS, 90 PERCENT IS IN THE OUTYEARS (FY07-09) AND 35 PERCENT
OF THE FY05 AND 45 PERCENT OF THE FY06 INCREASES ARE ALREADY
SLATED FOR RETURN TO THE GOVERNMENT AS PART OF A
GOVERNMENT-WIDE EFFICIENCY CLAWBACK., WITH THE
INSTABLITY OF A MINORITY GOVERNMENT AND THE POTENTIAL FOR AN
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN IN THE OUTYEARS, NO ONE IS BETTING THAT
DEFENSE WILL SEE ALL THE PROMISED RESOURCES. STILL, IT IS A
HUGE STEP FORWARD AND FOR THE TIME BEING GEN HILLIER HAS A
COMMITMENT FROM THE TREASURY BOARD THAT THE USD 10 BILLION
INCREASE IS A BASELINE.,

7. (C) CANADIAN MILITARY FORCES CAPABILITIES: WHAT LIES
AHEAD. THE CANADIAN FORCES, AND THE CANADIAN AIR FORCE IN
PARTICULAR, ARE STRETCHED AND OVER-TASKED, SURVIVING
PRIMARILY ON THE QUALITY OF THEIR PEOPLE. INSIDERS INVOLVED
WITH DEFENSE ISSUES BELIEVE THAT CANADA IS STILL UNABLE TO
COME TO GRIPS WITH THE KINDS OF CHOICES IT MUST MAKE IN ORDER
TO PREVENT ITS MILITARY FROM BECOMING IRRELEVANT. WHILE
SMALL NUMBERS OF HIGHLY CAPABLE FORCES EXIST, SUCH AS JTF-2
TIER-1 SOF COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCES (LESS THAN 300 TRIGGER
PULLERS),CANADA IS UNWILLING TO MOVE INTO THE NICHE AREAS
WHICH THE BUDGET CAN SUPPORT. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE,
CANADIAN FORCES WILL REMAIN AROUND 50,000 - CERTAINLY NOT
EXCEEDING 60,000. EVEN WITH A DOUBLING OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET
CANADA COULD NOT RECAPITALIZE ITS EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE
FOR PERHAPS 15 YEARS, AND NO ONE PREDICTS THOSE SORT OF
FUNDING LEVELS (UNLESS PERHAPS IN THE UNFORTUNATE EVENT
CANADA WERE TO EXPERIENCE A MAJOR 9-11 TYPE ATTACK). GIVING
UP ON MAJOR MISSION AREAS, SUCH AS AN OPERATIONAL BLUE WATER
NAVY (AND MOVING TO SUPPORT/TRANSPORT AND 200 MILE SECURITY
MISSIONS),IS THE ONLY WAY CANADA CAN FULLY FUND AND SUPPORT
OPERATIONS WITH EXISTING (OR FORECAST) BUDGETS. CANADA SEEMS
DESTINED TO HOBBLE ALONG WITH ONE OF THE SMALLEST MILITARIES
IN THE WORLD TO FIELD A COMPLETE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE.
THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS CANADIAN FORCES AND THE DEFENSE
BUDGET HAVE BEEN NEGLECTED SO LONG THERE IS NO WAY WITHIN THE
CURRENT CANADIAN POLITICAL CONTEXT AND WITH COMPETING
BUDGETARY PRESSURES FOR THEM TO RETURN TO PREVIOUS
CAPABILITIES. THE STRATEGIC TREND IS THAT THE CANADIAN AIR
FORCE (REDUCING TO 49 AVAILABLE CF-18S WHICH HAVE NOT
DEPLOYED OUTSIDE AMERICA SINCE 1999) AND THE CANADIAN NAVY
(THREE READY SHIPS) WILL EVOLVE INTO A HOMELAND/CONTINENTAL
DEFENSE FORCE. THE SAME FATE AWAITS THE CANADIAN ARMY UNLESS
CANADA ACQUIRES STRATEGIC AIRLIFT TO PROVIDE THE MOBILITY
REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT GEN HILLIER,S VISION.


8. (U) CURRENT ISSUES:


A. (C) HOMELAND DEFENSE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS INAUGURATION,
THE PM CREATED A NEW MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS CANADA (PSEPC),AN INSTITUTION ANALOGOUS TO THE
U.S. DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. THE AGENCY'S GOAL IS TO
PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY AND COORDINATE EMERGENCY
RESPONSES. ALTHOUGH THE LINES OF AUTHORITY OF THIS MINISTRY
ARE STILL BEING DRAWN AND THEY ARE MORE FOCUSED ON INTERNAL
ORGANIZATION THAN STANDING UP A WORKING ORGANIZATION, IT
ALREADY HAS ESTABLISHED LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH
COUNTERPART USG AGENCIES, ALBEIT WITHOUT THE SAME SENSE OF
URGENCY.


B. (C) MARITIME SECURITY. ALTHOUGH THIS IS SLOWLY CHANGING,
CANADA'S MARITIME SECURITY STRUCTURE HAS BEEN ADMINISTERED IN
AN UNCOORDINATED FASHION BETWEEN A PLETHORA OF GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES. IN TERMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY, THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE (RCMP) IS
THE ONLY NATIONAL AGENCY WITH A DAY-TO-DAY, LEGISLATED
MANDATE TO POLICE ALL CANADIAN WATERS. IN SOME
CIRCUMSTANCES, CANADIAN MARITIME FORCES (NAVY) CAN AND HAVE
BEEN GIVEN LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS AND BECOME INVOLVED IN
MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS IF SPECIAL AUTHORITY IS GRANTED
BY GOVERNMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD, A
SUB-AGENCY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS (DFO),
IS TASKED WITH A COLLECTION OF MARINE PROGRAMS AND SERVICE
MISSIONS AND DOES NOT FULFILL A LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTION.


C. (C/RELCAN) NORAD RENEWAL. THE CREATION OF CANCOM AND THE
SHORT NEGOTIATING TIMELINE FOR NORAD RENEWAL ARE LIKELY TO
LIMIT PROGRESS IN EXPANDING NORAD. ALTHOUGH THE CANADIAN
GOVERNMENT HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO DISCUSS NORAD EXPANSION INTO
OTHER DOMAINS, THE SENSITIVE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH MARITIME
CONTROL (AND THE FACT THAT THE MARITIME OPERATORS DO NOT
THINK IT NEEDS TO BE CHANGED) WILL LIKELY MEAN LIMITED
PROGRESS IN NORAD EXPANSION/TRANSFORMATION. THERE SEEMS TO
BE CONSENSUS THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE EXTENDED AS GOOD
UNTIL CANCELLED, AND MOVED AWAY FROM THE REQUIREMENT FOR
5-YEAR RENEWALS. THERE IS ALSO WIDE SUPPORT FOR MAKING IT
EASIER TO INCORPORATE ANY OTHER REQUIRED TASKS ONCE THOSE ARE
DETERMINED AND TO CONTINUE A BINATIONAL/BILATERAL PLANNING
FUNCTION TO REPLACE THE BINATIONAL PLANNING GROUP (BPG) WHEN
ITS MANDATE EXPIRES IN MAY 2006.


9. (U) RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS:


A. (C/RELCAN) WE CONTINUE TO TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE WE CAN
ASSIST THE CANADIAN FORCES WITH LIFT WHEN NECESSARY. OUR
INTEGRATED LOGISTICS OPERATIONS CONCEPT (ILOC) ALLOWS
CANADIAN MOVEMENTS TO SEAMLESSLY INTEGRATE INTO THE U.S.
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM WHEN REQUIRED. OUR ACQUISITION
CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENT GIVES THE CANADIAN FORCES ACCESS TO
U.S. LOGISTICS AND LIFT AT THE SAME PRICE WE CHARGE OUR OWN
FORCES. WE ARE GLAD YOUR EXPERTS ARE TRAVELING TO SCOTT AFB
TODAY (29 JUN 05) TO BENCHMARK THEIR REQUIREMENTS OFF OF OUR
MODELS AT AIR MOBILITY COMMAND AND TRANSCOM. AFTER ALL WE
ARE MOVING FROM THE SAME CONTINENT, CROSSING THE SAME OCEANS,
MOVING MOSTLY THE SAME TYPES OF THINGS TO MOSTLY THE SAME
PLACES.


B. (C/RELCAN) NORAD NEEDS TO MAINTAIN FULL-SPECTRUM AIR
INTERCEPT AND ATTACK CAPABILITY, PARTICULARLY AGAINST THE
CRUISE MISSILE THREAT OUTLINED IN THE CANUS THREAT
ASSESSMENT. WE UNDERSTAND YOUR PRIORITIES HAVE RESULTED IN
NOT FIELDING AN IMPROVED INFRARED MISSILE FOR THE CF-18 AT
THIS TIME. WE WOULD LIKE TO HELP YOU LOOK FOR AFFORDABLE
ALTERNATIVES TO FIELD THIS IMPORTANT CAPABILITY AT LEAST FOR
NORAD ALERT FIGHTERS AND KEEP CANADIAN FIGHTERS INTEROPERABLE
AND CAPABLE WITH THE LATEST MUNITIONS TO MATCH THEIR IMPROVED
AVIONICS CAPABILITIES.


C. (C/RELCAN) WE THINK THE SAME CAPABILITIES THAT MAKE US
STRONG IN THE HOME, GAME ARE ESSENTIAL TO MAKING OUR
FORCES CREDIBLE, CAPABLE, AND USABLE FOR THE AWAY, GAME.


E. (C/RELCAN) MAKING THE NORAD AGREEMENT AN ENDURING
ARRANGEMENT NOT SUBJECT TO FIVE YEAR RENEWALS WILL SHOW A
STRONG COMMITMENT BY BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES TO NORAD AS AN
INSTITUTION, AND REDUCE NORAD,S EXPOSURE TO POLITICALLY
OPPORTUNE, CRITICISM.


F. (C/RELCAN) NORAD,S RENEWAL IS A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR
ADDRESSING GAPS AND SEAMS IN OUR MUTUAL HOMELAND DEFENSE
EFFORTS. WHETHER WE INVEST FUTURE COOPERATION BINATIONALLY
IN NORAD, BI-LATERALLY BETWEEN CANCOM AND NORTHCOM, OR BOTH,
WE NEED TO ENSURE WE COOPERATE IN A VERY DELIBERATE AND
COMPREHENSIVE MANNER.

10. (U) POC FOR THIS MESSAGE IS COL DAVE BRACKETT, DEFENSE
AND AIR ATTACHE, USDAO OTTAWA. UNCLAS 613-688-5401. STU-III
613-688-3123. SIPRNET: DIBRADS(AT)NOTES.DAWN.DIA.SMIL.MIL.