Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05OTTAWA1166
2005-04-18 15:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:  

CANADA SCENESETTER FOR POL-MIL BILATS

Tags:  PREL MARR CA 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 001166 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

FOR PM ACTING A/S LIKINS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR CA
SUBJECT: CANADA SCENESETTER FOR POL-MIL BILATS

Classified By: POL M/C Brian Flora. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

BACKGROUND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 001166

SIPDIS

NOFORN

FOR PM ACTING A/S LIKINS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR CA
SUBJECT: CANADA SCENESETTER FOR POL-MIL BILATS

Classified By: POL M/C Brian Flora. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

BACKGROUND


1. (C) Your leadership of the U.S. delegation at the
inaugural US-Canada political-military consultations is
greatly appreciated. While the United States and Canada meet
regularly in continental security and defense forums, there
has been growing recognition in both governments that broader
policy discussions on security goals outside the North
American context would be useful. We hope that the April 27
talks will help to set a precedent for a regular bilateral
dialogue on shared international security interests and
concerns.


2. (C) Our discussions are taking place against the backdrop
of domestic political uncertainty. The fragile Martin
government has been trying to avert a loss-of-confidence vote
that could propel the country to the polls less than a year
after the June 2004 elections. Prime Minister Martin's
overriding concern is to reverse his party's parliamentary
minority and to win a majority mandate. But the Liberals
continue to be battered by ugly fallout from a Chretien-era
spending scandal involving Quebec. Sealed evidence from the
investigation revealing illegal activity by the Liberal party
was leaked to the public in early April, reviving the specter
of Quebec "sovereignty" and ratcheting political tensions in
Ottawa to a fever pitch.


3. (C) True to the political winds and its minority mandate,
the government is not pursuing an aggressive agenda in
foreign policy. At the same time, within the constraints of
political scandal, limited funding, and slipping global
clout, Canada continues to seek an active diplomatic agenda
in multilateral institutions to address concerns such as
non-proliferation, Iran, and the Middle East peace process.
Low defense spending and a host of related limitations
notwithstanding, the government also strives to maintain a
respectable level of involvement in Afghanistan and other
field missions, usually under a multilateral umbrella.
Foreign policy topics of significance under the Martin
government are addressed below.

U.S.-CANADA RELATIONS


4. (C/NF) Though PM Martin has made it a top priority of his

government to get Canada-US relations back on track, his
good intentions have been subsumed by domestic politics. The
Prime Minister's Office (PMO) continues to believe it was
absolutely correct to walk away from controversial
participation in the U.S. missile defense program. But the
government has not managed to shut down its pro-defense
critics at home and has been at some pains to demonstrate
that Canada remains a committed U.S. partner on international
defense and security matters. Though Canada had maintained a
wary distance from any Iraq-related military assistance, for
example, within days of the decision on missile defense, the
PMO announced a contribution to the NATO Training Mission's
Iraq Trust Fund of CAD 1 million (USD 800,000) and pledged
military trainers (albeit not in country) for the Iraqi
military.

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS


5. (C/NF) Closer to the U.S. than ever on border
collaboration and continental defense, Canada no longer sees
itself as a bridge between Europe and the United States, but
rather seeks a special relationship with each. This is a
natural evolution, as Canada finds its pocketbook linked
increasingly to the U.S. (two-way trade between the EU and
Canada is 10 percent of that between the U.S. and Canada),
while its international values lie closer to those of Europe
(Canada voted with the EU common position on 50 of 52 UNGA
resolutions; the U.S. voted with the EU on 21 resolutions).


6. (C/NF) Canada's relations with the EU, which some in the
francophone-dominated Foreign Affairs bureaucracy see as a
diplomatic counterweight to the U.S., are evolving rapidly.
Of six states designated by the EU as a strategic partner,
Canada probably has the most advanced and complex
relationship with Europe. At the March 2004 bi-annual
Canada-EU Summit, PM Martin, EU Commission President Prodi,
and Acting EU President Ahern agreed to a Partnership Agenda,
which improved cooperation on security, foreign policy,
trade, and investment. Once content to manage transatlantic
security relations exclusively through NATO and the OSCE,
recently Canada has been negotiating terms of participation
in potential EU field missions where NATO is not a player but
in which Canada may have human security or other interests.

7. (C/NF) Canada regularly affirms its commitment to NATO and
the OSCE as the principal anchors in the transatlantic
security relationship. But an appetite for spending on
social programs and aversion to military expenditure
continues to dominate the budgeting priorities of the
Liberals who have been in power since 1993. Defense spending
as a percentage of GDP ranks Canada in the bottom third of
NATO countries.

UN REFORM


8. (SBU) The centrality of multilateral institutions--the UN
especially--to Canada's foreign policy cannot be overstated.
In his UNGA address, PM Martin urged bold reforms to
strengthen the UN's capability to conduct humanitarian
intervention, to deny WMD to terrorists and hostile states,
to protect human rights and dignity, and to build better
public institutions in failing states. Canada has been
active in the more mundane agenda of the "Group of Friends";
it has lobbied for a more open and transparent UNSC and is in
favor of a modest increase in its elected--not
permanent--membership. Canada's deteriorating capacity to
assist with any of this agenda, however, has seriously
weakened its voice in the international forum.


9. (C) At the recent G-8 Political Directors' meeting,
Foreign Affairs Assistant Deputy Minister Jim Wright said
that Canada supports UNSYG Annan's proposed Peace-Building
Commission and the principle of "Responsibility to Protect."
Though acknowledging that Canada understands the latter
concept would be problematic for some, Wright said the GOC
wishes to pursue it in a "practical" way.

NATION-BUILDING AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION


10. (C) Sudan: Underscoring the Prime Minister's declared
interest in alleviating the situation in Sudan, Canada
pledged CAD 90 million in assistance at the Oslo Donors'
Conference. The GOC also announced that up to 31 Canadian
Forces (CF) personnel will be deployed to southern Sudan over
the coming months as part of UNMIS. In London April 6, ADM
Wright told U/S Burns that Chief of Defence Staff Hillier
would visit Sudan in the second half of April to examine
options for potential other contributions--possibly
helicopter support or training.


11. (C) Haiti: Prime Minister Martin consistently has made
the case for Canada's "special responsibility" toward Haiti,
a francophone country where Canada played a major role in the
1990s. In addition to diplomatic efforts, and
notwithstanding its operationally-stretched Forces, Canada
contributed 500 troops to stability operations under UNSCR
1529, followed by a policing contingent of 100 RCMP officers.
ADM Wright recently proposed to U/S Burns a bilateral
dialogue on Haiti at a senior level.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM


12. (C) Afghanistan: Canada has been with us fully in
Afghanistan, contributing troops (and leadership of ISAF V in
2004),money (USD 500 million through 2009),and political
support consistently. Following Cabinet approval of the
government's 2005-06 Afghanistan package, ADM Wright informed
A/S Burns that Canada would deploy 180-250 CF personnel to
the PRT in Kandahar at the end of the summer. The GOC also
plans to deploy a battalion in spring 2006, at conclusion of
the Canadian army's 18-month "operational pause".


13. (SBU) Iraq: Canada just as surely was not with us on
Iraq, maintaining a position of non-involvement in the war
while withholding overt criticism of the U.S.-led coalition.
Canada did lead the maritime task force monitoring movement
in the Persian Gulf, a service that began with an eye on
Afghanistan but proved useful in the lead-up to the
liberation of Iraq. Though the GOC pledged CAD 300 million
(approx. USD 235 million) for reconstruction efforts, sent
RCMP trainers to help with the Iraqi civilian police program
in Jordan, and is prepared to assist with capacity building
in the Iraqi government, it steadfastly declines to put
"boots on the ground", even as a NATO member.

NONPROLIFERATION - IRAN


14. (SBU) Iran: Though not on the agenda for our talks,
Canada shares U.S. concern over Tehran's nuclear program and
has led efforts alongside the USG, UK and Australia, to reign
in Tehran's nuclear ambitions via the IAEA. Canada termed
its bilateral approach to Iran "controlled engagement" until
the 2003 killing of a Canadian-Iranian journalist in police
custody in Tehran, when it shifted to "no engagement" in
protest. A new Canadian Ambassador recently returned to
Tehran, but relations remain tense.

LANDMINES


15. (C) A leading advocate of the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention (also known as the "Ottawa Convention"),the
government of Canada acknowledges U.S. commitment to and
activism in de-mining in spite of U.S. non-accession, and we
have been able to work together on humanitarian de-mining
initiatives. At the same time, Ottawa was highly offended by
the U.S. proposal in the CD last year for a transfer ban on
"persistent" landmines because it undermined "the only
multilateral disarmament agreement on landmines", which
advocates a comprehensive ban.

Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa

DICKSON