(C) IRANIAN SCIENTIST OF CBW CONCERN IN CANADA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 001007

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2013
TAGS: PARM PREL CVIS CA IR CBW
SUBJECT: (C) IRANIAN SCIENTIST OF CBW CONCERN IN CANADA

REF: STATE 270366

Classified By: POL M/C Brian Flora. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Polmiloff met April 5 with Foreign Affairs Canada
Acting Director for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Marina
Laker, at the latter's request, to discuss Iranian national
Mehdi Arbabi Ghahroudi, currently in Canada on a one-year
work permit that will expire 04 July 2005. In addition to
her verbal summary, Laker handed over a classified non-paper,
the text of which is included at para 4.


2. (S) Laker prefaced her comments by noting that the U.S.
and Canada have enjoyed an excellent information-exchange
relationship with regard to Iranian proliferation activities.
Not only have there been regular exchanges between
intelligence services, she said, our governments collaborate
closely in the context of CBW and nuclear non-proliferation
regimes. Laker stated that because of its diplomatic
presence in Tehran, the GOC has been in a position to
contribute value-added information on Iran. Moreover,
Canadian government monitoring of Iran and Iranians
(including visa applicants) in general had intensified
following the torture and murder by Iranian secret police of
a Canadian journalist in 2003. For these reasons, the GOC
found the second-to-last bullet in the USG demarche somewhat
"odd" as it suggested a lack of understanding of the depth of
Canada's commitment to halting CBW proliferators.


3. (S) In the case of Dr. Mehdi Arbadi Ghanhroudi, Laker said
the Canadian government had no/no evidence to support that
the National Research Centre for Genetic Engineering and
Biotechnology (NRCGEB) in Iran was involved in BW related
activities, or that an individual affiliated with NRCGEB was
involved in such activities. The Canadian government had
determined that Arbadi Ghanhroudi's line of research at
Canada's NRC-IBS did not have BW applications. Finally,
Arbadi Ghanhroudi's application for a work permit and his
credentials were thoroughly vetted by Canadian authorities
prior to issuance of the one-year work permit.

4, (C) TEXT OF Canadian non-paper:

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS

-- The Canadian government was made aware of the United
States' concern with Dr. Mehdi Arbadi Ghanhroudi (an Iranian
scientist) in relation to his past affiliation with the
National Research Centre for Genetic Engineering and
Biotechnology (NRCGEB) in Iran, in November 2004.

-- The Canadian government issued Dr. Ghanhroudi a work
permit valid until 2005/07/04.

-- He is currently working at the National Research Council
Institute for Biological Sciences (NRC-IBS),where he is
conducting research on the Campylobacter antibody project.
The Campylobacter bacterium is very fragile and hence
unsuited to biological warfare applications.

-- Dr. Ghanhroudi received recommendations for this position
from his PhD supervisor at the VUB University in Brussels,
Belgium as well as from the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases in Bethesda, Maryland.

-- Dr. Ghanhroudi was initially offered a position at the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases in
Bethesda, Maryland.

-- The Canadian government has no intelligence information
indicating that the NRCGEB is involved in BW related
activities.

-- The Canadian government maintains that there is no reason
to suspect an individual affiliated with the NRCGEB as being
involved in BW activities.

-- Canada's visa application and vetting process is very
thorough and fully responds to the Canadian government's
non-proliferation commitments and obligations, including our
legally binding obligations under domestic and international
law.

-- The government follows the highest standards for visa
screening. It was noted at the 2003 Australia Group annual
plenary that, in some cases, Canada's visa screening
procedures and practices were implemented some years before
many Australia Group partners.

-- The Canadian government will not pursue this matter
further unless new security information is forthcoming.

-- Canada welcomes, and would in fact recommend, a
strengthened exchange between our intelligence agencies in
order to deal with these types of issues.

Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa

DICKSON