Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NICOSIA304
2005-02-23 13:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

SHIP VISIT TO CYPRUS: CALLING IN THE NORTH IS A

Tags:  CY TU PREL MOPS MARR 
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P 231319Z FEB 05
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3511
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
CIA WASHDC
COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
DIA WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
SECNAV WASHDC
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE 
USDAO NICOSIA CY
COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
COMLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
SAFE WASHINGTON DC
USNMR SHAPE BE
ODC ANKARA TU
CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2/ECJ5-E//
USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N2//
HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//INS//
CINC INTEL SUPPORT HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGB-C-RE/AEAGC//
CINC INTEL SUPPORT HEIDELBERG GE//USAINTELCTR
DASSO FRANKFURT GE
UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
USAREUR ACE DARMSTADT GE
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
USNMR SHAPE BE//SA SACEUR/INTAF//
NSACSS FORT GEORGE G MEADE MD
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
ODC ANKARA TU//TCH//
CDR66THMIGP DARMSTADT GE//IAPG-CMD//
USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL
ONI WASHDC
COMSIXTHFLT //N2//
HMSNG WASHDC
ONI SUITLAND MD//32/25//
CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 000304 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2014
TAGS: CY TU PREL MOPS MARR
SUBJECT: SHIP VISIT TO CYPRUS: CALLING IN THE NORTH IS A
BAD IDEA

REF: IIR 689801035

Classified By: Ambassador M. Klosson, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 000304

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2014
TAGS: CY TU PREL MOPS MARR
SUBJECT: SHIP VISIT TO CYPRUS: CALLING IN THE NORTH IS A
BAD IDEA

REF: IIR 689801035

Classified By: Ambassador M. Klosson, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Embassy Nicosia supports a visit by the USN
to the Republic of Cyprus (south),but opposes a ship visit
to north Cyprus under the current circumstances. The
Republic of Cyprus has hosted many visits by the United
States Navy (USN) over the years without incident. The
Cyprus government has been supportive of these visits, which
have enabled the US military to maintain its presence in the
region while supporting the Combatant Commander,s Theater
Security Cooperation (TSC) strategy. The Republic of Cyprus
is ideally suited to support USN visits in terms of port
infrastructure, support architecture, and security. The US
Embassy is in a position to provide the necessary support, as
well as leverage the events to further support the U.S.
government's goals and policies for Cyprus. A USN visit to
north Cyprus, on the other hand, would do little to help ease
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community, and would
have a significant negative impact on areas of key policy
cooperation with Cyprus -- such as counter-terrorism and
non-proliferation cooperation, including halting negotiations
close to agreement on a PSI shipboarding MOU. Furthermore,
the north is ill suited to support such visits.
Security/Force Protection, port infrastructure, support
architecture, and personal security are all questionable at
best. A USN visit would highlight the Turkish military
presence because the TGS would likely be heavily involved in
many aspects of the visit. END SUMMARY.

BACKGROUND ON USN VISITS TO CYPRUS
--------------


2. (C) The Republic of Cyprus has been the beneficiary
without incident of USN ship visits for the past 14 years.
Since 1999, Cyprus has hosted 40 visits, 34 prior to 9/11,
and 6 since with approximately another 10 non-routine visits
(medevac). In all, since 1991, Cyprus hosted 72 ship visits
by the USN. As recently as March 2004, NAVEUR Headquarters
London listed Cyprus as one of the top ten countries to
conduct ship visits in support of European Command's Theater
Security Cooperation Strategy. These visits are an integral

engagement strategy for Cyprus, country campaign plan (CCP),
recently developed to maintain access to the region, build
relationships to curb the flow of illegal goods and services,
and support the counter-proliferation efforts in the region.
No country has protested the USN,s right to conduct these
visits, and all have occurred with little to no fanfare. In
addition, France, India, Greece, and the UK have conducted
ship visits without incident. No U.S. or other non-Turkish
naval vessels have visited the north since 1974.


VISITING THE SOUTH: POLITICALLY HELPFUL AND EASY TO DO
-------------- --------------

3.(C) A USN ship visit to the south would directly advance
our non-proliferation and counter-terrorism objectives. A
ship visit to the south would signal that, while we will
press ahead with our policy of easing the isolation of the
Turkish Cypriots, cooperation in other areas of interest to
both sides will continue.


4. (C) From an infrastructure standpoint, the Republic of
Cyprus is ideally suited to support a USN Ship visit. Both
of its main seaports have been inspected by the US Navy and
have a current port inspection survey on file (PIVA). As a
result of the previous history of USN visits, the support
architecture is in place to support a variety of sea going
vessels to include submarines. Husbanding agents have
supported everything from Carrier Strike Groups on exercises
in the eastern Mediterranean, to Expeditionary Strike Groups
conducting humanitarian assistance measures for earthquake
victims, to Presidential Summit meetings between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union on Malta. The USG, through an exchange of
diplomatic notes with the Republic of Cyprus, has a SOFA-like
agreement to protect military personnel in the event that
legal issues arise as a result of liberty visits. Everything
is in place to resume successful ship visits to the Republic
of Cyprus.

VISITING THE NORTH: IMPRACTICAL AND ...
--------------


5. (C) While the south is well suited to host a USN Ship
visit, north Cyprus is not. Port facilities are well below
what is available, and already certified, in the south.
Access to the institutions that would support such a visit is
difficult. The lack of a recognized local political entity
poses significant coordination difficulties; for example,
SOFA-like protection of military personnel arranged via the
exchange of diplomatic notes would be impossible in the
north. Security/force protection is also a questionable
area, and would unhelpfully highlight Turkey's extensive
presence and interference in the north. Husbanding agents
are currently unknown and untested. As a result, the ability
of the Embassy to support a ship visit is limited at best.

... A COLOSSAL POLICY BLUNDER
--------------


6. (C) A USN visit to the north would also have a disastrous
effect on key U.S. interests in Cyprus and would provoke an
unprecedented firestorm of Greek Cypriot protest. Such a


visit would require, by definition, intimate cooperation with
the Turkish military in north Cyprus, which is considered an
army of "occupation" by the GOC and whose presence in Cyprus
has been condemned repeatedly by UNSC resolutions. Greece, a
new UNSC member, would certainly raise the issue in the
Council. Perhaps more importantly, the ROC would respond
immediately by stopping cooperation in policy areas of
importance to the United States, including but not limited to:

-- Counterterrorism and non-proliferation. The USG is close
to finalizing a PSI shipboarding agreement with the
Government of Cyprus that would improve oversight of the busy
seaports in the south. The GOC would come under significant
pressure to reject cooperation with forces that had
&legitimized8 the Turkish &occupation8 by visiting the
north.

-- Bicommunalism. The GOC is already threatening to pull out
of long-standing bicommunal programs, including Fulbright
scholarships. A ship visit would push the GOC to be more
aggressive in undermining bicommunal activity.

-- UN Settlement Process. A ship visit would further damage
U.S. credibility among Greek Cypriots and harm our ability to
press for a more constructive Greek Cypriot position on
renewing UN settlement talks.


7. (C) Furthermore, a USN ship visit would provide very
little concrete, long-term benefit to the Turkish Cypriots --
especially if it rendered USG help to their community more
difficult. A port call by a U.S. military asset is a
symbolic gesture that would actually work against our efforts
to provide substantive assistance to the Turkish Cypriots. A
ship visit in no way advances the most important priorities
we share with the pro-settlement Turkish Cypriot leadership:
laying the ground for a Cyprus settlement by ending north
Cyprus, isolation from international trade, and encouraging
the sustainable development of their economic and business
infrastructure. North Cyprus needs freighters, not frigates.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Previous ship visits to the south have been
non-problematic, and another visit to the south would help
advance U.S. policy priorities with the GOC. A visit to the
north would be both impractical and politically disastrous in
the current climate. END COMMENT.

KLOSSON