CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NORTH CYPRUS:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000291

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY TU PHUM PINR ECON
SUBJECT: CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NORTH CYPRUS:
LIVING WITH AN 800-POUND GORILLA

REF: A. 03 NICOSIA 2373 AND PREVIOUS

B. 03 USDAO NICOSIA IIR 6823001804 AND PREVIOUS

C. NICOSIA 221

D. NICOSIA 223

E. 04 NICOSIA 1916

Classified By: Ambassador M. Klosson, for reasons 1.4, b & d.


1. (C) SUMMARY. With roughly 25,000 troops in Cyprus and a
history of interference in Turkish Cypriot politics, the
Turkish military exercised considerable sway in many spheres
of civilian life in the north. The army has kept a low
profile, however, since the 2003 elections that brought the
pro-settlement "government" of Mehmet Ali Talat to power.
But the Turkish army remains influential thanks to its
prestige, direct control over local security forces, and role
in the economy. Military sensitivity about its core policy
equities -- control of overall security and of the Green Line
-- constrain the civilian leadership's room to maneuver. As
a result, the Talat administration is sometimes unable to
move ahead with policy measures opposed by the army, even if
these steps are in the interest of the Turkish Cypriot
community. Future settlement talks will undoubtedly require
difficult concessions from the Turkish side beyond those
foreseen in the Annan Plan, and may reveal some differences
between Turkish Cypriots and Ankara. END SUMMARY.

A FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH
--------------


2. (C) Over the years, often with "President" Rauf Denktash's
active encouragement, the Turkish army has played a prominent
role in north Cyprus. Since the 2003 elections that brought
the pro-settlement CTP of Talat to power, the military has
loosened its grip on local politics and allowed a more open
dialogue over most questions of governance. But in the words
of one academic, the Turkish army remains a "800-pound
gorilla" with which the locals must cohabitate.


3. (C) The army's influence is due in no small part to the
sheer size of the Turkish garrison here, which is especially
large compared to the local population. Turkey keeps all
information that might reveal the exact number and
composition of these forces under wraps; OSCE and CFE
requirements do not oblige Turkey to report its troop
strength on Cyprus. But UNFICYP and USDAO estimate the force
consists of two mechanized infantry divisions totaling 25,000
men (plus roughly 3,000 dependent family members). This
means there is more than one Turkish solider for every ten
civilians in north Cyprus.


4. (C) The Turkish military's power is augmented by its
control over all Turkish Cypriot security forces. Under a
"temporary emergency" provision of Turkish Cypriot "law," the
Turkish Cypriot security forces are under the direct command
of a 2-star Turkish general. The 3000-5000-man Turkish
Cypriot military is completely integrated into Turkey's
"Peace Forces," and the civilian authorities have no
operational control over these units. The 2000-strong police
force is also directly subordinate to the Turkish army under
this arrangement.

THE MOST RESPECTED INSTITUTION
--------------


5. (SBU) The average Turkish Cypriot has positive feelings
toward the Turkish military. According to pollster Muharrem
Faiz, 88 percent of the people in north Cyprus say the army
is the "most trusted" institution on the island -- a figure
that dwarfs the consistently low popularity of politicians
and "TRNC government" institutions. These feelings are
rooted in the Turkish Cypriot community's historical
experience; they remind anyone who is willing to listen of
the violent oppression they suffered at the hands of the
Greek Cypriot majority prior to the 1974 "Peace Operation,"
and even left-wingers only grudgingly admit that the Turkish
army's treatment of Greek Cypriots during the invasion may
have been less than humane.


6. (SBU) With such prestige, the military can essentially
ignore criticism from the locals. Turkish Cypriot merchants,
for example, routinely complain about cut-rate competition
from duty-free PX stores to no avail. Neither have they
managed to convince the army to procure more than a small
amount of foodstuff on the local economy. The army, which
uses over ten percent of all electricity produced by the
rickety "TRNC" power company, has often been lax in payment
of its utility bills -- drawing only muted protests from
Turkish Cypriot leaders.


7. (C) Even pro-solution figures such a "PM" Talat, who
privately concede that the presence of the Turkish army is an
obstacle to any settlement agreement with the Greek Cypriots,
are hesitant to criticize it in public. With the exception
of the outspoken Mustafa Akinci and his former BDH allies,
Izzet Izcan and Huseyin Angolemli, no Turkish Cypriot
politician is willing to call openly for the removal of
Turkish troops -- partly for fear of antagonizing Ankara, and
partly for fear of alienating voters.

THROWING ITS WEIGHT AROUND
--------------


8. (SBU) The military's uncontested moral authority, to say
nothing of its size and strength, has allowed it to exercise
a powerful role in Turkish Cypriot politics since before
Cyprus independence. Throughout the 50s and 60s, the Turkish
military supplied TMT paramilitary forces with weapons and
support, and had corresponding influence on the selection of
Turkish Cypriot leaders. According to local lore Rauf
Denktash, who shoved former Cyprus VP Fazil Kucuk aside in
the late 1960s, became leader of the Turkish Cypriot
community with the consent and encouragement of the TGS.
From the invasion of 1974, through the declaration of the
"TRNC" in 1983, to the most recent elections in 2003,
political developments in north Cyprus have all taken place
under the watchful eye of Turkish troops.


9. (C) Turkish priorities during that 30-year period were to
consolidate their control over north Cyprus, forcing the
Greek Cypriots to accept the "TRNC" as a fait accomplis.
After 1974, the army facilitated the resettlement of mainland
Turks to Cyprus, doled out contracts to sympathetic local
businessmen, pressured opposition politicians, and supported
a long string of hard-line governments under Rauf Denktash.
This support was not a one-way street; USDAO notes that
Turkish force commanders regularly get promoted after their
service in Cyprus. It is believed that Denktash has used his
deep state connections to reward Turkish generals who were
helpful to him during their tours on the island.


10. (C) As recently as the parliamentary elections of 2003,
the Turkish army (refs A and B) openly intervened on behalf
of the nationalist UBP of Dervis Eroglu and the DP of Serdar
Denktash, Rauf's son. Reports of vote buying, logistical
support to the parties, and open campaigning by Turkish
officers were credible and widespread. One local
businessman, who had a long-standing contract to supply sugar
to the army, told us the military suddenly stopped buying
from him when he started campaigning for a pro-settlement
party in 2003. Rumors persist that there is a military
"blacklist" of companies whose bad politics prevent them from
getting contracts from the army. In 2003, the army also
brought charges against several Kibris newspaper writers for
"defaming and insulting the military" and began proceedings
against them in a military court.


11. (C) Yet after the emergence of the pro-solution
administration of "PM" Talat in January 2004, the Turkish
military toned down its role in politics. The army broke
ranks with Denktash and, perhaps going against the better
judgment of many of its own officers, stayed out of the April
2004 Annan Plan referendum, allowing an overwhelming "yes"
vote. It suspended its charges against the Kibris
journalists, and allowed the "TRNC" to repeal the law which
allowed military courts to try civilians for political
offenses.


12. (C) There have been very few reports of military
interference in this month's parliamentary elections (refs C
and D). During his January visit to the island, Turkish Land
Forces Commander Buyukanit made a careful point of meeting
with leaders from both left and right. A close advisor to
the DP's Serdar Denktash told us that Buyukanit carried a
clear message from the TGS, which he delivered privately to
each party leader: the army would keep its nose out of local
politics.


13. (C) Speculation abounds as to why the army is keeping
such a low profile. One journalist suggested that TGS Chief
Ozkok has succeeded in forcing a more "European" outlook on
the military. Other observers simply believe that the army
has decided to go along (for now, at least) with the AKP
government's goals of a Cyprus settlement and EU membership.
In the absence of military intervention, a more open,
pluralistic political atmosphere is developing in north
Cyprus.

THE LIMITS OF TURKISH CYPRIOT PEOPLE POWER: KEY ARMY EQUITIES
-------------- --------------


14. (C) But Turkish Cypriots know there are limitations to
their newfound political liberty. In a recent meeting with
the Ambassador, Talat privately admitted that his room for
maneuver was very limited. He noted that although he was
allowed autonomy in matters of "administration," at the end
of the day the army could still "control everything."


15. (C) The military has a clear hierarchy of interests. As
Talat alluded, the generals pay little attention to most
day-to-day governance issues, including the budget,
education, economic development and the like. The military's
paramount concern is to retain control over north Cyprus
security, including final authority over security along the
Buffer Zone and continued command over local security forces.
Cognizant of -- and frustrated by -- the military's red
lines, Turkish Cypriot civilian leaders are often unable to
advance policy initiatives they feel would be to the benefit
of their community. For example:

-- Proposals to bring the police under civilian leadership,
while privately supported by almost all political leaders
including Talat and Serdar Denktash, are generally considered
too "radical" to be advocated openly. The BDH is the only
one of the major parties to include an open call
"civilianization" of the police in its party platform.

-- Despite a Turkish Cypriot willingness to proceed with the
opening of additional Green Line checkpoints for civilian
crossings, military footdragging on demining and police
staffing has caused delays and limited the civilian
leadership's flexibility on when and where additional
crossings can be opened.

-- According to Talat and other observers, the Turkish army
has been historically "timid" about its cooperation with the
Committee for Missing Persons, a three-member body set up by
the UN to investigate the fate of people missing since the
violence of 1963-74. Talat seems genuinely interested in
advancing this "human rights issue," but can move no faster
than the military is willing to go. While he says the
Turkish army has become more forthcoming about information
relating to possible mass grave sites in the north, the CMP's
work has yet to bear fruit; one suspected grave proved empty
when excavated last month.


16. (C) Another telling example relates to procedures
regulating Green Line crossing by U.S. Embassy FSNs. In a
recent and highly arbitrary change of practice, the Turkish
Cypriot police began requiring our Greek Cypriot staff to
show extra forms of identification and fill out "visa" forms
when crossing north on Embassy business. Although Turkish
Cypriot civilian authorities (up to and including Talat, "FM"
Serdar Denktash, and the "Minister of the Interior") have
promised to rectify the situation by issuing new orders
governing police procedure, the officers at the checkpoint
continue to harass our FSNs. An "MFA" official privately
intimated that although the civilian authorities can cajole
the police, the cops would not change even their simplest
procedures -- especially relating to the Green Line --
without explicit direction from the military. Our
communications with the Turkish Embassy on this matter have
so far been unsuccessful.


17. (C) What's more, top army brass occasionally lay down
public markers with regard to the Cyprus question. General
Buyukanit's January public declaration that "not one Turkish
soldier" would leave the island without a settlement has
generally been interpreted by Talat's people as a
good-cop-bad-cop message to the Greek Cypriots. Nonetheless,
statements such as this render it virtually impossible for
any Turkish Cypriot civilian leader even to discuss
confidence-building measures involving a drawdown of troops,
the hand-over of Varosha, or other such steps that might be
to their tactical advantage in the future.

COMMENT
--------------


18. (C) In spite of its reflex suspicion of Talat's
ex-communist CTP, the Turkish army has left his "government"
largely alone. It stood out of the way and allowed him to
take power, did not block the community's firm endorsement of
the Annan Plan, has not voiced opposition to the new law that
could eventually lead to the deportation of illegal Turkish
settlers (ref E),and seems willing to let the current
elections unfold without interference. Nonetheless, Turkish
Cypriots know the army retains the ability to run the show
should events unfold in a way contrary to the military's
interest.


19. (C) If settlement talks restart in earnest, it is almost
certain the Turkish Cypriot side will need to make
concessions beyond what was provided for in the Annan Plan.
How much would the army allow to ensure Greek Cypriot
acceptance of a future settlement plan? Would the generals
agree to withdraw all their troops from Cyprus or abandon the
right of intervention? Would they allow the deportation of
significant numbers of Turkish settlers?


20. (C) These questions will not be decided in Cyprus. USDAO
notes the army here strictly adheres to orders from the
mainland; local commanders must get approval from Ankara to
meet with even working-level counterparts, and are unlikely
to show any initiative on their own. Turkish Cypriots will
continue to study how relations between AKP and the TGS
evolve -- and will need firm signals from both that the
military is on board before they offer further concessions
for a settlement. END COMMENT.
KLOSSON