AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALLS ON THE TURKISH

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 002024

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALLS ON THE TURKISH
CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On December 27, Ambassador Schlicher paid
introductory calls on key players in the Turkish Cypriot
leadership --"President" Mehmet Ali Talat, "Prime Minister"
Ferdi Sabit Soyer, and "Foreign Minister" Serdar Denktash --
to discuss the current state of play on the Cyprus issue and
prospects for restarting UN-led negotiations. All three were
clearly downbeat with respect to prospects for new
negotiations. ROC President Papadopoulos was comfortable in
his political position and was intent on keeping the Turkish
Cypriot side under intense pressure. His ultimate goal,
Talat maintained, was to absorb the Turkish Cypriot community
by "osmosis." All agreed that only a major shock to the
Greek Cypriots -- in particular direct flights into Ercan
airport -- would bring Papadopoulos back to the negotiating
table. At the same time, Talat identified Turkey's excessive
influence in the north as the most serious problem facing his
administration. Both Talat and Serdar stressed that, without
parallel moves to ease Turkish Cypriot isolation, they would
not endorse Ankara's opening ports and airports to
ROC-registered ships and planes. Ambassador Schlicher
underscored our appreciation for Turkish Cypriot efforts in
support a settlement and our sympathy for Turkish Cypriot
frustrations. It was essential, however, for the Turkish
Cypriot side to stay the course. Backsliding on pro-solution
policies would make it impossible for the United States to
continue our efforts to alleviate the isolation of the north.
End Summary.

Talat: On The Horns of a Dilemma
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador told "President" Talat that the United
States recognized and appreciated Turkish Cypriot efforts in
support of a settlement to the Cyprus problem. This is why
we had put in place a range of new programs and policies
aimed at easing the isolation of Turkish Cypriots, including:
a sizable assistance effort, more flexibility in issuing
visas, and high-profile meetings with senior USG officials.
We understood Turkish Cypriot frustration, but the leadership
was making the right decisions and it was important to hold
firm to the current course. Moderate rhetoric would help
ensure that the Turkish Cypriot side retained both the moral
high ground and the sympathy of the international community.


3. (C) Talat stressed his dissatisfaction with the European
Union's clumsy handling of the aid and trade package. By
bending over backwards to accommodate the Greek Cypriots, the
Commission had made it impossible for the Turkish Cypriot
side to accept the aid. If the Commission ended up losing
the 120 million Euros, it would be the Greek Cypriot side
that was to blame. Papadopoulos' objective was to keep the
Turkish Cypriots under economic and political pressure in
order to weaken their position at the negotiating table. The
economic situation in the north had improved considerably in
the last few years, but frustration was growing and the
Turkish Cypriot public could see no light at the end of the
tunnel. Greek Cypriots believed they would eventually
succeed in absorbing the Turkish Cypriots through "osmosis."
This was just another word for assimilation and second-class
status. The Turkish Cypriots, Talat insisted, were actually
more "European" and democratic in their mindset than the
Greek Cypriots. The political system in the south, he
declared, was essentially "totalitarian" and the Greek
Cypriot media tightly-controlled.


4. (C) Talat noted that, although Papadopoulos had defied
the will of the international community in rejecting the
Annan Plan, he had paid no price for his rejectionism and,
among international actors, only the United States seemed
concerned at the lack of progress towards a Cyprus
settlement. The Greek Cypriots would need to be "shocked
back to the negotiating table" through serious efforts at
lifting Turkish Cypriot isolation, including most importantly
direct flights to Ercan airport. Talat stressed that,
without real progress on this front, he "would not consent"
to Turkey's opening its ports and airports to Cypriot ships
and planes. Ankara could not take this step without covering
support from the Turkish Cypriot leadership and this would
not be forthcoming as long as the ports in the north remained
under embargo. Talat anticipated that this would lead to a
new crisis between Turkey and the EU sometime in 2006, but
the ports issue was an absolute "redline" for the Turkish
Cypriots.


5. (C) When the Ambassador asked the Turkish Cypriot leader
what he considered the most difficult problem he faced in his
administration, Talat replied with absolute candor that it
was the excessive influence of Ankara. The ECHR had assigned
responsibility for the property issue to Turkey rather than
to the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara's contribution to the
"TRNC" budget ensured Turkey had a say in every decision of
consequence. Talat hurried to clarify that his relationship
with the GOT was not a bad one and he recognized that Turkish
influence could be helpful in pushing difficult legislation
-- like the new property law -- through a reluctant
parliament.

Soyer: Papadopoulos Looking to Kill Annan
--------------


6. (C) In his charmingly fractured English, "Prime Minister"
Soyer reaffirmed for the Ambassador Turkish Cypriot support
for a solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of the
Annan Plan. It was clear, however, that Tassos Papadopoulos
and the Greek Cypriot side were uninterested in sharing power
with Turkish Cypriots on an equal basis. Papadopoulos wanted
to kill the Annan Plan and replace it with something more to
his liking. Only by taking significant steps to ease Turkish
Cypriot isolation could the international community force
Papadopoulos to engage in talks on the basis of the Annan
Plan. As with Talat, the Ambassador stressed our
appreciation for the frustrating and difficult position in
which the Turkish Cypriots found themselves. We were doing
what we could to ease the isolation of the north, but it was
vital that the Turkish Cypriot leadership maintain its
pro-solution orientation.


7. (C) Soyer believed that the Turkish Cypriot "government"
would hold true to its support for a fair settlement. It
took two to tango, however, and Greek Cypriot "paranoia" made
it impossible to cooperate with authorities in the south even
in areas of clear mutual interest. The Turkish Cypriot side
had reached out to Greek Cypriots to coordinate on problems
like avian flu, narcotics trafficking and people smuggling
that required a comprehensive, island-wide approach. The
Greek Cypriot authorities had repeatedly rejected any
cooperation with Turkish Cypriot institutions. Rather, the
Greek Cypriot side was always looking for ways to block
progress. The Astromeritis/Zodhia crossing had only opened
because the Turkish Cypriot side ultimately forced the issue
through unilateral action by declaring their side open for
business. The Turkish Cypriots had tried this approach again
with the Ledra/Lokmaci crossing, although here the results
had been more disappointing. The Ambassador underscored the
importance of reaching agreement on the Ledra crossing and
urged Soyer work closely with UNFICYP on some kind of
compromise.


8. (C) Ambassador noted the importance of promoting
commercial ties between the Turkish Cypriots and the wider
world, including the United States. A U.S. company was
bidding on a public tender for a desalination plant in the
north and we hoped the tender process would be fair and
transparent. It was also important to resolve the issue of
tariff treatment. U.S. goods entered the north on less
favorable terms than European products, which was a
disincentive to trade with the United States. Soyer agreed
that this tariff issue could and should be rectified and
stressed that the "government" had plans to amend the customs
law to give U.S. goods equal treatment.


Serdar: Pessimistic Revisionist
--------------


9. (C) In a characteristically pessimistic mood, "Foreign
Minister" Serdar Denktash told the Ambassador that 2006 would
be a difficult year for both the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey.
The world had turned its back on the Turkish Cypriots and
Papadopoulos had "gotten away with" his "no" vote on the
Annan Plan. (Comment: This was a bit brazen on Serdar's
part, as he himself voted "no" in the referendum and publicly
denigrated the agreement). A "win-win solution," Serdar
maintained, was simply not achievable in the Cyprus context.
Someone was going to lose, and at this point it looked like
the Turkish Cypriots had been earmarked for that role. The
Ambassador urged that Serdar take the long view. Current
circumstances were frustrating and unfair, but the Turkish
Cypriot side had made the right choices and was moving in the
right direction. Serdar suggested that impatience among

Turkish Cypriots was building to the point where the current
approach was no longer sustainable. Support for Talat's CTP
(Serdar himself is DP) was dropping fast and the public had
little hope that things would improve. Meanwhile, confidence
levels on the island were low and prospects for a new UN-led
negotiating effort lower still. "We don't trust the Greek
Cypriots, and they don't trust Turkey," Serdar explained
succinctly. Papadopoulos' goal was to drag the Cyprus issue
out from under the UN umbrella and into the EU. This was
something Turkish Cypriots could never accept.


10. (C) Serdar insisted that the Turkish Cypriot side would
not wait indefinitely for a solution to the Cyprus problem.
As he has in the past, he warned that Turkish Cypriots would
hold onto their pro-solution approach only through the ROC
presidential elections in 2008. After that -- and assuming
no progress toward a solution -- they would have to explore
"other options." The Ambassador cautioned Serdar that these
"other options" were illusory. We had been able to reshape
fundamentally our engagement with the north only because of
the Turkish Cypriot side's commitment to reunification and
reconciliation. If that changed, our policy would almost
certainly have to change as well. It was not in the
interests of Turkish Cypriots to adopt a separatist or
rejectionist approach to the Cyprus issue. In the meantime,
demonstrations of magnanimity and moderation would help keep
Papadopoulos on the defensive.


11. (C) Like Talat, Serdar insisted that the Turkish
Cypriots would fight against Turkey's opening its ports and
airports to ROC-registered traffic without a parallel easing
of restrictions on the use of ports in the north. Without
our agreement, he bragged, the Turkish Grand National
Assembly would never approve opening Turkish ports. Serdar
also made a pitch for direct flights, arguing that an
Ankara-Ercan-Washington route would be commercially viable.
The Greek Cypriots had proven adept at walking back whatever
gains Turkish Cypriot diplomacy produced, including most
notably with Azerbaijan and The Gambia. ROC officials
followed Serdar wherever he went, assiduously undoing
whatever he accomplished on his missions abroad.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) The message from the Turkish Cypriot leadership was
consistent and predictably downbeat. Blue skies
notwithstanding, it always seems to be raining in the north.
Some of this is affected for our benefit. Even the hard-core
pessimists recognize that the Turkish Cypriot standard of
living has been on a sustained upswing. But the sentiments
behind the argument are real enough. Across the board, the
Turkish Cypriots feel themselves abandoned and betrayed by
the international community, particularly the European Union.
They see little prospect for a settlement, or for much of
anything else. While the status quo may be unacceptable, it
is almost certainly sustainable. We will continue to stress
with our Turkish Cypriot interlocutors the importance of a
long-term view and the risks that backsliding on pro-solution
policies would pose to the very real gains they have made
since the welcome end of the Denktash era.
SCHLICHER