KIDS THESE DAYS: WHAT DO GREEK CYPRIOT YOUNG

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 002007

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CY
SUBJECT: KIDS THESE DAYS: WHAT DO GREEK CYPRIOT YOUNG
PEOPLE REALLY WANT?

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schilcher;
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In the April 2004 referendum on the Annan
Plan for a Cyprus settlement, Greek Cypriots in the 18-24 age
group voted "No" by a margin of nine-to-one. Both anecdotal
impressions and polling data lead to the conclusion that, on
balance, young Greek Cypriots take a harder line on the
Cyprus issue than do their parents. They are also less
flexible than their Turkish Cypriot counterparts and less
willing to compromise on the terms of a settlement. Young
people in the south are also generally more conservative.
Why this is and what can be done about it are critical
questions to answer in considering the future of the Cyprus
question. A big part of the problem is undoubtedly the
education system, which is highly politicized and presents a
distinctly one-sided view of recent Cypriot history.
Moreover, young people in Cyprus have no memories of a
unified island with mixed communities. Few have friends on
the other side or a personal connection to the old family
home in the north. We have been speaking to a large number
of young people, educators, academics and journalists about
the attitudes and political inclinations of young people in
Cyprus -- particularly on the Greek Cypriot side -- and what
can be done to ensure that this generation remains committed
to an achievable Cyprus settlement. End Summary.


From the Cradle
--------------


2. (C) In our extensive embassy outreach efforts, we have
learned, to our chagrin, that young audiences are the most
difficult. Greek Cypriot high school and college students
generally take a hard line on the Cyprus issue and have
adopted and built on their parents' anti-American attitudes
to the point of willful ignorance. Available polling data,
including some polls commissioned by us, bear this out. In
the April 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan, more than 90% of
Greek Cypriots in the 18-24 age group voted "NO" to a
settlement package that would have reunified the island and
enabled the majority of refugees to return to their homes.
What comes through most clearly in our conversations with
Greek Cypriot young people is the sense of "injustice" that
colors their perception of the Cyprus dispute and limits
their willingness to compromise. As one student told
Polchief succinctly during a presentation to a political
science class at the University of Cyprus, "we have
international law on our side. We're right. They're wrong.
Justice must be done." If the youth are in fact the future,
there is cause to fear for the future of the Cyprus issue.



3. (C) The politicization of Greek Cypriot youth begins
early. While family attitudes are the most important forces
shaping the political attitudes of the young, the education
system also plays a significant role. School teachers in the
south are notoriously political and largely Greek-nationalist
in orientation. Most of the teachers have studied at
universities in Cyprus or Greece rather than in the UK or the
United States. The available teaching materials are largely
out of date, even by Greek standards, and reflect nationalist
and intolerant sentiments that were more mainstream half a
century ago. Impressionable students are instructed to
prepare projects documenting Turkish atrocities dating back
to the Ottoman period, but with particular attention to the
events of 1974. Greek Cypriot students can recite a list of
Turkish crimes in Cyprus with the ease of an American 8th
grader offering a list of the world's longest rivers. The
school parking lot may be full of BMWs and students may be
dressed in the latest fashions, but a strong streak of
victimization nevertheless runs through the curriculum. A
recent circular from the Ministry of Education instructed
teachers to give special emphasis to "Greek nationalism and
the strengthening of the historical memory of the loss and
enslavement of patriarchal land."


4. (C) Moreover, students are taught that the roots of
Hellenic civilization lie in Periclean Athens rather than
Byzantium and that the Greek ideal represents all that is
great and good in western civilization. One recent
university graduate, Andreas, explained that this ancient
tradition was presented as both an honor and a burden,
something he should strive to live up to, but with the
understanding that he will necessarily fail. This is
obviously not a recipe for compromise and goes a long way
towards explaining the Greek Cypriot sense of residing
precariously at the point of the spear in a Huntington-esque
clash of civilizations. One middle-aged teacher explained
his thinking to us in the following way. "Atilla cannot be
trusted. The Turks inevitably will move south -- either
through war or a Cyprus solution. It is our responsibility
as educators (sic) to ensure our students are prepared."
There is, however, some room for self-criticism. In a recent
Embassy-sponsored poll, 31% of Greek Cypriots agreed with the
statement that the education system plays a negative role in
efforts to reach a Cyprus settlement.


Study War No More
--------------


5. (C) For Greek Cypriot men, 25 months of mandatory
military service is the norm and, for most, represents a
significant formative experience. There are no student
deferments. Even foreign-born men of Cypriot origin are
subject to induction if they visit Cyprus. Learning to hate
the enemy is a part of the Greek Cypriot National Guard
(GCNG) training program, and time in the army clearly hardens
attitudes toward Turkey, Turkish Cypriots, and settlement
efforts. One young man who had recently completed his tour
of service told us that his time in the GCNG was like an
out-of-body experience. He clearly understood that his
emotions were being manipulated by his officers, but it
worked nevertheless, and at least during his military service
he was alienated from his own (progressive) political
beliefs. One factor that might help account for the
extraordinarily high percentage of "no" voters in the 18-24
age group is that many of the men were either current GCNG
soldiers or had recently completed their tour of duty.
Meanwhile, many of the Greek Cypriot students at universities
abroad -- who could reasonably be expected to be on the more
progressive end of the political spectrum -- did not return
to the island to participate in the referendum vote.


6. (C) There is a real question as to the carry-over effect
of military service. For some -- and this is strictly
anecdotal -- two years carrying a rifle in the GCNG seems to
generate a permanent change of attitude with respect to the
other side and the future of a Cyprus settlement. Some, of
course, remain unchanged by the experience. Most young men
seem to experience at least some change in their attitude
towards Turkish Cypriots, but the harder or more negative of
these new emotional leanings seem to lose their edge over
time. In other words, their military service is
transformative, but not necessarily permanent.


The Role of the Church
--------------


7. (C) There is little doubt that Greek Cypriot young people
are considerably more religious and observant than their
Turkish Cypriot counterparts. Moreover, the Cypriot Orthodox
Church is significantly more political than religious
institutions in the north. Even the Greek Cypriot communist
party goes out of its way to establish and maintain close
relations with the Church. AKEL leader Demetris Christofias,
for example, has two portraits on the wall of his party
office -- Vladimir Lenin and an icon of St. George. With a
few exceptions (i.e., the Bishop of Morphou),church leaders
made no secret of their opposition to the Annan Plan. The
Bishop of Kyrenia infamously warned his flock that "yes"
voters were traitors to Cypriot Hellenism and "would not
inherit the kingdom of heaven." Thanassis Tsokkos, leader of
the youth wing of the opposition DISY party, told us that he
saw a clear correlation between "religiosity" and views
toward the Annan Plan, with the more religious members of his
organization being most willing to reject the settlement on
"principle." Ioannis Paifakos, chair of the Classics
Department at the University of Cyprus, believed that the
current incapacity of the Archbishop has further limited the
ability of the Church to compromise and accept less than
absolute victory. History and doctrine predisposed the
Church to hard-line attitudes on the Cyprus issue and only a
strong Archbishop -- notably lacking at this particular
moment -- could push the Church in a different direction.


Don't Go There: Why Bicommunalism Isn't Cool
--------------


8. (C) With the opening of the crossings in April 2003, it
became possible for many young Cypriots to visit the other
side for the first time in their life. As many as half of
those in our key 18-24 demographic have done so, but half of
those again have done so only once or twice. Chrystalleni, a
23-year-old aspiring teacher, told us that she would never
cross north until she could do so "as a free Cypriot" to
reclaim her family home in a village near Morphou. In social
-- if not legal terms -- refugee status is inheritable and
spreads through the population as a dominant gene. In one
recent poll, nearly 60% of young respondents indicated they
were "from refugee families." While it is considered "cool"
among young Turkish Cypriots to go south for a night on the
town, few Greek Cypriots return the favor. The opening of
the crossings has allowed older Cypriots to re-establish
relationships with friends and former neighbors from the
other side, but their children seem to have little interest
in building new ones.


9. (C) The exception to this seems to be those young people
have made an affirmative choice to participate in bicommunal
activities, including those supported by U.S. funding.
Participants are universally positive about their
experiences, and we have clear evidence of lasting ties being
forged between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot young
people. Committed bicommunalists represent a very small
percentage of the population, and program implementers must
be careful to avoid drawing repeatedly from the same well.

Attitudes in the North
--------------


10. (C) Turkish Cypriot youth are, in general, less rigid and
less doctrinal than Greek Cypriot youth. It is difficult,
however, to identify the reasons why this so. A professor at
Eastern Mediterranean University described Turkish Cypriot
young people as "lost," trapped between Turkish and Cypriot
identities without the ability to accept association with
either one as a natural fit. Turkish Cypriot youth simply do
not feel "Turkish" the way that Greek Cypriot young people
feel "Greek." Like it or not (and they clearly do not),
Turkish Cypriot young people also understand that they are
the ones most disadvantaged by the status quo. More than one
young person in the north has told us that he or she voted
"yes" to the plan not because it would reunify the island but
because it represented change. One young academic, Dr. Aysel
Yontar, told us she supported the Annan Plan even as she
expected it would ultimately fall apart. Cyprus' entry into
the EU has brought the outside world tantalizingly close, but
there is still a Greek Cypriot bouncer controlling the velvet
rope at the entrance. Most of all, young people in the north
are acutely conscious of the attitudes of Greek Cypriots, and
bristle at the breezy dismissal of their aspirations.
Turkish Cypriot young people are largely of the view that
Greek Cypriots are looking, selfishly, to protect their
privileged position and do not want to share the fruits of
sovereignty with their poor cousins in the north.


Burying the Past
--------------


11. (C) Nearly everyone working for a solution of the Cyprus
problem is concerned about the attitudes of the young,
particularly on the Greek Cypriot side. The nature of the
problem seems clear enough. The $64,000 question (CYP 30,976
at today's rate of exchange) is: "What can be done about
it?" Embassy-supported bicommunal activities are a start and
seem to be making a difference, but reach only a limited
segment of the population. Reforming the education systems
on both sides of the Green Line remains a high priority. We
have heard from more than one conflict resolution expert who
has visited the island that, while the attitudes of the young
are often more hard-line than those of their elders, they are
typically easier to change. We have put considerable thought
and energy into programs aimed specifically at the teaching
of history and we intend to reinforce those efforts.
Changing the attitudes of even a single teacher has important
ripple effects through an entire community, particularly in
terms of efforts to reach young people outside of the major
urban centers. The same could be said of programs aimed at
improving the quality of teaching materials. There is no
escaping the fact that this generation of young people will
one day grow up and take the reins of power in Cyprus.
Whether or not the Cyprus problem is resolved by that point,
the attitudes of today's youth will go a long way toward
shaping the realities of the island's future.
SCHLICHER