Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NICOSIA1617
2005-10-04 13:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

"AND FOR MY NEXT TRICK...": REVISITING THE CYPRUS

Tags:  PREL PGOV CY 
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O 041316Z OCT 05
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4897
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 001617 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY
SUBJECT: "AND FOR MY NEXT TRICK...": REVISITING THE CYPRUS
ISSUE AFTER OCTOBER 3

Classified By: CDA Jane Zimmerman; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 001617

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY
SUBJECT: "AND FOR MY NEXT TRICK...": REVISITING THE CYPRUS
ISSUE AFTER OCTOBER 3

Classified By: CDA Jane Zimmerman; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Although the end result of the EU's October
3 decision on Turkey was positive, the tortuous negotiations
on the framework and the "counter declaration" highlight the
implications that the unresolved Cyprus dispute has for U.S.
interests across a wide range of issues. While the prospects
for a new round of Cyprus talks appear dim, we should take
concerted steps now both to enhance the prospects of success
for any future negotiations and to ensure minimum spillover
into other issue areas. Our immediate goals should include:
building bridges between the two communities; reinforcing
Turkish Cypriot support for reunification; and promoting a
more constructive Greek Cypriot position on the settlement
package. In the absence of negotiations on a comprehensive
settlement, we may want to try to broker some accommodation
on the parallel issues of boycotts and embargoes that will
advance U.S. interests in nonproliferation and enhanced
NATO-EU cooperation. Meanwhile, we should work to deepen our
dialogue with Nicosia on issues that go beyond the Cyprus
problem where we have shared interests. These include
counterterrorism, nonproliferation and UN reform. End
Summary.

A Fresh Look
--------------


2. (C) Now that the contentious October 3 EU decision to
begin accession negotiations with Turkey is behind us, it is
worth taking another look at the fundamentals of the Cyprus
issue and considering afresh what steps the United States,
the EU, the UN, and other key actors can take to both advance
the prospects for an eventual settlement and minimize the
negative consequences of the current impasse. Although the
end result of the October 3 decision was a success, the
tortuous negotiations on the framework and the "counter
declaration" regarding Ankara's obligations towards the ROC
made clear that the Cyprus problem will continue to spill
over into other issue areas and complicate key aspects of our
regional agenda. That the Cyprus dispute remains a serious
drag on Turkey's EU aspirations is obvious. Cyprus has
already signaled its intention to turn Turkey's ratification
of the customs union protocol into another mini-crisis for
the EU if Ankara insists on including its own July

declaration in the package the government will forward to the
Grand National Assembly for approval. Equally, the feud
between Turkey and Cyprus undermines our efforts to find a
modus vivendi for EU-NATO cooperation, restricts the progress
of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, and undercuts
cooperation between the EU and key nonproliferation
mechanisms such as MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement. If
the Cyprus problem cannot be "solved," we will need to find a
way to manage it more effectively.

Quo Vadis: Prospects for New Talks
--------------


3. (C) Although President Papadopoulos and other senior GOC
officials regularly claim that UN SYG Annan is on the verge
of launching an initiative on Cyprus, the prospects for a new
round of talks are -- at best -- dim. Following the last
round of UN "pulse-taking" in June, then U/S Kieran
Prendergast reported to the Security Council that the gap
between the positions of the two sides was wide and growing
and the level of mutual confidence low and falling.
Moreover, he described the proposed Greek Cypriot list of
changes to the Annan Plan as "daunting." Prendergast himself
told us that he put considerable thought into his choice of
adjectives. It is a characteristic understatement.
Papadopoulos continues to believe that Greek Cypriot
interests are best served by shifting the locus of action
from the UN to the EU and using Turkey's own European
ambitions to leverage unilateral concessions out of Ankara.
Nicosia's experiences last December and in the run-up to
October 3 have exposed the shortcomings of this approach, but
Papadopoulos has not lost faith in the longer-run efficacy of
EU leverage.


4. (C) If Papadopoulos is in no hurry for a quick fix to the
Cyprus problem, neither is Ankara. The GOT has been spending
down the credits it accumulated with its support for the
Annan Plan in April 2004 and does not yet seem to understand
that Turkey's "yes" is a depreciating asset. Among the
principal actors, the only party eager for a resumption of
talks is the Turkish Cypriot side. Turkish Cypriot leader
Mehmet Ali Talat makes no secret of his frustration and
impatience. He won power on a pro-solution, pro-settlement
platform but cannot deliver without Greek Cypriot
cooperation. This also explains Talat's single-minded focus
on easing Turkish Cypriot isolation. Steps in this direction

would not only constitute a political victory for
pro-solution forces in the north, they would also -- in
Talat's view -- put pressure on the Greek Cypriot side to
adopt a more constructive and flexible approach. It is
unlikely, however, that Talat will get the chance to test
this hypothesis. We have already put in play most of what we
have to offer and the Europeans are constrained in their
ability to reach out to the Turkish Cypriots by Nicosia's
membership in the club. The EU's inability to agree on a
package of trade and aid measures for the Turkish Cypriots,
for example, reflects GOC resistance to any "upgrading" of
the Turkish Cypriot administration or any kind of direct
relationship between the EU and Turkish Cypriot "officials."



5. (C) Under these circumstances, Annan is understandably
reluctant to reengage on the Cyprus issue and we should not
push him to do so. There are, however, things we can do to
ensure that when and if a new round of Cyprus talks do begin
they have a realistic chance to succeed. Our goals should
include:

-- Building bridges between the two communities;
-- Reinforcing Turkish Cypriot support for reunification; and,
-- Promoting a more constructive Greek Cypriot position.


6. (C) We are already hard at work on all three objectives.
Our traditional bicommunal programs support the first goal,
as do our newer efforts aimed at matchmaking between Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot businesses. We have also had
some success in promoting the opening of more crossing
points, encouraging progress in the Committee on Missing
Persons, de-mining, and pressing the Turkish Cypriot side to
allow Orthodox religious services in the north and to allow
access by preservation experts to medieval monuments in the
Nicosia Buffer Zone. With respect to support for
pro-solution Turkish Cypriots, the $30.5 million Cyprus
Partnership for Economic Growth (CyPEG) has been successfully
launched with three long-term contracts in place. These
three contracts are focused on enterprise development and
banking; water and energy use efficiency; and environmental
protection. Unfortunately, Greek Cypriots are inclined to
look at both CyPEG and our bicommunal programs as threatening
or even as "punishment" for their opposition to the Annan
Plan. It is, therefore, important for the Department to seek
relief from the implications of the Nethercutt Amendment in
Appropriations Acts for FY 2006 and future years so that USG
bicommunal programs do not have to exclude activities that
benefit the Government of Cyprus.


7. (C) The third goal, pressing the Greek Cypriot side to
adopt a more constructive position, is both the most
important and the most difficult. We cannot be too
aggressive in pursuing this goal as just the hint of American
pressure is enough to rally even Papadopoulos' most committed
opponents to his banner. Our best hope here is that a
prolonged period of UN inaction will strain the President's
relationship with AKEL, his instinctively pro-solution
partner in government. Parliamentary elections scheduled for
May 2006 will be a critical bellwether of the price AKEL will
pay for supporting Papadopoulos. While Anglo-American
pressure is relatively easy for Papadopoulos to discount and
shrug-off, pressure from fellow Hellenes is harder to ignore.
A combination of pressure from the inside (AKEL) and the
outside (Athens) will be necessary if Papadopoulos is to be
convinced to adopt a more conciliatory approach to the UN and
his Turkish Cypriot compatriots.

Quo Vadis Redux: What Do We Do Without Talks?
-------------- -


8. (C) As a new round of Cyprus talks appears unlikely at
any point in the foreseeable future, we need to develop a
coherent strategy for managing the spillover effects of this
exasperating problem. Although the parenthetical language
added at Cypriot insistence to paragraph 7 of the negotiating
framework nearly derailed the entire process, it is in our
interest that Ankara stop blackballing Cyprus in all
international organizations as a matter of principle. This
would effectively "de-fang" one of the most potent arguments
the Greek Cypriots have in pressing for the EU to adopt a
hard-line approach with Ankara. Moreover, bringing Cyprus
into groups such as the MTCR or the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation forum on merit would be good for the work of the
groups in question and eliminate a potentially serious point
of friction between key international organizations and the
European Union. Turkey's adopting a more flexible approach
to engaging the ROC internationally might also open up
possibilities on the EU-NATO front where Ankara's insistence
on a strict reading of Berlin-Plus requirements are

handicapping efforts to promote cooperation. Even though
Turkey is now obligated "to progressively align" its policies
on membership in international organizations with those of
the EU, it is unlikely that Ankara will ease up on Cyprus
without some kind of quid for the Turkish Cypriots. We could
look at ways the Greek Cypriot side might loosen certain of
the restrictions in place on -- for example -- Turkish
Cypriot participation in international sporting events in
exchange for Ankara's acquiescence to Nicosia's joining the
MTCR. This is obviously not easy and the odds of success are
not high, but the potential payoff is significant and it is
worth taking a serious look at the possibilities.

Meanwhile...
--------------


9. (C) We must not lose sight of the fact that Cyprus is a
country, not a problem. As a member state of the European
Union, it is now part of the vaunted transatlantic
relationship and we should look for opportunities both to
broaden and deepen our cooperation with Nicosia on issues
that have little or nothing to do with the island's division.
Our cooperation on counterterrorism and nonproliferation has
generally been excellent. Cyprus was the first EU state to
sign a PSI shipboarding agreement with United States. We
cooperate well and closely on anti-money laundering efforts
and terrorist financing. We should work to build on these
areas of cooperation and keep our differences over the Cyprus
issue separate and apart. One area where we should put
pressure on the government is the GOC's unwillingness to
crack down on the activities of Kongra Gel/KGK on Cyprus.
The island is both a base for fundraising operations and a
key transit point for KGK fighters. The Greek Cypriots are
ambivalent about the KGK, and there is a certain "enemy of my
enemy" mentality that reinforces the authorities natural
tendencies to passivity. Getting the GOC to do more about
Kongra Gel will be a high priority for the Embassy's
Counterterrorism Working Group.


10. (C) We are also working with the GOC to support U.S.
policy on UN reform. This is an area in which FM Iacovou is
knowledgeable, interested, and generally right-thinking. We
intend to raise the profile of this issue in our dialogue
with the GOC not because Nicosia is particularly influential
in the UN system but because it is an area of considerable
commonality of view. In trying to get beyond the Cyprus
problem, we will need to emphasize points of agreement and
minimize areas of intractable disagreement. Hopefully, we
can leverage cooperation on UN reform into broader
cooperation on a range of regional and global concerns.
Nicosia's decision to launch a new aid program -- capitalized
at $5-6 million a year -- will also generate new
opportunities to work with the GOC in coordinating our
response to humanitarian crises, particularly in Africa.


11. (C) Cyprus' role in the Middle East remains largely one
of potential, but we will continue to look for ways to engage
the GOC constructively in the BMENA initiative. The Cypriots
do have good contacts with the Palestinian leadership and GOC
officials are frequent visitors to Damascus, Beirut and
Tehran. At a minimum, more regular consultation with the GOC
on developments in the Middle East should encourage Nicosia
to take a more active role in regional affairs. Cyprus likes
to bill itself as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East
and a logical home for multinationals looking to invest in
the region. While it is not at all clear that the corporate
world feels the need for a bridgehead, we should seek to
capitalize on Nicosia's own self-image to promote BMENA
objectives.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) It is easy to despair when considering the
prospects for a Cyprus settlement. The Cyprus problem here
is like the weather. Everybody talks about it, but nobody
does anything about it. Moreover, time is the enemy of a
solution. Without a settlement, the vectors in the relevant
variables are almost all negative, including: demographic
and political trends, the pace of development of disputed
properties, growing cynicism and indifference in the south,
and impatience and frustration in the north. To the extent
possible, therefore, we want to liberate U.S. policy towards
Cyprus from the anchor of the Cyprus problem itself. Cyprus
is no longer (and truthfully never really was) a single-issue
country. EU accession has only confirmed and accelerated
this trend. While this development does little to help us
solve the Cyprus problem, it does create considerable
incentive for us to get beyond the problem and advance our
shared goals in the many areas where we can cooperate
meaningfully with Nicosia.

ZIMMERMAN