Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI997
2005-02-08 12:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:
NEW NSA SIGNALS COMMITMENT TO US-INDIA
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000997
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2015
TAGS: PREL ETTC PTER BG NP IN PK US
SUBJECT: NEW NSA SIGNALS COMMITMENT TO US-INDIA
PARTNERSHIP, RAISES CONCERN ABOU...
SUBJECT: NEW NSA SIGNALS COMMITMENT TO US-INDIA PARTNERSHIP, RAISES CONCERN ABOUT ""TALIBANIZATION"" OF BANGLADESH
REF: NEW DELHI 922
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000997
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2015
TAGS: PREL ETTC PTER BG NP IN PK US
SUBJECT: NEW NSA SIGNALS COMMITMENT TO US-INDIA
PARTNERSHIP, RAISES CONCERN ABOU...
SUBJECT: NEW NSA SIGNALS COMMITMENT TO US-INDIA PARTNERSHIP, RAISES CONCERN ABOUT ""TALIBANIZATION"" OF BANGLADESH
REF: NEW DELHI 922
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: In his first meeting with the Ambassador since his elevation as National Security Adviser, MK Narayanan identified progress in US-India relations as one of the three or four top priorities that the PM has tasked him to focus upon. Although Narayanan was uninformed about Phase 2 of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (PolCouns briefed in detail),the NSA understood the importance of PMO involvement to maintaining forward momentum, including on the NSSP export control benchmarks. Narayanan also welcomed the Ambassador's proposal to stay in close touch on our respective regional policies, relating how King Gyanendra had explicitly assured Prime Minister Singh in a January telephone call that there would be no Palace move against the civilian government. The NSA was typically preoccupied with India's eastern neighbors, warning of creeping ""Talibanization"" in Bangladesh and leadership splits in Burma. On Kashmir, Narayanan assessed that violence is ""now at one of its lowest levels in 15 years, with a vibrant grassroots democracy."" But he also warned that this progress is ""fragile and cannot be taken for granted."" In a telling reflection of the NSA's place in the national security hierarchy, Narayanan mentioned on two issues the need to check with the Foreign Ministry before getting back to us, but also emphasized that he, more than most, is attuned to the political realities of coalition government. End Summary.
2. (C) The Ambassador used a February 7 meeting with recently-named NSA MK Narayanan to review major issues on our bilateral agenda and to seek a better sense of where Narayanan will fit into the new national security team.
Narayanan continues to occupy the same tastefully decorated office he used as internal security adviser, a few steps down the hall from the PM's South Block office, but the stacks of files on his desk and credenza had grown visibly since the last time we saw him there. Responding to the Ambassador's opening presentation, Narayanan explained that Manmohan Singh had identified progress in US-India relations as one of the three or four top priorities that he expected the new NSA to focus upon. In this context, he was up to speed on issues including the Boeing civil aircraft tender (he noted the importance of the President's phone call) and discussion of a possible Presidential visit later this year. Although familiar with the broad outlines of our Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) Narayanan was unbriefed on the Phase 2 requirements or the status of Phase 1 implementation.
PolCouns briefed in detail on the Phase 2 quid-pro-quos, reinforcing the Ambassador's hope that the GOI will quickly build an interagency consensus for the required export control legislation. Narayanan asked specifically about the division of NSSP responsibilities between State and NSC, sharing his sense that White House (and PMO) backing had been key to getting us this far.
Nepal
--------------
3. (C) The Ambassador noted with concern the pattern of insurgency and failing governance that seems to be emerging in much of India's periphery, and flagged the need for us to coordinate closely, including through intelligence and C/T channels. Honing in on Nepal, Narayanan described King Gyanendra as an ""enigma,"" whose declarations the GOI is no longer prepared to believe. To explain this point, the NSA described a January conversation in which the King conveyed to the PM his decision to postpone a long-anticipated visit to New Delhi. Asked explicitly whether the Palace was ""planning something,"" the King said no. These Palace reassurances were conveyed again in late January, so that now, Narayanan added, whatever the King says ""we will take with a ton of salt."" Echoing the Foreign Secretary (reftel),Narayanan expressed concern about Chinese efforts to exploit the crisis in Kathmandu for bilateral advantage, and was pleased that the US had joined India in demarching Beijing on the need to oppose the King's action.
4. (C) Looking beyond the immediate situation in Kathmandu, Narayanan described a deep crisis of governance, with the political parties marginalized, the King hurting democracy and a crown prince who is a ""loon."" ""We can starve the RNA,"" Narayanan noted, but what if that just ""strengthens the Maoists?"" Narayanan said he did not anticipate any changes in the current GOI position, but asked rhetorically how we should deal with the Maoists -- pointing to the fact that the Palace writ now extends only to Kathmandu, and not beyond.
Bangladesh/Burma
--------------
5. (C) Turning to Bangladesh, the NSA described with concern what he called a BDG ""plan to decimate Awami League leaders"" adding that this ""is not something we can accept as part of their system."" He argued that Jamat Islami is now firmly entrenched in rural Bangladesh, warning of what he termed the creeping ""Talibanization"" of that country. PolCouns pressed for better US-India information sharing in this area, prompting Narayanan to promise to check with the MEA on how our dialogue might be intensified. In addition to spill over effects from Bangladesh, Narayanan was also concerned by what he called the ""apparent divergence"" within the leadership in Burma, and the risk that India could find itself surrounded ""by states which are collapsing.""
Kashmir
--------------
6. (C) The Ambassador raised Kashmir, asking about conditions of governance there. Narayanan was cautiously upbeat, reporting that ""violence is now at one of its lowest levels in 15 years, with a vibrant grassroots democracy."" But he also warned that this progress is ""fragile and cannot be taken for granted."" (Other Pakistan topics septel). Concluding this SA overview, Narayanan offered to pursue the idea of an intensified regional dialogue that addresses the issues in a less piecemeal manner.
Military Sales
--------------
7. (C) The meeting wraped-up with a review of military sales issues, building on Narayanan's discussion earlier that day with a delegation from the US-India Business Council headed by Tom Pickering and Joe Ralston. The Ambassador cited the strong US delegation at Aero-India as evidence of the US intention to play in a big way in the Indian military sales area. Narayanan -- who spoke warmly of his past relationships with Ambassador Pickering and General Ralston
-- described the US as ""the most important player in the market"" with a diverse range of offerings. Nonetheless, Narayanan said, ""we have a nagging feeling about reliability."" The Ambassador argued that US companies are well positioned to address the Indian interest in co-production, and underlined that the climate for addressing reliability issues has totally changed in the US.
MULFORD
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2015
TAGS: PREL ETTC PTER BG NP IN PK US
SUBJECT: NEW NSA SIGNALS COMMITMENT TO US-INDIA
PARTNERSHIP, RAISES CONCERN ABOU...
SUBJECT: NEW NSA SIGNALS COMMITMENT TO US-INDIA PARTNERSHIP, RAISES CONCERN ABOUT ""TALIBANIZATION"" OF BANGLADESH
REF: NEW DELHI 922
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: In his first meeting with the Ambassador since his elevation as National Security Adviser, MK Narayanan identified progress in US-India relations as one of the three or four top priorities that the PM has tasked him to focus upon. Although Narayanan was uninformed about Phase 2 of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (PolCouns briefed in detail),the NSA understood the importance of PMO involvement to maintaining forward momentum, including on the NSSP export control benchmarks. Narayanan also welcomed the Ambassador's proposal to stay in close touch on our respective regional policies, relating how King Gyanendra had explicitly assured Prime Minister Singh in a January telephone call that there would be no Palace move against the civilian government. The NSA was typically preoccupied with India's eastern neighbors, warning of creeping ""Talibanization"" in Bangladesh and leadership splits in Burma. On Kashmir, Narayanan assessed that violence is ""now at one of its lowest levels in 15 years, with a vibrant grassroots democracy."" But he also warned that this progress is ""fragile and cannot be taken for granted."" In a telling reflection of the NSA's place in the national security hierarchy, Narayanan mentioned on two issues the need to check with the Foreign Ministry before getting back to us, but also emphasized that he, more than most, is attuned to the political realities of coalition government. End Summary.
2. (C) The Ambassador used a February 7 meeting with recently-named NSA MK Narayanan to review major issues on our bilateral agenda and to seek a better sense of where Narayanan will fit into the new national security team.
Narayanan continues to occupy the same tastefully decorated office he used as internal security adviser, a few steps down the hall from the PM's South Block office, but the stacks of files on his desk and credenza had grown visibly since the last time we saw him there. Responding to the Ambassador's opening presentation, Narayanan explained that Manmohan Singh had identified progress in US-India relations as one of the three or four top priorities that he expected the new NSA to focus upon. In this context, he was up to speed on issues including the Boeing civil aircraft tender (he noted the importance of the President's phone call) and discussion of a possible Presidential visit later this year. Although familiar with the broad outlines of our Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) Narayanan was unbriefed on the Phase 2 requirements or the status of Phase 1 implementation.
PolCouns briefed in detail on the Phase 2 quid-pro-quos, reinforcing the Ambassador's hope that the GOI will quickly build an interagency consensus for the required export control legislation. Narayanan asked specifically about the division of NSSP responsibilities between State and NSC, sharing his sense that White House (and PMO) backing had been key to getting us this far.
Nepal
--------------
3. (C) The Ambassador noted with concern the pattern of insurgency and failing governance that seems to be emerging in much of India's periphery, and flagged the need for us to coordinate closely, including through intelligence and C/T channels. Honing in on Nepal, Narayanan described King Gyanendra as an ""enigma,"" whose declarations the GOI is no longer prepared to believe. To explain this point, the NSA described a January conversation in which the King conveyed to the PM his decision to postpone a long-anticipated visit to New Delhi. Asked explicitly whether the Palace was ""planning something,"" the King said no. These Palace reassurances were conveyed again in late January, so that now, Narayanan added, whatever the King says ""we will take with a ton of salt."" Echoing the Foreign Secretary (reftel),Narayanan expressed concern about Chinese efforts to exploit the crisis in Kathmandu for bilateral advantage, and was pleased that the US had joined India in demarching Beijing on the need to oppose the King's action.
4. (C) Looking beyond the immediate situation in Kathmandu, Narayanan described a deep crisis of governance, with the political parties marginalized, the King hurting democracy and a crown prince who is a ""loon."" ""We can starve the RNA,"" Narayanan noted, but what if that just ""strengthens the Maoists?"" Narayanan said he did not anticipate any changes in the current GOI position, but asked rhetorically how we should deal with the Maoists -- pointing to the fact that the Palace writ now extends only to Kathmandu, and not beyond.
Bangladesh/Burma
--------------
5. (C) Turning to Bangladesh, the NSA described with concern what he called a BDG ""plan to decimate Awami League leaders"" adding that this ""is not something we can accept as part of their system."" He argued that Jamat Islami is now firmly entrenched in rural Bangladesh, warning of what he termed the creeping ""Talibanization"" of that country. PolCouns pressed for better US-India information sharing in this area, prompting Narayanan to promise to check with the MEA on how our dialogue might be intensified. In addition to spill over effects from Bangladesh, Narayanan was also concerned by what he called the ""apparent divergence"" within the leadership in Burma, and the risk that India could find itself surrounded ""by states which are collapsing.""
Kashmir
--------------
6. (C) The Ambassador raised Kashmir, asking about conditions of governance there. Narayanan was cautiously upbeat, reporting that ""violence is now at one of its lowest levels in 15 years, with a vibrant grassroots democracy."" But he also warned that this progress is ""fragile and cannot be taken for granted."" (Other Pakistan topics septel). Concluding this SA overview, Narayanan offered to pursue the idea of an intensified regional dialogue that addresses the issues in a less piecemeal manner.
Military Sales
--------------
7. (C) The meeting wraped-up with a review of military sales issues, building on Narayanan's discussion earlier that day with a delegation from the US-India Business Council headed by Tom Pickering and Joe Ralston. The Ambassador cited the strong US delegation at Aero-India as evidence of the US intention to play in a big way in the Indian military sales area. Narayanan -- who spoke warmly of his past relationships with Ambassador Pickering and General Ralston
-- described the US as ""the most important player in the market"" with a diverse range of offerings. Nonetheless, Narayanan said, ""we have a nagging feeling about reliability."" The Ambassador argued that US companies are well positioned to address the Indian interest in co-production, and underlined that the climate for addressing reliability issues has totally changed in the US.
MULFORD