VZCZCXRO7628 OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDE DE RUEHNE #9758/01 3620845 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 280845Z DEC 05 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7921 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9414 RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0713 RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 0527 RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 0167 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0532 RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0105 RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 9439 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0383 RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 009758 |
1. (S) Summary: A/DCM and Poloff delivered Ref A demarche to MEA officials, who promised to provide the additional information to concerned GOI agencies and report the status to us at an early date. New Delhi remains concerned by Ref C decision to sanction Indian entities for INPA violations, particularly the Sabero case, where the GOI feels it and Sabero cooperated to the fullest extent possible. The MEA has not yet decided on its public response to the sanctions announcement. End summary. Mayurakshi Case -------------------------- 2. (S) A/DCM and Poloff, meeting with MEA Joint Secretary (Disarmament and International Security Affairs) Hamid Ali Rao and Deputy Secretary (DISA) Naveen Srivastava on December 28, delivered Ref A talking points and emphasized that Mayurakshi officials may attempt to conceal evidence of planned transfers of controlled equipment to Iran now that they are aware of USG interest in the shipment. We also passed on BIS documentation proving Mayurakshi's misrepresentation of the intended end-user. Srivastava replied that he would convey the additional information on Mayurakshi to GOI agencies investigating the transaction, and undertook to provide us with a status update as soon as feasible. Srivastava also noted that re-export of both the AHRS and gyroscopes would fall under India's new export controls. Sabero Sanctions -------------------------- 3. (S) Rao expressed the GOI's displeasure with Ref C decision to sanction Indian entities Sabero and Sandhya Organics, and emphasized New Delhi's belief that with respect to the Sabero case, both the GOI and Sabero had done everything possible to respond to USG requests, including Sabero's voluntary decision to desist from further transactions with the Iranian entities. Echoing Foreign Secretary Saran's comments in Washington, Rao lamented that SIPDIS the Administration had not acknowledged the GOI's cooperation. This cooperation went beyond anything justified under Indian law or international regimes, Rao reiterated, adding "we cooperated, and the company cooperated" by stopping further exports after the request. "How do we approach the company now," he complained, when the US imposed sanctions after the company acted on the GOI's behest? 4. (S) Rao further noted that the transaction triggering sanctions was not illegal under Indian law at the time, nor would it be illegal prima facie under current law. The Sabero transaction could fall under catch-all provisions of the new WMD law, but that would require more detailed information on the Iranian end-user than the USG had provided in the Sabero case, he continued. The Sabero discussions in 2003 had ended with the GOI asking for further information to provide a legal basis for Indian action, but the US did not respond, Rao recalled. Srivastava pointed out that without more detailed information, the GOI would not be able to defend any actions to block the shipments under the catch-all provisions if the company challenged it in court. "We would lose that case," he observed, and set a bad precedent for future export control actions. 5. (S) After A/DCM again encouraged the GOI to focus on the NEW DELHI 00009758 002 OF 002 positive working relationship that led to rescission of sanctions on Dr. Surendra (Ref B), Rao responded that MEA had not yet determined what type of public response to the sanctions may be forthcoming. However, he worried, the sanctions announcement could provide a "cudgel" to the US "non-proliferation lobby" opposed to the July 18 nuclear agreement, which would argue that India's non-proliferation record is not as good as claimed. Srivastava noted that INPA procedures provide for waivers, and requested that the USG consider waiving the Sabero sanctions in light of the firm's cooperation. Rao further suggested USG review of the case of YSR Prasad (sanctioned along with Surendra), whose trips to Iran had been "under IAEA aegis," and therefore should not trigger sanctions, he asserted. Comment: Damage Control -------------------------- 6. (S) This is not the first time that the GOI has expressed its frustration with INPA sanctions, as New Delhi believes that even after taking steps that the US has requested to block transfers, Indian entities are nonetheless the subject of punitive sanctions. In this context, Srivastava's request for consideration of a waiver is an attempt to distinguish Sabero for its voluntary cooperation. We will continue to work with MEA interlocutors to find the best way to manage the public reaction to this sanctions announcement to minimize its impact on the broader, cooperative engagement on non-proliferation. 7. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) BLAKE |