FS SARAN GIVES AMBASSADOR MORIARTY READOUT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 008750

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015
TAGS: PREL PBTS PGOV MOPS ECON IN
SUBJECT: FS SARAN GIVES AMBASSADOR MORIARTY READOUT OF
PM-KING TALK AT DHAKA

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. Summary (C) In a 16 November meeting, Indian Foreign
Secretary Saran and visiting Ambassador Moriarty discussed

SIPDIS
the worrying political climate in Nepal. The Ambassador
described options for increasing pressure on the King to
reach out to Nepalese political parties to counter growing
Maoist influence and promote a multi-party democracy in the
Kingdom. Saran relayed the substance of a meeting between
Prime Minister Singh and the Nepalese King at the SAARC
Summit (strictly protect) during which Singh underlined
India's support for a multi-party democracy and pressed for
outreach to the parties. During the discussion, the King
acknowledged the failure of his February 1 seizure of power
and lobbied for more active support of his position from
India. Saran was cautious about the King's intentions,
noting that his words often do not match his actions, and
agreed with us on the need for dramatic action to break the
political stalemate. End Summary.

On the Ground Realities
--------------


2. (SBU) In a November 16 meeting with Foreign Secretary
Saran, visiting Ambassador Moriarty relayed his
"ground-truth" perspective that the Maoists were the only
group in Nepal making any progress. The political parties
were desperate to get back into the rural areas to organize
pressure against the King, but needed Maoist permission to do
so. Moreover, despite the cease-fire, Maoist extortion and
abduction continued at high rates. For his part, the King
has offered no plans to counter Maoist moves, and it is
unclear when he might do so. Consequently, increased
external pressure or persuasion was necessary to convince the
King to make a dramatic political gesture to break the
stalemate. One possibility would be for the King to call for
an internationally-monitored bilateral cease-fire. The
Maoists might well reject such a proposal, in which case
domestic and international opinion would swing violently
against them. If they agreed to an effective, monitored
cease-fire, HMGN would be viewed as the party that had
brought peace to the countryside. More importantly, if the
Maoists were no longer able to use terror, their influence in
Nepal's villages would decline dramatically; if they were no
longer able to obtain funds through extortion, many cadre
would leave the Maoists.

PM Singh Efforts to Dialogue
--------------


3. (C) After agreeing that the King had to take dramatic
steps to begin the process of reconciliation with the
parties, Foreign Secretary Saran noted with dismay the
discrepancy between what the King says and what the King
does. Saran went on to relay the substance of the one-on-one
meeting between Prime Minister Singh and the King on November
13 in Dhaka on the margins of the SAARC summit. Singh told
the King that the latter's actions of February 1, 2005 to
concentrate power in the Monarchy were obviously not working;
the King's request for three months to chart the way forward
had turned into 10 months, with no end in sight. Singh said
the security situation in Nepal had deteriorated and that
India was concerned that the worsening economic situation
might lead to the collapse of Nepal's economy. In light of
these troubling trends, Singh asked whether the King had a
"Plan B".


4. (C) The King acknowledged the failure of his February
palace putsch, but explained that he was forced to react in a
time of crisis. The King said he remained committed to
multi-party democracy. However, he was highly critical of
Nepal's political parties and warned that multi-party
democracy in Nepal could not be a carbon copy of democracy in
India due to historical differences between the two
countries. He said he felt India was treating Nepal
insensitively and that he wanted India's support. The King
further insisted that India had no right to tell him who
should lead a multi-party government.

The Indian Position
--------------


5. (C) In reply, FM Saran noted, PM Singh had told the King
that political parties in any democracy had short-comings;
one must live with those short-comings and recognize that the
voters would decide who was entitled to lead their country.
It was the voters' responsibility to decide between the good
and the bad. Singh had also stressed that there could be no
multi-party democracy without political parties. He
reassured the King that India did not expect democracy in
Nepal to mimic its own but that the creation of a democracy
had to follow certain tenets, which included allowing the
evolution of political parties. He said that neither India
nor the King should have a role in this process. Singh
pointed out that the King's actions were endangering the
Monarchy. Singh underscored the necessity of reaching out to
the political parties and bringing them into the fold to
prevent continued polarization in the country.

Playing the China Card
--------------


6. (C) The King said he understood Singh's reasoning and was
looking at options for the way forward, which would include
municipal elections, FM Saran continued. PM Singh reiterated
the need for fast action by the King, noting it was not in
India's best interest for the Maoists to gain power. The PM
added that there was evidence of links between Maoists and
Indian Naxalites. This was why India had provided massive
assistance to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) in the past and had
beefed up intelligence sharing with Nepal. India was
reluctant to provide security assistance, however, if the RNA
were to be used as an instrument of repression. Singh also
criticized Nepal's tendency to "wave the China or Pakistan
card," pointing out that such moves made it much harder to
engender any support for HMGN within India. The King pushed
back, however, saying that he had been forced to reach out to
China, given the cut-off of support by India, which was
treating Nepal as a pariah.

SAARC
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador Moriarty also raised the subject we have
heard from others in the GOI that India would welcome a U.S.
request for observer status at SAARC (septel). Saran said
that was definitely Indian policy and encouraged the U.S. to
submit an application in the SAARC meeting in Kathmandu and
to keep India informed so New Delhi could weigh in on the
behalf of the U.S. request.


8. (U) Ambassador Moriarty cleared this cable.


9. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
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