INDIAN INTEREST, AND HESITATION, ABOUT MARITIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000860

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHSA ETRD EWWT XD XO IN NSSP
SUBJECT: INDIAN INTEREST, AND HESITATION, ABOUT MARITIME
SECURITY INITIATIVES

Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Despite skepticism from some strategic
commentators, the Indian government continues to express
interest in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and
other maritime security programs, but will not join PSI
unless the matter of the Core Group is resolved. In the
latest signal of GOI support for PSI principles, MOD
Mukherjee flagged PSI as a necessary response to the threat
of global proliferation networks. On a related issue,
negotiations on Indian participation in the Container
Security Initiative (CSI) are at an advanced stage, with a
delegation scheduled to travel to Washington later in
February to formalize GOI involvement. CSI may be a useful
stepping-stone toward engaging with India on maritime
security issues, but we will not get India off the fence on
PSI until we clarify the status of Indian membership in the
Core Group. End Summary.

Continued Interest -- and Questions -- about PSI
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2. (U) In the most positive indication to date that the GOI
is interested in expanding its maritime security engagement
with the US, DefMin Pranab Mukherjee on January 29 stressed
the need for a multilateral mechanism to tackle the threat of
WMD proliferation. In comments at a major Institute for
Defense Studies and Analyses' (IDSA) conference, Mukherjee
recalled that India had interdicted a North Korean ship
carrying missile components in 1999, and how the intercept of
a ship carrying uranium enrichment equipment to Libya
eventually led to the unraveling of the AQ Khan network.
"The anxiety is that these instances could well be the tip of
the iceberg," he warned. "Some initiatives such as the PSI
have been mooted. These need to be examined in greater
detail. The underlying need for a consensual multilateral
effort cannot be denied," the DefMin concluded.


3. (C) In a recent meeting with PolCouns and Pol-MilOff, MEA
Additional Secretary (International Security) Meera Shankar
reiterated GOI interest in joining PSI, but not in
contravention of maritime conventions and not as a "junior
partner." According to Shankar, the GOI will not consider
participating in PSI until there is clarification on the
status of the Core Group, i.e., whether India will be
admitted to the Core Group or whether the Core Group is
disbanded altogether. "We recognize a convergence of
objectives on PSI: maritime security, preventing
proliferation to non-state actors," she said, "but we can't
accept discriminatory membership or contravening
international law."

Skeptics Weigh In
--------------


4. (C) The GOI's conditional interest in collaborating with
the US on maritime security programs such as PSI, the
Container Security Initiative (CSI),and the nascent Regional
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) contrasts with
strategists' skepticism about these initiatives. In a
January 31 article for the influential Delhi-based Observer
Research Foundation (ORF),Vijay Sakhuja noted that some
Asian nations have reacted differently to these initiatives,
reflecting concerns about their status vis-a-vis UNCLOS, the
legality of consequent interdictions, impact on trade,
sovereignty, and about a growing US presence in Asian waters.
"Although there is broad convergence on issues of common
security concerns (which) may even provide the impetus to
bring the Indian and US navies closer, India must be
conscious about regional security concerns and not get
muddled in American strategic moves in the region,
particularly with regard to PSI and RMSI," he cautioned. He
went on, however, to encourage support for CSI, to the extent
that it enables greater trade with the US.


5. (U) Prominent "Hindu" foreign affairs commentator
Siddharth Varadarajan has also pointed out that PSI does not
distinguish between WMD and missiles. "The US may have
accepted India's de facto nuclear status, but it remains a
vocal critic of the country's missile program. Unless
India's own missile status is formally accepted, it will be
difficult for New Delhi to participate in the aggressive
pursuit of international ships suspected of carrying missile
parts," he argued.

Repositioning India as a Nonproliferation Partner
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6. (U) Countering these critics, JNU Professor and frequent
Indo-US commentator Dr. C. Raja Mohan has argued that
participation in PSI and CSI may be an opportunity for India
to reposition itself as part of the global nonproliferation
solution. According to Mohan, PM Manmohan Singh wants India
to "negotiate purposefully on the terms under which it could
join the new global nonproliferation initiatives, including
PSI and CSI." "Getting on board the new global
non-proliferation arrangements should, therefore, be at the
top of India's diplomatic agenda. Meanwhile the Indian
nuclear discourse must...focus on the new acronyms like the
CSI and PSI, where the real action is," he concluded.

CSI as a Stepping Stone
--------------


7. (U) On February 1, "The Economic Times" reported that the
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) has decided to join the
Container Security Initiative (CSI) and a high-level meeting
of MEA, port, and customs officials will meet in New Delhi on
February 4 to finalize terms and conditions. A GOI
delegation is expected to travel to Washington later in
February to formalize Indian participation. In a February 2
conversation with PolCouns, MEA J/S (Americas) S. Jaishankar
expressed satisfaction with progress on CSI, but also
cautioned that MEA would need to deal with inevitable
Parliamentary questions about a "give away" of Indian
sovereignty. In this context, he added, it would be
important for India to negotiate a reciprocal CSI agreement
that allows the GOI to say its undertakings with Washington
are mirrored in Indian rights vis-a-vis US commerce.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) India's CSI interest is a useful stepping-stone
toward greater engagement on maritime security. We find GOI
concern about the possible conflict between PSI and
international maritime conventions something of a red
herring, given the extent to which other major maritime trade
nations have already considered and disposed of this issue --
and expect the same to happen here when the matter is treated
at the political level. The key to getting India off the
fence on PSI remains clarifying the status of Indian
membership in the Core Group. If we can resolve that, we
will be pushing on an open door to enlist India as a partner
in our global counterproliferation efforts.
MULFORD