Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI8247
2005-10-24 12:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

NEPAL, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRANIAN TERRORISM: FOREIGN

Tags:  PREL PTER MASS EAID ENRG PHUM IN NP AF PK CH CE BM TH 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 008247 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER MASS EAID ENRG PHUM IN NP AF PK CH CE BM TH
SUBJECT: NEPAL, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRANIAN TERRORISM: FOREIGN
SECRETARY DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES WITH U/S BURNS

SIPDIS

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 008247

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER MASS EAID ENRG PHUM IN NP AF PK CH CE BM TH
SUBJECT: NEPAL, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRANIAN TERRORISM: FOREIGN
SECRETARY DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES WITH U/S BURNS

SIPDIS

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. This message contains an ACTION REQUEST for SA. Please
see para 11.


2. (C) Summary: Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and his
regional Joint Secretaries told visiting U/S for Political
Affairs Nick Burns on October 22 that the GOI would announce
that day the opening of several points along the LOC for
earthquake-related transit between India and Pakistan. Saran
responded favorably to discussion of possible Indian
participation in an Afghan PRT, but pushed back on New
Delhi's responsibilities for pressing Iran over terrorism and
human rights. India remains very concerned with the
deteriorating political situation in Nepal and the rise of
religious extremism in Bangladesh (including growing ties to
groups in Southeast Asia),even as it sees a chance for
progress on long-running border disputes with Pakistan.
Saran expressed hope for peace and democratic elections in
Sri Lanka, while emphasizing concern for the LTTE's lack of
cooperation in the peace process. End Summary.

Nepal: Still Some Hope
--------------


3. (C) Saran, joined by much of his senior management team,
began his tour d'horizon with an overview of Nepal, stressing
that New Delhi greatly appreciates close consultations with
the US in responding to the problems there. India's
objectives remain aligned with those of the US, he
emphasized, including first, prevention of a Maoist takeover,
and second, restoration of multiparty democracy. Although
the "prospect is dismal," the GOI still hopes to see King
Gyanendra and political parties work together in a democratic
government that will then be able to resolve the Maoist
insurgency through a political process. New Delhi has "some

indications" that the King may be reassessing the situation,
and recognizing that his actions post-February 1 have not
been successful. Even close palace confidantes and
traditional backers have told Indian interlocutors that they
feel the King is now part of the problem and not the
solution, said Saran, and the Nepalese elites have been
working on their "Plan B," including taking savings out of
Nepal and purchasing homes around New Delhi under assumed
names.


4. (C) Political parties and civil society organizations are
likely to step up street demonstrations after the Tihar
holiday in November, Saran predicted. "Time is running out"
for the palace to reconcile with the parties, he observed,
pointing out that civil society had become more vocal at
protesting the King's actions than the political parties, and
the "republican sentiment" is growing among Nepalese. While
there is a risk the King would use the RNA to suppress the
demonstrations, Saran admitted, New Delhi would strongly
protest any such attempt to use the RNA in such a political
role. While the GOI has decided to stay engaged with the
monarch to continue to press for reconciliation with the
political parties, the King has on many occasions made the
right promises, but then done the opposite, Saran lamented,
pointing to recently enacted curbs on media freedom.

More Reported Arms Sales
--------------

5. (C) Gyanendra continues to try to break out of his
political isolation, Saran observed, commenting that the EU
troika statement was constructive, but that other states
including China and Pakistan appear to be willing to break
that isolation by selling arms and ammunition. Saran
highlighted a report from two days earlier that China planned
to sell 14,000 - 16,000 AK-47 rifles to the RNA, adding that
the GOI had raised arms sales with Islamabad and Beijing, but
would appreciate Washington doing the same. U/S Burns
responded positively. Early fears of RNA shortages of
ammunition have disappeared, Saran observed, partly as a
result of other suppliers providing ammunition, and partly
because the RNA has not taken the fight to the Maoists but
remains in its barracks.

Maoist Intentions?
--------------


6. (C) Saran observed that the Maoist cease-fire appeared to
be holding, and cited "indications" that the Maoist
leadership, having patched up the Bhattarai-Prachanda split,
may be inclined to extend the cease-fire, and eventually give
up their arms under UN auspices as part of a political
settlement. In the meantime, he added, they continue their
contacts with the political parties to work out the contours
of an eventual settlement. When U/S Burns expressed strong
USG concern over reports that top Maoist leaders were allowed
to live in India openly, Saran assured him that there was "no
question of a free run" for Nepalese Maoists in India, adding
that the GOI has arrested several Politburo members and other
top leaders even in the past few months. New Delhi has "no
hesitation" about curbing their activities as much as
possible, he explained, especially in light of GOI concerns
that Nepalese Maoists collaborate with Indian extremists.
However, he added, if the Maoists are willing to give up
violence, enter into a democratic process, and attempt to win
seats in elections free from intimidation, India would accept
their participation, following the same strategy New Delhi
has toward domestic extremists.

Iran: What Do Strategic Partners Do?
--------------


7. (C) U/S Burns forcefully spelled out serious US concerns
with Iran's behavior, outlining its long history of political
and financial support for terrorism from the 1979 Embassy
hostage-taking to present support for terrorism in Iraq. The
new hardline government is likely to increase the role of
religion in state affairs and lead to further crackdowns on
human rights and radicalization in its foreign policy. The
last five months of the EU-3 engagement on nuclear issues led
to disappointment, and Iran must recognize that with the
EU-3's credibility on the line, Tehran cannot walk away from
negotiations without repercussions. The USG hoped its
strategic allies would review their assumptions about Iran,
U/S Burns said, commenting that Washington relies on its
allies and friends that have diplomatic relations with Tehran
to let Iran know "how misguided its policies are." He
stressed that the international community needs to use its
resources to check Iran's nuclear ambitions.


8. (C) Saran listened to USG concerns about Iran's history
and behavior, but said India's perspectives and concerns were
different. Although the US-India strategic relationship is
growing, and India opposes Iran's nuclear ambitions,
Washington should not expect New Delhi to follow suit in all
areas. India will weight US views more significantly as the
strategic partnership moves forward, but there will be issues
on which New Delhi has different policies "because of our
strategic compulsions," Saran said. Noting that India has
had to deal with fundamentalist regimes in its neighborhood
before, Saran stated that New Delhi believes that isolating
Iran would only lead to further radicalization. J/S Dilip
Sinha observed that after an initial period of uncertainty
from the new and inexperienced Iranian leadership, the
Ahmadinejad regime is perhaps becoming "more moderate,"
citing as evidence the return of Rafsanjani to the leadership
group.

Afghanistan: We're Involved, Why Not the Russians?
-------------- --------------


9. (C) The Undersecretary said that the US and India should
have more dialogue on Afghanistan. Although not yet US
policy, he suggested that India might usefully be involved
with a PRT in Afghanistan. U/S Burns explained the evolving
post-Bonn framework for US engagement in Afghanistan, noting
the expanding role of NATO in security operations across the
country. He also previewed NATO intentions to establish a
formal partnership with Afghanistan modeled on the
Partnership for Peace (PFP) with former Soviet-bloc states,
arguing that such a partnership is a logical extension of
NATO's increasing role in Afghanistan. The USG would be
asking European nations to do more in the future, he said.
Responding to Saran's question about Russian and Chinese
reactions to a NATO partnership, U/S Burns stated that the US
does not discuss Afghanistan much with Beijing, but that
Moscow should have no complaint, as Russia was a founding
member of the PFP. U/S Burns also reviewed the Secretary's
recent trip to Central Asia, noting the agreements with
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for military facilities, but not
permanent bases.


10. (C) Saran noted that he would accompany the Foreign
Minister to Moscow on October 27 and would be discussing
regional issues including Afghanistan. He said New Delhi
would favor greater Russian and Chinese participation rather
than seeing them sidelined as NATO's role expands. Our goal
should be to "maintain the international consensus on
Afghanistan that existed after 9/11," he suggested. U/S
Burns welcomed an increased role, but pointed out that the
Russians have a "credibility gap" among Afghans, and the
Chinese are not doing "one tenth of what we are." Saran
emphasized India's centuries-old ties with Afghanistan and
desire to remain strongly engaged in reconstruction, noting
"we are putting our money where our mouth is." He seemed to
agree with U/S Burns' point that future international
assistance could be more efficiently managed through a
central coordinator for multilateral assistance instead of
sectoral leaders. New Delhi also strongly supports
Afghanistan's participation in SAARC, Saran said, noting that
Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah recently sent a formal
request for inclusion to Pakistan's Foreign Minister Kasuri
(the current SAARC chair),and that India would support the
request at November's SAARC summit.

11. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Saran conveyed a GOI request for
Central Bureau of Investigation access, if in US custody, to
Akhtar Usmani and Mansoor Akhtar, two former Taliban
officials wanted for questioning in India regarding the
hijacked IC 814 flight. Please provide guidance to respond
to this request.

Pakistan: Progress on Sir Creek and Siachen
--------------


12. (C) Saran informed the delegation that India and
Pakistan had made recent progress on border talks in the
Siachen glacier and Sir Creek regions. Islamabad had agreed
to a joint survey of the "vertical section" of the Sir Creek
border as a way to narrow the differences in positions,
similar to a helpful survey done earlier on the "horizontal
section." Additionally, India and Pakistan have agreed to
discuss options for a maritime boundary, beginning from the
seaward side, in order to reduce the uncertainty in maritime
borders that remains the most problematic outcome of the
disagreement on the land boundary terminus at Sir Creek.


13. (C) The main difference on Siachen remains the issue of
recording the current positions of forces before a
withdrawal, Saran stated, as Pakistan preferred only to
record the post-withdrawal positions, and demarcate a zone of
disengagement. New Delhi wants a mutually-agreed document
recording the current positions, and "it will take more time"
to settle the details, he said, but Pakistan agreed in
principle to recording the positions at the last discussion.
The two nations also agreed to have no activity in the zone
of disengagement without pre-notification following the
withdrawal, and further discussions on extending the Line of
Control (LOC). "I think we'll have some movement" on both
boundary areas, Saran concluded.

Quake Relief
--------------


14. (C) Saran and his deputies outlined Indian assistance to
Pakistan including 8500 blankets, 600 tents, 22 tons of
medical supplies, 10 tons of plastic sheets, and USD 500,000
in private assistance (with more to follow). Islamabad has
requested additional medicine, tents, and blankets, he said,
and India expects to send another consignment of tents and
blankets soon. New Delhi planned to announce that day that
several points on the LOC would be opened for quake-related
civilian travel, and could serve as points for relief
supplies to transit. Additionally, India has allowed
international organizations to purchase supplies in India and
use the border crossing between Amritsar and Lahore to send
them to Pakistan.

Bangladesh: More Worries
--------------


15. (C) Observing a convergence in Washington's and New
Delhi's assessment of Bangladesh, Saran outlined Indian
concerns that the BDG is still in denial about the extent to
which participants in the ruling government support violent
extremism, preferring to relegate jihadist activities to a
problem of law and order, or to blame the opposition or
India. The GOI has "no doubts" about ISI links to the
extremist forces in Bangladesh, Saran stated. The arrest of
Mufti Abdul Hannan of Harkatul Jihad in Bangladesh showed
links to Harkat al-Din in Pakistan, Saran said, and his
interrogation revealed ties to partner in the government JEI.


16. (C) Beyond Bangladesh and Pakistan, Saran reported, the
GOI has seen links between Bangladeshi extremists and
terrorist organizations operating in Southeast Asia. The
Government of Thailand has shared information with the GOI
showing Bangladeshi ties to militant Muslim groups operating
in Southern Thailand, he stated. Bangladesh's inclusion in
this "international network" and its turn away from a
liberal, open strain of Islam is a "huge concern" to New
Delhi. Using the strongest language we have yet heard from
the GOI, Saran said that New Delhi is very concerned about
the "determined attempt to eliminate moderate and secular
voices" in Bangladesh through the "politics of assassination
and intimidation." The August 17 blasts were a message from
the Islamic extremists to the government, he speculated, to
say "don't try to take action against us," as they have
proved their ability to cause havoc in Bangladesh. The US is
"equally worried" about Bangladesh, U/S Burns responded,
relating the stiff conversation that the Secretary had with
Bangladesh's Foreign Minister at UNGA. J/S Mohan Kumar
agreed with U/S Burns' focus on Bangladeshi elections,
commenting that electoral reform in Bangladesh is critical.


17. (C) In addition to Bangladesh's domestic extremism, New
Delhi is frustrated by the continued presence of anti-India
insurgents operating from across the border, Saran stated.
The recent Foreign Secretary meetings went well, and the GOI
hopes for better cooperation with Dhaka on illegal
immigration, cross-border insurgents, and "economic
complementarity," Saran said, mentioning the proposed
trilateral gas pipeline from Burma, and GOI encouragement of
Indian investment in Bangladesh, including a 2 billion dollar
project from Tata Corporation. The GOI plans to attend the
November SAARC summit, notwithstanding "deep" concerns about
the security situation in Dhaka.

Sri Lanka: Hope for Peaceful Solution
--------------


18. (C) Saran noted that India is in favor of a negotiated
political settlement in Sri Lanka but expressed concern that
the LTTE is not fully cooperating. New Delhi is committed to
the unity of Sri Lanka and a peace settlement must recognize
the principles of democracy, not reflect LTTE dictatorship,
he said. India believes that it bears some responsibility
for the Tamil community and the GOI has started small
community development projects in northern Sri Lanka. The
international community needs to take more aggressive action
in monitoring LTTE activities and Saran wanted assurances
that the USG monitors the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization
(TRO),an LTTE front in the US. Saran also noted that
Islamic fundamentalism is growing in eastern Sri Lanka. He
hoped that elections in December would be successful, and
suggested continued monitoring of the peace settlement in the
meantime. It is not clear if the LTTE is committed to the
cease-fire, he observed.


19. (C) PDAS Don Camp reassured Saran that the USG continues
to watch LTTE activities in the US. Nonetheless, the TRO,
unlike the LTTE, is not on the terrorist list; thus the USG
cannot stop financial flows from them. Camp explained that
USAID contact with the LTTE is limited to interaction
necessary to deliver humanitarian aid to Tiger-controlled
territory. U/S Burns noted that the USG is disappointed that
the EU did not designate the LTTE as a terrorist
organization. Saran welcomed the EU's recent statements on
Sri Lanka but questioned Norway's continued interest in the
peace process since the GON did not participate in the New
York Core Group meeting. U/S Burns responded that the USG
would be surprised if Norway did not try to maintain its
leading role in conflict resolution, and expressed
disappointment that India was not permitted to attend the
Core Group meeting. The USG would welcome an Indian role, he
said, but noted that the Group is not as effective as hoped.

China
--------------


20. (C) Saran did not elaborate on India's relations with
China, other than to comment that Beijing is uneasy with
US-India cooperation in Afghanistan. Saran expressed GOI
interest in continuing discussion on China.


21. (U) Participants in the meetings:

GOI
---

FS Shyam Saran
J/S (Americas) S Jaishankar
J/S (International Security) Hamid Ali Rao
J/S (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) Dilip Sinha
J/S (Nepal and Bhutan) Ranjit Rae
J/S (East Asia) Ashok Kantha
J/S (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives) Mohan Kumar
PolCouns Designate (Indian Embassy Washington) Renu Pall
Director (Americas) Gaitri Kumar
Deputy Secretary (Americas) Santosh Jha
Undersecretary (Americas) Raj Srivastava, notetaker

US
--
U/S Nick Burns
Ambassador David Mulford
SA PDAS Don Camp
DCM Bob Blake
PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt
P Staff Toby Bradley
AMBX Laura Taylor-Kale, notetaker
Poloff Jai Nair, notetaker


22. (U) U/S Burns has cleared this message.


23. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
MULFORD