NEPALESE MAOISTS STILL TOP CONCERN FOR GOI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 007505

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER MASS KDEM IN NP PK CH
SUBJECT: NEPALESE MAOISTS STILL TOP CONCERN FOR GOI

REF: NEW DELHI 6411

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: The GOI still sees the Maoists as its chief
concern in the ongoing crisis in Nepal, MEA told us on
September 27. However, the GOI believes the cease-fire could
be a sign of progress toward an ultimate political solution,
if the Maoists prove sincere in their professed commitment to
democracy. New Delhi assesses that the military balance
between the RNA and Maoists remains the same since the
February takeover thanks to the RNA's procurement of
ammunition from Pakistan and China. The MEA expressed
concern that meetings between the Maoists and UN officials
could lend the insurgents undue international legitimacy.
End Summary.

Maoists Still the Problem, but Some Hope?
--------------


2. (C) MEA Joint Secretary (North) Ranjit Rae told PolCouns
and Poloff on September 27 that the GOI recognizes the risk
of legitimizing the Nepalese Maoists through contacts and
efforts to include them in settlement discussions. India and
the US are "equally concerned" about the Maoists, Rae said,
but we must recognize that the insurgents must be included in
a political settlement. The "number one problem" in Nepal is
the Maoist threat, Rae observed, but the King has
superimposed on top of this the challenge of restoring
democracy. India is looking for a solution that will solve
both problems, which will require the participation of all
parties.


3. (C) New Delhi has consistently passed the message that
the Maoists cannot win militarily, Rae added, and that the
only way for them to achieve progress on their social and
economic agenda is to give up violence and accept democracy.
India uses its leverage over the Maoists in the form of
leaders in custody and border district enforcement actions to
apply a "carrots and stick" approach, and could crack down
further if the Maoists do not give up violence.
Additionally, Rae said, the GOI emphasizes to the Nepalese
political parties that they must insist that the Maoists join
the parties' agenda for democracy, and not the other way.


4. (C) The Maoist cease-fire should be seen as an outgrowth
of the parties' efforts to talk with the Maoists, Rae
suggested. While it is too early to tell if Maoist
statements accepting democratic government are genuine, the
way things are developing is "not unsatisfactory" at this
point. If the parties can rally enough popular support to
set the agenda in discussions with the Maoists, the King may
see the writing on the wall and realize he must accommodate
democracy, Rae speculated. On the other hand, he added, New
Delhi worries that the King may have taken the wrong message
from his "walk about" in Kathmandu, concluding that he has
sufficient popular backing to take more "adventurous" steps
to crack down on political parties.

RNA-Maoist Balance
--------------


5. (C) The security balance between the Maoists and the RNA
looks "pretty much the same" to New Delhi since the royal
takeover, Rae reported. Earlier concerns about RNA
ammunition shortfalls appear to have eased since Nepal has
been able to procure ammunition from Chinese and Pakistani
sources. Although the RNA seems to be in a financial crunch,
Rae said, it is attempting to purchase Mi-17 helicopters from
a Kazakh company in what appears to be a murky financial deal
involving a Kazakh business entity with investments in a
telecom venture run by the King's family members. Following
the meeting, Under Secretary (Nepal) Manu Mahawar requested
that the USG look into another reported line of credit
offered to a Pakistani company to provide additional 5.56 mm
ammunition for the Indian-made INSAS rifles. PolCouns took
note of the issue and asked if this was in addition to
previous lines of credit (reftel). Mahawar undertook to
provide further details.


6. (C) PolCouns drew attention to continued speculation
about a meeting between UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and the
Maoists, asking for India's take on the UN role. Rae
acknowledged that Brahimi and the Maoists had been in contact
via e-mail, but indicated he was out of the loop on any
further contacts. He expressed concern that the Maoists
could exploit these UN feelers to project an undue impression
of international legitimacy.

Comment: Maoists Still Top Worry
--------------


7. (C) In light of continued speculation about Indian
agencies' contacts with the Maoists, Rae's assertion that New
Delhi still sees the threat of Maoist domination as its top
concern is reassuring. That said, no new ideas other than
wishing and hoping that King will climb back from his limb
emerged from our conversation.


8. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
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